SPECIAL EDITION
MIGRATION, RACISM AND MULTICULTURALISM

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Book Reviews
European Immigration: A Sourcebook. Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas
Many Middle Passages – Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World.
Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus and Marcus Rediker (eds)
plus
Borders, Migration, Security and Trafficking Dilemmas:
Current Debates and Cypriot Challenges
(an extended review essay addressing major debates and recent publications)
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Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus and Marcus Rediker (eds)  
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Migrants demonstrating for their rights
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Mediterranean Voices Project (Euromed Heritage Project)
Rethinking Migration, Discrimination and Multiculturalism in a Post-tourist Society

This special issue is devoted to interconnected issues that are key debates for the twenty-first century for Cyprus and other European societies and beyond. Issues relating to migration, integration, discrimination and multiculturalism are crucial academic as well as policy matters at the heart of the current political debates. The aim of this special issue is to bring together different dimensions that relate to one or more of the above themes in order to unpack them, taking into account the state of the art debates.

If one reflects on the history of migration to Cyprus over the past thirty years, the social, economic, cultural and political transformations that have shaped the current landscape are uncovered. Cyprus has metamorphosed from an agricultural economy to a kind of ‘post-industrial society’ based on tourism and services without ever really going through an ‘industrial’ phase. Although the key drivers for this transformation were the factors of production, ‘embattled labour’, as one scholar called the labour of Cyprus, was at the centre of the deep changes recorded: the massive economic development, particularly since the 1970s has allowed Cyprus to improve its standard of living and join the EU. The Cypriots – primarily displaced persons – originally made up the labour force that transfigured society.

In 1989, the Government, under pressure from employers, decided to change its policy. In the 1990s the slowdown in the growth of the economy in comparison to the late 1970s and 1980s, together with the rise of inflation, formed the basis for the abandonment of restrictive labour immigration policies practised up to 1990. In contrast to the restrictive policies, 1990 saw a radical change in government policy. For the first time migrant labour was allowed to enter Cyprus on a much larger scale in order to meet labour shortages in those sectors of the economy that were no longer popular with Cypriots. The reversal of the policy on ‘foreign’ labour was explained as the result of excessive demand and the near full exploitation of the indigenous labour supply: pressure from employers and the fear of inflation resulting from wage indexation made the change of policy possible. Other global factors that have influenced the policy to open up the Cyprus labour market are the following: geopolitical regional changes, such as the collapse of Beirut as centre of the Middle East, the collapse of the regimes of eastern Europe (with the resulting ‘release’ of investment in financial services), and the Gulf war; a world-wide growth in tourism and migration flows. Globalisation-related trends and arguments in conjunction with the socio-economic orientation of consecutive Cypriot Governments are the main reasons for increasing migration to Cyprus. The island is not atypical in southern Europe, who “function as the ‘entrance hall’ to the EU” as
Anthias and Lazaridis mention (1999, p. 3), but can be compared to some South East Asian countries which are also undergoing seminal trends of development.

We can speak of Cyprus as a de facto divided ‘post-tourist society’ in the sense that it is shaped by the rapid ‘tertialisation’ of the economy and society based on a ‘mass tourism model’: the visitors to Cyprus outnumber the country’s residents by a ratio of 3:1. The economic, social and cultural effects of this are profound.

In November 2006, a session of the Cyprus Sociological Association Conference (in honour of Michael Attalides) took place, entitled: “Social Change and Urbanisation: Does the Impact on Migration (external and internal) on Cypriot Society require a new ‘Cypriot Consciousness’?” At that conference it was reflected upon how the transformation had occurred. In 1981, Michael Attalides’ study, Social Change and Urbanisation, illustrated the trends taking place up to that point, but since then, massive population mutations have occurred mapping the sharp changes we have witnessed over the past thirty years. Some of the key debates that are included in this special issue draw on, and develop, the themes articulated in that interesting session. The debates have, however, moved on to exploit the wealth of new research that has taken place in Cyprus in recent years around the topics of migration, integration, multiculturalism and combating discrimination.

At a cultural level, during the 1980s and 1990s there were public debates over ‘Cypriot consciousness’, which were primarily shaped around the terrible encounter of ethnic conflict, the invasion and occupation and refugees’ experiences. In the north, Turkish-Cypriots who, at least temporarily, had possibly felt relief at the end of their exclusion from public life and an existence under siege in the enclaves, then faced the reality of living in a sealed authoritarian regime not recognised by anyone but Turkey. Everyday life was dominated by Turkey as the ailing economy reflected the fate of the outmoded nationalist and anti-democratic leadership of Rauf Denkash; thus a new Cypriot consciousness emerged in the north as the way forward to meet the challenges of a re-unified federal country in the EU. This dream is yet to be realised.

Be that as it may, in the south the debates on identity that began before the arrival of migrant workers and continued after the arrival of migrants, failed to grasp initially the profound effect that migration would have on Cypriot society in less than twenty years. Today, it is estimated that there are about 160,000 third country migrants and 60,000 EU citizens who reside in the Republic, whilst there is probably a similar number of non-Cypriots to the north of the barbed wire. Migration has had a massive impact on society: economic, social, and cultural. Since 1990, Cyprus, a small country divided by ethnic conflict, has evolved from being a net exporter of migrants into a country of immigration destination. An economy based on tourism requires labour to service this tourism.
The arrival and presence of migrants, together with the island's accession to the EU in 2004 and the failure so far to resolve the Cyprus problem, are factors that have shaped the institutional and political climate since. Moreover, Cypriot society is faced with new challenges such as problems of racism and discrimination towards migrants as well as other vulnerable groups. The question of multiculturalism is now a vital element in educational reform; questions around hybrity and inter-ethnic marriages have emerged. Furthermore, there are questions that require scrutiny of the structural, socio-economic and political institutions to address discriminatory patterns. Accession to the EU has brought about new challenges and a new institutional framework demanded by the EU Acquis to combat discrimination, to integrate migrants and to effectively combat ‘illegal migration’. Finally, questions relating to the population, settlement and migration in the northern part of the country require special attention as they impact directly on the unresolved Cyprus problem.

In the past The Cyprus Review has dealt with some aspects relating to matters that are discussed in the current issue. However, this is the first time that a special issue has been devoted to the subject and the editors hope that this volume will contribute to the debates at an academic, research and policy level.

This issue begins with an article by Cetta Mainwaring who looks at the “edge of exclusion” and places the Cypriot migration experience and the changes recorded, in a comparative perspective with another island economy: although about thirty times smaller in size, Malta faces similar dilemmas and the debates seem kindred to Cyprus.

Next, we have Elena Papamichael’s article, which unpacks the practices of educational multiculturalism by exploring Greek Cypriot teachers’ understandings of “intercultural education” in what is apparently an increasingly diverse society.

The next paper by Nicos Trimikliniotis and Corina Demetriou considers the socio-legal dimensions of the new institutional framework that has resulted from the transposition of the anti-discrimination Acquis (the EU law and principles). The article evaluates the current anti-discrimination law and institutional framework in the Republic of Cyprus. Following on, Mihaela Fulas-Souroulla’s article examines questions of marriage and migration by exploring Greek Cypriot representations and attitudes towards inter-societal marriage.

The final paper in the article section examines the population question in the northern part of Cyprus. The population issue is a major political, social, economic and cultural affair that affects inter-communal relations and attitudes, particularly as regards the negotiations for a settlement. It is also a major political issue in current diplomatic debates in Turkish-Cypriot politics. Mete Hatay’s paper discusses how
discourses on persons from Turkey are ingrained in Orientalism, as the rhetoric of
the ‘local’ expresses a deep-rooted xenophobia in Turkish-Cypriot society. A very
different perspective on the same subject is offered by Muharrem Faiz in his
commentary paper. He illustrates that the discourses on the population issue must
be located within the context of a “radical demographic change” that can only be
explained by structural factors over-determined by Turkey as well as super-
exploitation of irregular workers in a capitalistic system.

The final commentary article by Nicos Philippou returns to the south to look at
migrants, social space and visibility, and explores the transformations undergoing
(Greek)Cypriot society over recent years: migrants are part of our very own social
landscape, performing vital functions of our society and economy.

Finally there are three book review essays by Floya Anthias, Nicos Trimikliniotis
and Hauke Dorsch that examine some relevant migration books.

Nicos Trimikliniotis

Note
Migration in Southern Europe’ in Anthias, F. and Lazaridis, G. (eds.), Into the Margins:
Exclusion and Migration in Southern Europe. Avebury, Ashgate, pp. 1-12.
A sea front in Larnaca

© Photographer: Fatema Islam
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Mediterranean Voices Project (Euromed Heritage Project)
ON THE EDGE OF EXCLUSION:
THE CHANGING NATURE OF MIGRATION
IN CYPRUS AND MALTA

Cetta Mainwaring*

Abstract
At the heart of the Mediterranean crossroads, lie two islands that bridge North and South, islands that will undoubtedly continue to experience flows of migrants and refugees, like the ones that have caused such a furore during the last decade. Malta and Cyprus were admitted into the European Union (EU) in 2004, a fact that has greatly affected the type of migration they are both experiencing and the related policy responses. Moreover, they lie between the shores of rich Europe, with its declining birth rates and consequent labour shortages, and poor Africa with its burgeoning jobless population, visible demarcations of the North-South divide and the related South-North migration routes into the EU. Their geographic location now means that they are lucky enough to be considered part of “Europe”, but must also bear the consequences as their borders have been redefined as external EU borders in need of fortification and control.

This paper is a comparative analysis of how Malta and Cyprus are coping with their new migration realities as member states on the European Union’s southern periphery. I will first discuss what the two islands have in common and where they differ in terms of migration and the responses to this relatively new phenomenon for countries historically known as countries of emigration. Where can lessons learnt be shared and what does each of these countries have to gain from the experience of the other? This discussion will be framed within the accession of the two states to the EU. Although part of the rich club, they are also minor political players within the Union and therefore hold little power to affect the type of migration and asylum policies they are obliged to enact as member states. Indeed, as members, they are now not simply facing new forms of migration, but have also been placed in the difficult position of acting as gatekeepers. In this context, EU policies and directives have impelled them to adopt increasingly restrictive migration policies.

Keywords: Cyprus, Malta, European Union, migration, migration controls, externalisation, asylum, irregular migration, refugees, mixed flows.
Introduction

On 1 May 2004, Cyprus and Malta became two of the newest members to join the European Union (EU), along with eight Central and Eastern European countries, in the biggest enlargement the EU has experienced, both in terms of population and landmass. In the run-up to the 2004 ‘big bang’ enlargement, the focus around Europe was mainly on the possibilities of mass migration from Eastern Europe. As might have been expected, migration projections into or out of the new southern European members were not considered to be as significant. Malta and Cyprus are of course small countries, with populations of 401,880 and 788,457 respectively. Moreover, the numbers of migrants and refugees arriving in Malta and Cyprus are small, if compared unequivocally to other countries in Southern Europe.

They are latecomers to the migration phenomenon experienced by Southern European countries, which transitioned earlier from countries of emigration to those of immigration. The academic literature written on this evolution in Southern Europe is significant, but has focused primarily on larger countries, such as Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. This sudden transformation has raised social, economic and legal issues for which administrations have not been prepared. Unfortunately, host populations have also seen an increase in hostility towards non-EU nationals, who are perceived as a threat to the national culture and economy. Although Malta and Cyprus are largely absent in this academic literature, they have recently become much more vocal in EU fora while protesting the “unfair burden” being placed on them in terms of migration as new member states on external borders.

Indeed, as new EU members, the two islands have had their borders redefined as external borders in need of fortification and control. Located on the EU’s southern rim, which has been characterised by some as the “soft, vulnerable underbelly of Fortress Europe”, these countries are considered a liability due to the porous nature of their borders and the large informal sectors in their economies. Moreover, the two islands find themselves at the crossroads between Europe, the Middle East and Africa, strategically placed in a position to either bridge or divide the Mediterranean region.

As dead bodies wash up on the shores of the Mediterranean, it is clear that a tragic human crisis with far-reaching social and political implications is at stake. What light can these uniquely situated islands shed on the recent debates over migration to Europe? Located along the EU’s southern periphery, they are important with regard to the continued attempts in Europe to externalise asylum processes and focus on short-term restrictive policies, rather than protective, human rights based policies. In this context, EU policies and directives have impelled Malta and Cyprus to adopt increasingly restrictive migration policies in line with their new roles as members on the external border. This paper first looks in turn at each of these
countries and the new migration realities they face. Then, trends across the two cases will be highlighted, with a focus on the public and media discourses surrounding migration, the affects of EU membership in general, and the specific affects of the emphasis within the EU on externalising migration controls, as well as asylum processes.

Migration Realities of Mediterranean Island States

During the twentieth century, large numbers of civilians from both Malta and Cyprus sought better opportunities in richer countries such as the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa. Indeed, the high unemployment levels on the islands after World War II caused many to emigrate in the post-war period, encouraged in part by schemes such as subsidised steamship fares. Cyprus and Malta were then British colonies, but gained independence in 1960 and 1964, respectively, although the Queen remained Malta’s head of state until 1974 and British troops were not expelled from the island until 1979. Although these two former British colonies experienced similar histories of emigration, the end of the twentieth century brought with it different immigration patterns and realities for the two islands.

Cyprus

Although Cypriot migration has a long history, the divisions between the two constitutionally recognised communities and the events of 1974 dramatically increased the number of emigrants leaving the island. Since independence, the country has struggled with the ethnic tensions between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, who make up 82% and 18% of the population, respectively. This tension, culminating in the forced division of the island in 1974, has been explicitly linked to demographic concerns and migration to the island, a tension exacerbated by the Turkish government’s encouragement of the settlement of its nationals in northern Cyprus.7

The coup carried out by the Greek junta and the subsequent Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus dealt a severe blow to the Cypriot economy. With a 37% loss of the island’s territory to Turkey, GDP fell by 18% between 1973 and 1975 (falling to 842 million Cypriot pounds), while unemployment increased by 30% (reaching 22.5% in 1975).8 In spite of this devastating poverty, economic growth followed in the 1980s and 90s primarily due to mass tourism, the expansion of the tertiary sector, and considerable monetary investments from refugees fleeing the Lebanese civil war. What has been referred to as an “economic miracle” was made possible in part by the cheap labour supplied by the 200,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees who were expelled from the northern part of the island after the Turkish invasion.9 Thus during this time, Cyprus had little need for migrant labour from other countries and maintained restrictive immigration policies.
However, in the late 1980s, the economic growth on the island led to a demand for labour that exceeded the supply of the native population. Therefore, in 1990, Cyprus abandoned its restrictive policies and started granting a large number of temporary work visas to foreigners. Today, these work permits are granted for a period of four years, and are attached to a specific employer within a sector that is deemed to have labour shortages that Cypriots cannot or will not fill. Until recently, the permits were granted for six years, a time period was shortened in response to concern that an EU directive on the long-term residence of third-country nationals could allow for permanent settlement after five years. The introduction of this legislation in 1990 resulted in an increase of documented migrant workers (excluding domestic workers) from 545 in 1990 to 10,370 in 1996 and to 30,225 in 2005. In addition, there were an estimated 15,863 migrant workers employed as domestic labourers in 2005. Although the majority of migrants work as domestic workers, the service industry (including tourism), manufacturing, agriculture and construction industries also attract a large amount of migrant labour.

The changes in patterns of migration to Cyprus in the early 1990s were also affected by political events occurring internationally. The break-up of the Soviet Union resulted in labour migration from countries that were previously part of the USSR. Most notably, Pontic Greeks migrated from the Caucasus region, as they were entitled to Greek nationality, which allowed them to immigrate to Cyprus without the normal bureaucratic formalities. Unsurprisingly, conflicts such as the Gulf War in the early 90s, ongoing turmoil in Palestine, and the War in the Balkans during this decade contributed to the flow of migrants, as well as political and economic refugees arriving in Cyprus. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the resulting mayhem and suffering has also added to the number of asylum seekers as Iraqis have fled their homeland.

**Irregular Migrants**

In 2005, the total number of non-Cypriot residents, including irregular migrants, was estimated to be between 80,000 and 100,000, or approximately 10-13% of the population. The figures for irregular migrants are inherently difficult to obtain, but are thought to be between 10,000 and 30,000. Other estimates range even more widely, from 6,000 to 45,000. These irregular migrants include people from China, and from countries in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, ex-Yugoslavia, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, among others), in Southeast Asia (especially women who are employed as domestic workers from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan), and in the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, to name a few).

As is the case in wider Europe, most irregular migrants in Cyprus are ‘overstayers’, people who overstay their visas or people who work outside the realm of their visas, a phenomenon previously prevalent amongst overseas students in
Cyprus. During the 1990s, irregular migrants also arrived in Cyprus by sea from countries in the Middle East, such as Lebanon. However, the demilitarisation of the “green line” dividing the island in April 2003 has meant that irregular migrants can now move more easily into the southern part of Cyprus, and thus into the EU, by crossing this division. The partial lifting of the restrictions in movement has also allowed several thousand Turkish-Cypriots to cross the demarcation zone every day in order to work in the southern part, primarily in the construction industry. The government claims that at least 80% of all irregular migrants in Cyprus arrive by crossing the “green line”, a claim that ignores the reality of ‘overstayers’ and feeds ethnic tension on the island.18

Asylum
As the EU’s third smallest member, Cyprus has also recently experienced an increase in asylum applications. Between 2002 and 2003, the annual total increased by 363%; while in Europe as a whole it fell by 20%.19 In 2007, the total number of submitted asylum applications was 6,790 – not a large number in absolute terms. However, if one takes the size of the population into account, Cyprus received the largest number of asylum applicants per 1,000 inhabitants out of 51 European and non-European industrialised countries in 2007.20 The number of applicants in 2007, if taken on a per capita basis, is equivalent to over 500,000 applicants in the UK and France (where the actual number of asylum applicants for 2007 were 27,900 and 19,160, respectively), and over 700,000 in Germany (19,160 applicants).21 Obviously, such comparisons are limited in their usefulness and may be used unscrupulously by governments to sensationalise the issues around migration and asylum and to shirk their responsibilities of protection.22 They are used here to illustrate that the relatively small number of asylum claims made in Cyprus (and Malta, discussed below) when compared to other EU member states, may be viewed in a different light if one takes into account population size, population density or GDP.

In 2005 and 2006, Syrian nationals made the largest number of asylum applications, between 15% and 18%. Over the past five years, other nationalities that have been amongst the most numerous have been Sri Lankan, Georgian, Bangladeshi, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, Ukrainian, Iraqi and Russian.23 In 2003, Cyprus experienced firsthand an idiosyncrasy of the asylum system as the number of Bangladeshi and Pakistani asylum applications soared unexpectedly, the overwhelming majority coming from students who were on legitimate student visas. The principal reason for applying for asylum seemed to be that asylum seekers are given the right to access the labour market, while at this time people holding student visas were not. These applications were rejected, and as an example to others falsely claiming asylum, some of the students were deported back to their countries of origin without being able to finish their studies. Much stricter controls were also implemented for the granting of student visas. And perhaps more progressively,
Cyprus adopted an EU directive in 2007\(^{24}\) that allows third-country nationals to work while pursuing their studies through an amendment to the Aliens and Immigration Law, which now entitles such students to work on a part-time basis for up to 20 hours during term and 40 hours during holidays.\(^{25}\)

Having previously relied on support from the UNHCR for the processing of asylum applications, and often the resettling of recognised refugees, Cyprus was faced with the task of putting in place new national asylum systems (which began operating in January 2002) in order to comply with EU legislation before joining the Union.\(^{26}\) As in Malta, the increase in asylum claims over the past five years caught the authorities unprepared and created severe delays in processing claims, delays which last up to two or three years.\(^{27}\) Low recognition rates are another feature of the new Cypriot asylum system. Since 2004, many more asylum seekers have received temporary protection than refugee status, although the rates still remain low – between 1.6% and 3% – even with the inclusion of those granted temporary protection. In 2005, the Cypriot government, as well as the UNHCR, pointed to false claims as a reason for the low rates of recognition for refugees, which were less than one per cent for the previous year.\(^{28}\) However, the rate has remained below one per cent in subsequent years.\(^{29}\)

Asylum seekers are in principle not detained while their application is being processed and are given permission to work. However, Amnesty International reports that out of the 12,000 asylum seekers in Cyprus in May 2007, only 300 held work permits. They report similar finding for the government’s monthly stipend of 480 dollars afforded to asylum seekers: only 350 asylum seekers received it in 2007.\(^{30}\) There are also reports that asylum seekers are being denied the right to work and access to healthcare, housing and social benefits. Most therefore resort to trying to make a living by working in the informal sector, where they are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.\(^{31}\)

Detention is also a reality as failed asylum seekers and irregular migrants may be arrested and kept in the Central Prison in Nicosia or other police stations around the country. Amnesty International reported that in September and October 2007, detainees in the infamous Block 10 – a two-storey building within the Prison in Nicosia, which serves as a detention centre for rejected asylum seekers under deportation orders – several of whom had been held for over 30 months, protested against the length and conditions of their detention.\(^{32}\) Unfortunately, the government does not officially report the number of failed asylum seekers and migrants held and the length of their detention.

The Cyprus Problem and the EU

Migration to Cyprus is often associated with the ‘Cyprus problem’, the division of the island that occurred after the Turkish invasion in 1974. The settlement of non-
nationals is viewed within this framework as dangerous for the demographic character of the island. Moreover, restrictive migration policies are defended as necessary in order to protect the fabric of the nation, which is already under threat from the northern occupiers. This line of reasoning is certainly encouraged by the fact that Turkey has successfully promoted the settlement of Turkish nationals in northern Cyprus, a policy that has deepened the conflict on the island.33

The new realities of migration to the island have also been politicised within the discourse of the ‘Cyprus problem’. For example, the claim that as many as 97% of all irregular migrants reach Cyprus by travelling through the occupied northern part appears opportunistic, as it disassociates the phenomenon from the new economic and political realities in Cyprus, as well as more globally, that encourage this type of migration. As has already been noted, many irregular migrants have in fact overstayed their visas rather than entered irregularly, a phenomenon fuelled by the government’s reluctance to grant long-term residence status.34

The division on the island is further complicated by Cyprus’ new status as a member of the European Union. EU membership was previously hailed as the answer to the division of the island, but was not realised when Greek-Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan as excessively pro-Turkish in a referendum in 2004. Nevertheless, the island as a whole was accepted into the Union, with the acquis communautaire suspended temporarily in the northern part, since the ‘TRNC’ is not recognised by the EU.35 Therefore the “green line” is not technically considered an external EU border, although it is treated as one politically, as is clear in the Cypriot government’s rhetoric on irregular migrants crossing the demarcation line. The division of the island is thus emphasised and entrenched through the government rhetoric concerning the need to “protect” this zone. This issue will merit even more consideration when Cyprus adopts the Schengen agreement, which it plans to do in 2009 and which will theoretically abolish all passport controls for those travelling to other Schengen countries within the EU.36 Turkey’s pending membership to the EU would also add another dimension to this picture should it come to fruition.

Malta

Malta, like Cyprus, has a long history of emigration, which increased considerably during the post World War II era, when destruction incurred during the War and high levels of poverty and rates of unemployment caused many Maltese to search for better lives abroad, most often in Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA.37 Malta’s legislation on migration reflects this history, as the only relevant policy during the latter half of the twentieth century was the Immigration Act of 1970.38 Although Malta signed the Geneva Convention in 1968, to which it held a geographic limitation until 2001, there was no national refugee or asylum legislation until the Refugee Act was implemented in 200139 in order to align Maltese policies with EU legislation before accession took place in 2004.
Although Malta and Cyprus have similar histories of emigration, their more recent experiences with immigration have differed quite significantly. Over the last eighteen years, Cyprus has received and indeed encouraged a significant number of economic migrants to fill shortages in the labour market, which have not existed to such a degree in Malta. Rather, the migration debate in Malta has only come to the political forefront in 2002 and has centred on the “boat people” who arrive on the island from the North African shore, usually having departed from Libya (although the very large majority are not Libyan nationals). The number of these people increased dramatically and unexpectedly from 57 in 2001 to 1,686 in 2002, catching the Maltese authorities unprepared. This figure remained between 1,500 and 2,000 in subsequent years, with the exception of 2003, when it fell to 503. In 2007, there were 2,106 migrants and asylum seekers being housed in open centres around the island and over 1,300 were incarcerated in the three detention centres on the island. Although, the numbers of migrants and asylum seekers arriving are low when compared to the numbers arriving in other EU members states, the Maltese government has repeatedly pointed to Malta’s small size and to the fact that the population density (1,200 per square kilometre) is one of the highest in the world and thus the affects of these arrivals are exponential. For example, the 1,272 asylum applications that were lodged in Malta in 2006 are equivalent to 199,226 in France and 188,977 in the UK. The actual asylum claims made in these countries were 26,300 and 27,850, respectively. The Maltese government thus continues to ask the European Union to share the responsibility of the migration ‘burden’, a request that until recently has fallen on deaf ears.

Most of the migrants and refugees arriving in Malta come from sub-Saharan Africa, the largest percentages of asylum applications having come from Somalis, Eritreans and Sudanese over the past five years. These migrants usually travel through Africa until they reach Libya, where they may work for a number of years until they can earn enough money for the voyage across the Mediterranean. The focus in Maltese debates and legislation has thus been on deterring migrants from arriving in Malta by implementing harsh, restrictive policies, such as the island’s lengthy detention policy of up to 18 months. This approach is fuelled and simultaneously justified by the fact that many of the migrants claim they never intended to come to Malta, nor to stay there, but were either picked up by the Armed Forces on their way to mainland Europe because they were in distress while at sea or landed on the island believing they had arrived in Sicily or Italy.

It is important to make two observations here: first, that it is politically convenient for Malta to maintain that most of the migrants do not want to remain, a logic which helps the government portray Malta as a victim of migration patterns and EU legislation; and second, focusing on this fact disregards global patterns which point to the likelihood that Malta will continue to receive migrants and refugees in the coming years. There is also some preliminary evidence suggesting...
that Malta is in fact a final destination for a handful of the migrants, a reality that will likely continue as the migrant population grows, begins to fill gaps in the labour market, and networks are established between Malta and countries of origin.\textsuperscript{47}

The Blurry Line: ‘Illegal’ Migrants or Asylum Seekers?

When migrants, the majority of whom are male, are apprehended by the Armed Forces, they are immediately labelled ‘illegal’ and are transported to one of the three detention centres on the island. It is from detention that most apply for asylum, since it is their only legal recourse either for staying in Malta or continuing their voyage to continental Europe. After spending months in detention, failed asylum seekers, recognised refugees, those with temporary protection as well as irregular migrants who have not applied for asylum all move into one of the “open centres” on the island. The open centres are run by various organisations funded by the government and are all perpetually plagued with overcrowding. The inadequate conditions are evident in the newest open centre in Hal Far that officially houses 600 migrants and refugees and is called a ‘tent city’ due to the canvas tents that have been erected in place of buildings. The tents obviously provide little shelter or protection from rain and cold temperatures in winter and soaring temperatures in summer.

Until 2002, the limited number of asylum claims made in Malta was processed by the UNHCR office in Rome with the help of the Emigrant Commission in Malta, a non-governmental organisation set up in 1950 to help Maltese citizens wanting to settle abroad.\textsuperscript{48} The Refugee Act of 2001 replaced this arrangement and created a new, nationally run asylum system, which included the post of Refugee Commissioner, under whose auspice asylum claims and appeals have been assessed since January 2002. The young system has been hindered by the unexpected number of asylum claims made, as well as the lack of staff due to a limited budget and difficulties in obtaining adequate personnel, especially translators. The result is a slow application process during which asylum seekers are kept in detention for up to 12 months.\textsuperscript{49}

The Maltese government claims to have one of the highest rates of granting protection to asylum seekers in Europe. In 2006 (up to May), 49.2\% of applicants had been granted some form of protection, the majority (47.1\%) temporary humanitarian protection. When compared with the recognition rates in Cyprus, this is obviously a much bigger percentage. However, since Malta has created its own asylum system and the UNHCR no longer resettles recognised refugees from the island, there has been a significant shift towards granting people temporary protection rather than permanent refugee status.\textsuperscript{50} This trend is politically convenient for Malta as it reinforces the idea of the island as a place that migrants temporarily transit and not a place where they might want to settle permanently.
Maltese laws allow for the detention of irregular migrants for up to 18 months and asylum seekers for up to 12 months – a policy which is expensive and serves to criminalise people who have committed no crime. Moreover, it has weathered heavy criticism from human rights groups on the island, in Europe and internationally. The detainees themselves have held peaceful protests, even breaking out of the centres in order to march to the Prime Minister’s office. People who have often had traumatic experiences in their country of origin and during their journeys are detained for an unacceptable and inhumane length of time in appalling conditions. Overcrowded centres are the norm, and dirty conditions have spread diseases such as tuberculosis. The lack of privacy in the centres also causes tension between the detainees, which is exacerbated by being reduced to total idleness and provided with no form of physical or mental stimulation. Prolonged detention in such unhealthy conditions also produces severe psychological affects. The lack of attention to the mental health of detainees has been highlighted by the Council of Europe, which also reported on the need for on-the-spot psychiatric care, especially considering the traumas often experienced by migrants and refugees.

The lack of transparency is also a cause for concern. Only a limited number of NGOs have been given access to closed detention centres and even the press did not previously have a right to enter, except for the occasional pre-arranged ‘tours’ given by the government. The government maintained that this was in order to protect potential refugees and “to protect the families and friends of detainees who are still in their homeland from retribution by the regime against which protection claims are being made.” As Neil Falzon, the UNHCR representative in Malta, pointed out, this excuse is hardly valid and journalists should be given access “so that through their reporting, they will be able to teach the Maltese people more about the refugee situation …” Similar criticism has also come from many other organisations, institutions and individuals, such as the European Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini and the European Parliament. After the general election in March 2008, this policy was, however, reversed, thus allowing journalists to file requests to enter detention centres, by the newly appointed Minister for Justice and Home Affairs, Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, who argued that the government “… [has] nothing to hide” and must be more transparent.

Although these are significant improvements, the government’s lack of acceptance and insensitivity to the phenomenon of migration in Malta is still well illustrated through the asylum system and especially the detention policy. The migrants that arrive do not fit neatly into legal and political categories, which are narrow and do not reflect migrant agency, the multiple “push” and “pull” factors involved, or artificial boundaries and mechanisms operated by states that may interrupt a migrant’s journey. This is of course not a phenomenon limited to the Maltese islands.
Table 1: Asylum Applications and Recognition Rates in Malta and Cyprus, 1995-2008*

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<td>92</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>171</td>
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<td>30.43%</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>3.42%</td>
<td>5.99%</td>
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<td>9.17%</td>
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<td>20.00%</td>
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<td>522</td>
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<td>Recognition Rates (total)</td>
<td>92.57%</td>
<td>113.33%</td>
<td>49.23%</td>
<td>49.70%</td>
<td>85.88%</td>
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<td>Recognised Refugees</td>
<td>92.57%</td>
<td>113.33%</td>
<td>49.23%</td>
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<td>8.63%</td>
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<td>2.92%</td>
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*Asylum Applications are those received within the year and also include appeals. Recognition numbers are those also recognised (or not) within the year and thus do not necessarily correspond with the asylum applications made that year as is evident in the 1996 recognition rates for Malta. These rates are given as an indication of the percentages being granted some form of protection.

**For the first three quarters of 2008 (Jan.-Sept.). Recognition data for 2008 was not available at time of writing.
Asylum Claims in 2005

Source: UNHCR Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2005
Cyprus and Malta: Trends and Trajectories

Despite the fact that the number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Malta and Cyprus are small in absolute terms, it is clear that per capita, the two small islands are experiencing a large amount of asylum applications. Between 2003 and 2007, Cyprus received 39 asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants, the highest level in Europe. Malta was ranked third after Sweden, with 13 and 15 asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants, respectively. These numbers have overwhelmed the newly established asylum systems in both countries and lead to unacceptable delays in the processes, during which asylum seekers remain in a vulnerable state, either deprived of one of their most fundamental freedoms in a Maltese detention centre or a Cypriot prison, or with limited opportunities and government support within the community.

The government and media portrayal of these countries being overwhelmed or invaded allows for the justification of long delays in asylum processes, poor reception standards, and the shirking of the responsibility to protect asylum seekers and refugees. The continuation of a discourse that interprets the migration phenomenon as a result of inadequate border controls or of new laws imposed by the EU is not only naïve, but destructive to the integration of migrants and refugees into Maltese and Cypriot societies, especially in terms of durable settlement possibilities.

Another key aspect in keeping up this appearance is the insistence that both countries are transit points for migrants and asylum seekers, who intend to continue on to continental Europe, a journey thwarted by EU regulations, such as the Dublin II Convention. Although this assumption does reflect reality to some extent, more so perhaps in Malta where the labour market is smaller and opportunities fewer, it has been abused by politicians in order to attract EU support in the form of financial aid and ‘burden-sharing’ initiatives. Consequently, the focus of the migration debate and ensuing policies has shifted into the realm of security and control, rather than human rights and integration. What appears to be more pertinent however is the fact that they are no longer simply countries of emigration or even immigration but caught in the middle, countries of transit migration in transition, now required to become outposts of EU migration control.

Fundamentally important to this new reality is the fact that the flow of people moving across the EU’s southern border is a “mixed flow” – that is it includes people who are seeking asylum and refugee protection, as laid out in the 1951 Geneva Convention and its subsequent protocol (1967), as well as people who are seeking better economic opportunities. The response by nation states to these flows have erred towards more draconian migration controls, causing organisations such as the UNHCR to call for a differentiation between different types of migrants in order...
to continue to afford adequate protection to refugees. It has also led to an academic discussion of the asylum-migration nexus. Moreover, the recognition of mixed flows highlights how fundamentally the geopolitics of the Cold War, the historical context in which the Convention and the UNHCR were conceived, affected the definitions and structures of the institution. Having not been re-examined, the result is the continued use of a narrow definition that reifies a politicised and superficial division between political and economic migrants, which reflects poorly the reality where individual agency entwines with often indistinguishable political and economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.

Public and Media Discourses
The public and media discourses surrounding migration on the two island states largely ignore the realities of mixed flows of migration. Instead, the high number of economic and irregular migrants has added to the distrust of asylum seekers as ‘bogus’ refugees. This omission in the migration story has been detrimental to the reception of migrants in Malta and Cyprus and has added to prevalent racism, xenophobia, and feelings of invasion that are widely expressed in both countries. In Cyprus, the media have encouraged the association between migration and negative social consequences, such as unemployment, the break-up of marriages, criminality, and the national problem of Turkish occupation.

In Malta, local NGOs as well as international organisations have criticised the government for not doing enough to curb the growth of racism. For example, the policy of handcuffing migrants and asylum seekers while transporting them, as well as the broader detention policy, serve to criminalise people who have committed no crime and negatively affect the way Maltese people perceive them. The government has also been criticised for sending the wrong message to the Maltese population by emphasising the numbers and the cost of migration and even making racist remarks themselves, linking migrants and asylum seekers to crime, terrorism, and the spread of illness. Katrine Camilleri, Assistant Director of Jesuit Refugee Services Malta, said, “A lot of statements have been made, even by those in authority, associating immigrants with illness and with a security threat. Obviously anyone can be sick … it has nothing to do with nationality. But, irregular immigrants have been publicly associated with illness or with the threat that they might be terrorists. Of course, so could anyone else and we’re more likely to be than they are. No terrorist is going to come and spend 18 months in Safi [Detention Centre] … But, the fact that in the public mind we have made these associations is very dangerous.”

In both countries, the perception of being invaded by migrants and asylum seekers is encouraged by ignorance and misinformation, leading to xenophobia and racism. This racism is fuelled by two complementary factors based largely on fear: the fear of losing economic security and the related perception of material scarcity,
an image propagated by the governments’ rhetoric within the EU regarding Malta and Cyprus’ inability to cope with the ‘burden’ of migrants and refugees; and the fear of losing one’s national identity, a fear exacerbated by stereotypes and myths relating to both the national culture and cultures of the migrants and refugees. The perception of Maltese and Cypriot societies as homogenous, along with the state’s condonation of racism through its exclusionary practices, has further aggravated the issue. The migrant is thus constructed by nationals as the ‘other’, who is both inferior and threatening, challenging traditional divisions between nationals and non-nationals through the act of migration, as well as a group’s sense of identity within a specific culture, territory or ethnicity.

As McGhee points out, host communities must be educated about ethnic minorities and their culture in order for integration to take place effectively. Education, after all, is fundamental in the struggle against the perpetuation of intolerance and inequality within a society. An interesting study undertaken with Greek-Cypriot students demonstrates both the detrimental nature of narrow nationalistic and ethno-centric citizenship studies, and in turn, the effectiveness of education awareness campaigns in combating racism and xenophobia, and their positive influence on attitudes towards migration. Unfortunately, comprehensive education campaigns dealing with the new realities of migration, as well as the new realities of globalisation and wider economic, political and social patterns, are by and large absent in Malta and Cyprus, although NGOs attempt to fill some of the gaps produced by the lack of a comprehensive government-led initiative.

**The European Union: Demon or Saint?**

In the run up to the 2004 ‘big bang’ enlargement, Malta was the first candidate state to hold a referendum on EU membership. The high turnout (91%) and the narrow victory (53.65%) of the ‘yes’ camp indicates the divided opinion on the issue. Not only did less than 20,000 people swing the vote, but Malta was also the only state to have a major political party, the Labour Party, opposing membership to the EU. This degree of ‘euro-scepticism’ was unparalleled in all the other accession states of 2004. Indeed, in Cyprus the lack of ‘euro-scepticism’ was seen by some as naïve, as integration into the EU would necessarily involve costs as well as benefits.

Moreover, as Trimikliniotes has noted in relation to the accession debate in Cyprus, the extreme positions taken – the “Europhoria” and the “demonization” – concealed the true colours and consequences of integration. This was certainly also the case in Malta, where the campaign for and against Europe was deeply entangled with the polarisation of party politics and the debate therefore remained shallow and highly sensationalised. With regard to the present migration reality, the countries continue to oscillate between blaming the EU on the one hand, for all their migration woes, for not doing enough to support the small, “vulnerable” border
states and on the other hand, hailing the EU as the answer to their prayers, the only way forward in managing the migration issues at hand. Nevertheless, some practical measures have been taken by both countries to address concerns, such as the seven-year period during which EU nationals wanting to work in Malta must apply for a work permit, just as non-EU nationals must. What was not explicitly or adequately addressed in the discussion of migration is the fact that European integration, while involving the inclusion of some into an area of relatively open national borders, also involves the exclusion of others through the hardening of external borders. Thus although Malta and Cyprus have presumably increased their political power globally by joining the EU, they are still minor players and have been expected to increase migration controls and fortify their borders as gatekeepers to the EU.

As border states, Cyprus and Malta are both acutely aware of the consequences of this logic. The Dublin II Convention, which all member states must adhere to as part of the acquis communautaire, stipulates that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first EU country they reach, ostensibly to reduce the risk of ‘asylum shopping’. In both countries, the Convention has been seen to produce an unfair ‘burden’ in terms of migration numbers and has had implications for Search and Rescue (SAR) missions. Malta’s SAR region spans over 250,000 square kilometres of the Mediterranean and effectively means that every boat leaving Libya must pass through the region. Before joining the EU, Malta’s unwritten policy was to help boats in distress before sending them on their way to mainland Europe, their intended destination. However, due to the Dublin II Convention, the government is currently required to process the asylum claims of migrants whom the Armed Forces intercept within the SAR region. Although the Armed Forces are expected to come to the aid of boats in distress in the region, they allow others to pass through without intervening. The boats asking for assistance are brought into Maltese ports and the migrants aboard are transported to one of the detention centres, from where they can initiate the asylum process.

In Cyprus, which also has a large SAR region, relative to its landmass, of 176,000 square kilometres, the issue is again complicated by the division of the island. As stated earlier, the numbers of irregular migrants arriving by sea are much less significant than those in Malta. However, it has been suggested by the Cypriot Coast Guard that most boats attempt to travel through Cypriot waters in order to land north of the “green line” in the Turkish-controlled part of Cyprus, where regulations are seen to be more lax and from where one can easily travel overland across the demilitarised line to the southern part of the island.

What is clear on both islands is that the Dublin II Convention and EU membership have resulted in the redefinition and related shoring up and reassertion of their borders through the incorporation of more restrictive migration controls.
facilitated by new technologies and expertise. In Malta and Cyprus, the implications are conditioned by the fact that they are both island states with blue borders. This has had two crucial consequences: first and perhaps foremost, the reality of blue borders results in a high degree of immobility for migrants and refugees, especially in light of the Convention’s authorisation of surveillance and tracking measures, such as fingerprinting, used to return asylum seekers to the first country of arrival within the EU. Secondly, these blue borders are much more difficult to control than land borders as they cannot be demarcated in the same fashion, by building a wall or establishing guard towers. Sea borders are also multiple, involving layers of different types of inclusion and exclusion. Territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and search and rescues regions encompass progressively more area in the Mediterranean causing Maltese and Cypriot SAR regions to be much larger than the islands’ territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles or 22 kilometres out to sea. So, for instance, Malta has territorial waters comprising 3,800 square kilometres, while its SAR region spans over 250,000 square kilometres. Even when boats are intercepted within these waters, it is impossible to return migrants without the cooperation of bordering countries, such as Libya. Thus the FRONTEX patrol, Operation Nautilus II, launched in 2007 has largely operated as a rescue team, helping boats in distress and taking those on board to the nearest member state, Malta or Italy, rather than stemming the flow of migrants trying to enter Europe, its professed aim.80

The issue of an ‘unfair burden’ has recently been addressed within the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council and in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum,81 an agreement that was proposed by Nicholas Sarkozy in July 2008, when France took over the Presidency of the European Council, and was subsequently adopted by the Council in October. The Pact is not legally binding, but rather a political document and in this capacity proposes five commitments: (1) to organise legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each Member State, and to encourage integration, (2) to control illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or to a country of transit, (3) to make border control more effective, (4) to construct a Europe of asylum, and (5) to create a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage synergy between migration and development.

A running theme within the Pact is the need to strike a ‘balance’ between stricter migration controls and upholding migrant rights, as well as the rights of non-member states. The logic of balancing freedom and security, which entered the EU discourse after the 11 September attacks, has been criticised elsewhere for creating the illusion not only that liberty and security are similar and comparable types of concepts, but that they are also antithetical. This trade-off creates a detrimental tension between human rights and security.82 Moreover, the usefulness of the Pact
in building a common European migration and asylum policy has also been questioned. Carrera and Guild highlight nationalism and intergovernmentalism as the Pact’s guiding principles, arguing that this undermines the Europeanisation of policies and diverges from the supranational focus seen in recent Commission communications.

The Pact does address the issue of ‘burden sharing’ and explicitly points to the “disproportionate influxes of immigrants” faced by member states on the external border, gestures that have been received well by Malta and Cyprus. However, it leaves much to be desired as it does not address the issue of mixed migratory flows and the asylum-migration nexus. The logic employed also ignores the fact that globalisation, as well as the economic and political structures that exist in the EU (and the developed world more generally) cause the mixed flows of migration to varying degrees and in different manners. For example, increasing restrictions and border controls have increased “illegality” and resulted in more sophisticated smuggling techniques and the diversification of migration routes, which in turn has prompted calls for further restrictions. Externalising the responsibility of migration controls to North African countries with poor human rights records not only jeopardises migrants’ basic human rights, but has also caused some migrants who were intending to remain in the region, to instead move on to Europe due to increasing repression.

**Stuck on the Edge: The Impact of the External Emphasis**

Within the EU as a whole, the migration debate is increasingly focused on the external dimension, such as repatriations, return directives, readmission agreements and border controls, rather than the integration of migrants, facilitation of legal entry into the EU for migrants and asylum seekers, and the protection of human rights. Over the past twenty years, as borders have been relaxed within the EU, member states have introduced a torrent of restrictive measures targeting non-EU nationals, such as extended visa requirements, carrier sanctions, restrictions on freedom of movement, and limitations on the right to work – all designed to prevent or deter migrants from turning up on their doorstep and seeking asylum. There is also an evident desire to externalise part of the migration ‘problem’ through measures such as ‘extraterritorial processing’ and ‘protection in regions of origin’. These can be clearly seen in the UK’s unsuccessful proposal of 2003 to create Regional Protection Zones and Transit Processing Centres on the outskirts of the EU where most asylum applications would be considered in order to restrict the number of people entering and applying for asylum within the EU. Although some view this proposal as a way to reduce smuggling and the undertaking of dangerous journeys by asylum seekers, it has also raised many concerns, including the lack of incentives and resources for countries outside the EU to guarantee minimum human rights standards.
Although the proposal failed, the concepts and ideas behind it have gained prominence over more progressive proposals, such as development assistance, debt reduction, and the promotion of human rights and good governance in countries of origin. These underlying concepts can be seen in new efforts to set up camps in countries outside the EU, such as Libya, and in the shift towards bilateral agreements with these countries.89 Malta and Cyprus find themselves on the edge of the EU and have had their own migration debates affected by the larger European discourse. Control and restrictions have become ubiquitous without thought of human consequences. In Malta, repatriations are increasingly common, although the government maintains that it lacks the funds to repatriate all the migrants it would like to. Nevertheless, reports have accused the government of repatriating migrants to countries where they face extreme danger, as with a group of Eritrean migrants repatriated in 2002 and jailed and tortured upon their arrival.90 There are also reports of migrants being repatriated back to Libya.91 Deportation is also practiced in Cyprus where 2,892 people where deported in 2007 and 2,983 in 2006. The police have noted that these deportation numbers are dependant on the holding capacity of prisons where migrants are detained and which are currently reported to be at ‘full capacity’.92

The externalisation or ‘delocalisation’ of the migration ‘problem’ has also taken place through bilateral agreements that address the readmission of irregular migrants and the co-operation of law enforcement between EU members and non-members.93 Due to the slow process of harmonisation of asylum policies in the EU, there has also been a proliferation of such agreements made with non-member countries that border the Union, often in order to negotiate repatriation agreements. For example, there have been continued attempts by Italy to attract Libya into law enforcement co-operation in attempts to curb irregular migration, aimed especially at Libya’s (un)willingness to strengthen its border controls. Since 2003, Italy and Libya, as well as Spain and Morocco, have collaborated in joint patrols and the readmission of migrants, often even those who are not nationals, but have transited these countries, in exchange for aid.

Understandably, there has been fierce criticism of these negotiations with countries that have, at best, dubious human rights records.94 The Libyan judicial system, for example, has no procedure in place for asylum seekers and is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention that provides protection to refugees. In light of these factors, the agreements are seen as attempts to deny access to asylum processes within Europe. Such bilateral agreements, as well as the portrayal of migration as a security challenge, have also fostered the militarisation of the southern European border, where military (and semi-military) forces and hardware are increasingly deployed in attempts to prevent migration by sea. This security framework has become even more prevalent in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London.95
Indeed, the focus in the Mediterranean should be a humanitarian one based on human rights and the protection of vulnerable people. The headlines reporting the deaths and drowning of migrants in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea and the untold numbers that have died silently reflect the human tragedy that is being allowed to happen. Human Rights Watch report that 100,000 people attempt to cross the Mediterranean every year and that over the past decade, 10,000 have died trying.96 Although humanitarian grounds are often used as a justification for the need and increase in sea patrols involving co-operation from nation states on the southern and northern shore of the Mediterranean,97 this argument obscures the fact that tighter controls have resulted in migrants taking greater risks by attempting voyages in rickety boats during winter months when the seas are rough, voyages that are longer and more dangerous, resulting in more deaths at sea. The shifting of migration in response to increasing border controls has been witnessed already in Western Africa, where increased controls in the Straits of Gibraltar and around the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla resulted in migrants and refugees increasingly choosing the Canary Islands as their destination instead of Southern Spain.98 In turn, the fortification of patrols along the West African route, in part by the FRONTEX HERA I and II missions, has been said to have partially caused the increase of migrants and refugees coming through the central Mediterranean.99

These unforeseen consequences make clear that although policy and political rhetoric has been restrictive, draconian, and even xenophobic, the effects of policy on the ground are more subtle and varied. Migrants’ ability to react and respond in varying degrees to structures that help or hinder their journeys reflect their agency – their autonomy, will, flexibility and persistence. Migrant agency, coupled with restrictions, has resulted in part in increasingly varied and dangerous migration routes being taken. This along with the impossible nature of patrolling borders absolutely and the narrow political categories that define the “wanted” from the “unwanted” and thus justify the fortification of borders, results in irregular migrants entering host countries. Domestic business interests, supranational bodies such as the EU and international human rights norms also affect the inclusionary and exclusionary measures taken vis-à-vis migrants, often resulting in the inclusion of more migrants than governments acknowledge. Indeed, the focus on “boat people” and on the militarisation of the EU’s external borders can be viewed as a red herring, a convenient way for states to appear tough on migration, while accommodating business interests and the need for migrant labour, especially in light of the majority of irregular migrants in the EU being ‘overstayers’.

Conclusion

Migration is often viewed as having negative social and economic consequences, a justification for tighter migration controls. I argue here, as others have done,100 that the negative consequences are largely due to and certainly exacerbated by the
pursuit of control and the restrictive policies that are justified in the name of protecting citizens. Migration controls produce illegality, marginalising migrants and asylum seekers within the societies of receiving states. The vulnerability and precariousness associated with illegality allows for the exploitation of migrants within the labour market, benefiting employers who pay them low wages. As Saskia Sassen notes, “Border enforcement is a mechanism facilitating the extraction of cheap labour by assigning criminal status to a segment of the working class – illegal immigrants.” Thus, in Malta and Cyprus, migrants and asylum seekers are exploited by employers who are able to pay them below the minimum wage, withhold payment, and impose dangerous working conditions. The marginalisation of migrants was made clear in a shocking Supreme Court decision in Cyprus where a judge ruled in favour of a Cypriot employer who had withheld payment from one of his employees, a third country national, on the basis of his not having a work permit at the time.

The exclusion of migrants and asylum seekers from mainstream society, along with practices of detention and deportation, sends a clear message of these people being “unwanted”. The discrimination they endure in housing, healthcare, and employment, leads to their further marginalisation and ghettoisation, fuelling racism and xenophobia. Thus by rendering migrants socially and politically powerless, the state promotes the monetary interests of business by providing a cheap labour pool, while simultaneously undermining the working class and the wider society within its own borders.

Despite the different reactions by Malta and Cyprus due to divergent histories, geographies and cultures, the focus in both has been on short-term control, while long-term considerations such as the integration of migrants and refugees have fallen by the wayside and the human rights of ‘illegal’ migrants have suffered an even worse fate. Membership in the European Union has facilitated the emphasis on exclusion and influenced the ‘repressive’ elements of policy, especially through the redefinition of Cypriot and Maltese borders as external borders. The pressure exerted for these external borders to be fortified due to the relaxation of internal borders, along with the attempts to externalise control and protection measures, has closed off possible legal routes for migrants and asylum seekers to enter the European Union.

In southern Europe, there are also negative implications for member states, which adjoin countries that are (thus far) uninvited and possibly uninterested in EU membership. This artificial division imposed by the EU has further exacerbated tensions created by economic, political, cultural, and religious divides in the Mediterranean. Within the EU, the Dublin Convention reinforces a hierarchy and increases levels of distrust between core and periphery states whereby states on the fringes must act as “gatekeepers” or “outposts”. Others have also labelled
Cyprus, in particular, an “entrance hall” or “waiting room” for migrants attempting to transit to other European countries. Although these analogies are useful in that they reflect the experiences of many migrants in Malta and Cyprus, it is important to point out their limitations and ways in which they may be misleading. For instance, within the broader EU context, the numbers arriving in these countries are small and the numbers wanting to continue on to mainland Europe even smaller.

Research shows that the vast majority of irregular migrants arrive in Europe through legal channels and either overstay their visas or take up employment outside the legal terms of their visas. And yet, the member states that make up the European Union have increasingly focused their rhetoric, money, and time on FRONTEX patrols in the Mediterranean, on restricting asylum application to the first country of arrival through the Dublin II Convention, and on erecting fences, walls, and barbed wire in Ceuta and Melilla, Bulgaria and Slovakia, to create an image of “fortress Europe”. These exclusionary measures are costly, partially ineffective and more often than not result in the exclusion of those that are the most in need of protection, those that cannot afford to buy a plane ticket into Europe.

There is also a clear contradiction as businesses recruit migrant labour, usually through short-term residence schemes, in order to fill shortages, while governments, spurred on by domestic xenophobia and a desire to comply with EU standards, pursue their political interests by creating barriers to migration in order to control ‘illegal’ immigration. The policy response includes stricter visa requirements, increased patrolling of land and coastal borders, expedited asylum applications, the principles of ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘safe third country’, expulsion of irregular migrants, and the exchange of information with other Schengen countries on ‘undesirable’ migrants, including asylum seekers.

In Malta and Cyprus, these restrictions have produced a segmentation of society with widely felt social consequences as exclusionary practises and procedures influence citizens’ perspective of the migration phenomenon and increase levels of racism and xenophobia. The EU’s exclusionary policies, seen clearly in border states such as Malta and Cyprus, disenfranchise people who act as a reserve army of labour and who have little recourse to human rights law and protection from the state. They are immobilised in a system that boasts increased mobility and disenfranchised in a system that flaunts democracy.

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Notes

1. Although the affects of the division of the island on migration will be addressed, this paper focuses primarily on the Republic of Cyprus and not on the Turkish occupied north known as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’, although unrecognised by the international community or by any sovereign nation, with the exception of Turkey. I will refer to this occupied area as northern Cyprus.

2. The eight other countries to join in 2004 were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.


15. See Table 4.2 in Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2007) ‘Cyprus’, p. 51 for full breakdown of this figure; These figures are an estimate of the authors as there does not seem to be official numbers which are consistent. For example, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) estimate that there were 75,000 non-Cypriots in Cyprus in 2005, 15% of which were irregular migrants and 7-8% of which were asylum seekers. However, these figures do not include some ‘visitors’, such as retired persons and students [ECRI (2005) Third Country Report on Cyprus, Adopted on 16 December 2005, p. 53].


21. These comparisons are obviously limited. Their calculations were based on the number of asylum applicants in 2007 according to the UNHCR (‘Asylum Level and Trends in Industrialised Countries 2007’) and the populations given by the CIA fact book for July 2007.


24. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service.


29. See Table 1, p. 29.


36. It is worth noting that although Malta joined Schengen on 1 January 2008, it does not seem to have made a big impact on migration regulation due to it being an island and most visitors arriving by plane, where passport controls are nevertheless carried out.

37. See Malta’s Emigrant Commission for a breakdown of migration, including return migration, to and from these countries between 1945 and 1996. [http://www.maltamigration.com/statistics/canada.shtml?s=A30136C0-7D8627175959-58E8].


39. [http://www.legislationline.org/upload/old/acf4e8a7551788d76b660fabe09a726.pdf].

40. See Table 1, p. 29.


42. As a comparison, Spain, Italy and Greece have a population density of 90, 193, and 84 per square kilometre, respectively. Within the EU, the closest population density is that of the Netherlands at 393.
43. Calculations made using information from the following sources:
   [http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=6],
   [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2617427.ece],


   and Human Rights of Asylum Seekers in Malta. Experiences, Results and

46. Interviews with immigrants in detention and open centres in 2006.

47. As mentioned above, this is not occurring to the same extent as in Cyprus, but irregular
   migrants are being employed in the construction industry, without proper recourse to the
   law or to basic labour rights (Source: Interviews with migrants, NGOs and government
   officials in 2006).

48. The UNHCR also resettled many recognised refugees to other countries. See Table 1,
   p. 29 for a breakdown of asylum applications made each year in Malta.

49. The Commissioner’s Office was set up in January 2002 with only five staff members,
   which expanded to 13 in subsequent years (Interview with the Refugee Commissioner
   at the time, Charles Buttigieg, 6 July 2006).

   Table 1, p. 29.

51. The cost was 320,435 Maltese Lira (€746,385) in the first half of 2006 alone
   (‘Immigrants refused entry into Malta’, The Sunday Times of Malta, 16 July 2006).

52. The length of detention was previously indefinite. The 18-month limit, implemented after
   pressure from local NGOs, resulted in a delegation being sent by the Council of Europe
   to investigate the matter. The Council subsequently insisted that Malta change its
   indefinite detention policy. More recently, due to changes in the laws allowing migrants
   access to the labour market, asylum seekers whose application is still pending after 12
   months, must be released from detention. Rejected asylum seekers may be held in
   detention for up to 18 months. See Jesuit Refugee Services Malta (2006) Asylum in

53. European Parliament, Directorate-General Internal Policies, Policy Department C,
   Nationals (Detention Camps, Open Centres as well as Transit Centres and Transit
   Zones) with a Particular Focus on Provisions and Facilities for Persons with Special
   December 2005; Alvaro Gil-Robles, ‘Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for
   Human Rights, on his visit to Malta, 20-21 October 2003’, Office of the Commissioner for

54. Hal Far Detention Centre 21 July 2006; Safi Detention Centre 22 July 2006.
57. Interview, 27 July 2006.
61. This is not to say that this position is a unique one, as many, if not most, countries today are both countries of immigration and emigration. It is, however, a recent development on these islands, which provides a microcosm to investigate how this evolution is then reflected in policies and how these policies in turn affect the experiences of migrants.
63. Article 1 of the Convention defines a refugee as: “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.
65. Interview with Katrine Camilleri, Assistant Director and Lawyer for Jesuit Refugee Services, 26 June 2006; Interview with Joseph Abela, a Labour Member of Parliament also affiliated with the Peacelab, a religious-based NGO that houses migrants, 19 July 2006.


71. Interview with Paul Pace, Director of Jesuit Refugee Services, Malta, 26 June 2006; Interview with Neil Falzon, UNHCR Malta Representative, 27 July 2006.

72. [http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/maltese2.pdf].

73. Nicos Trimikliniotis (2001) ‘The Location of Cyprus’, p. 12; For a more full discussion of the affects of EU membership on Malta and Cyprus, see Pace, ‘Malta and Cyprus’.

74. Ibid.


76. For a map see [http://www.sar.malta.gov.mt/sar_in_Malta.htm].

77. Interview with Mario Caruana and Charles Deguara, respectively the Director of Policy Development and the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, 10 July 2006; Interview with Joseph Muscat, Maltese Member of the European Parliament, 7 July 2006; Interview with Refugee Commissioner, Charles Buttigieg, 6 July 2006.

78. For map, see [http://www.shipping.gov.cy/search_and_rescue/index.htm].


80. Italy initially also refused to cooperate, claiming the Nautilus II is futile without Libyan support. One can see from the FRONTEX reports that Spain, on the other hand, has been able to turn back migrants due to their agreement with Senegal and Mauritania. FRONTEX, ‘HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics’. Accessed from [http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art40.html] on 30 October 2008; See also ‘Tidal Wave’, The Economist, 21 June 2007.


97. This argument is made by the European Commission with regard to FRONTEX patrols [http://ec.europa.eu/snapshot2006/immigration/immigration_en.htm].


100. See for example, Teresa Hayter (2004) Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls. London, Pluto Press. Here I do not address the benefits of migration for sending and receiving states generally, but confine my argument to the affects of border controls.


108. Although the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (and more recently Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean) has attempted to overcome these divisions, they have largely failed and generally have focused primarily on economic liberalisation. For more on these agreements, Russell King and Marco Donati (1997) ‘The “Divided” Mediterranean’, in Ray Hudson and Alan Williams (eds.), Divided Europe: Society and Territory. London, Sage, pp. 152-162; See also Ronald Skeldon (1997) Migration and Development: A Global Perspective. Essex, Longman.


A young Filipino assisting an older Cypriot woman

© Photographer: Fatema Islam
Source: Limbo: The Migrant in Cyprus – A Portrait
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Mediterranean Voices Project (Euromed Heritage Project)
GREEK-CYPRIOT TEACHERS’ UNDERSTANDINGS OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION IN AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE SOCIETY

Elena Papamichael

Abstract
There is an increasing acknowledgement of cultural diversity as the norm in societies around the world, which creates further challenges for the educational systems, especially the teachers. Cyprus is not an exception; at the moment Greek-Cypriot teachers are working in highly diverse environments in the context of a predominantly monocultural educational system in a multicultural, still ethnically divided society. Based on research still in progress, this article aims to explore intercultural education in Greek-Cypriot primary schools, with a focus on the teachers’ role. A review of the field of multicultural education, its approaches and critics provides the framework for this study. The article discusses the preliminary findings of an ethnographic study conducted in two highly diverse Greek-Cypriot public primary schools, focusing on the teachers’ understandings and practices of intercultural education. The analysis shows that most participants consider acceptance of diversity and challenging negative elements of racism and xenophobia in children’s attitudes as the main aims of intercultural education. The teachers attribute a cross-curricular character to intercultural education and offer no standard ‘recipes’ for its implementation in everyday practices. In both schools, the practices mainly involve events for the ‘celebration of diversity’. The article concludes that intercultural education, as described by the participants in this study, represents the additive approach of multicultural education, which has been heavily criticised for tokenism and failure to challenge institutional racism. However, some teachers’ critical reflections and policy developments point to the possibility of moving toward a transformation approach of the curriculum.

Keywords: intercultural education, multicultural education approaches, teachers’ understandings, diversity, Greek-Cypriot primary schools
Introduction

“Diversity is as inevitable and as restrictive as gravity. It is not to be deplored, nor to be exalted. It is simply there, to be used as a resource” (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998, p. 14).

Diversity is, and always has been, a common characteristic of societies in one way or another. At the same time, in Cyprus, as in other parts of the world, the idea of a homogenised national group has been presented as the ideal, though it can never really exist. However, there are ‘processes that aim at achieving it, and practices that tend to uniform individuals, forsaking or denying diversity’ (Aguado and Malik, 2006, p. 456). One of these has been education. Education was the main means through which nation-states were maintained during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the promotion of strong national identities (Gellner, 1983). This is still a phenomenon common in countries that have only recently become independent or are under threat. However, national education systems are now facing the challenge to adjust in order to accommodate the increasing population diversity due to the internationalisation of economy. Economic migrants are both the effects and the victims of this change, as their movements follow the market needs and, at the same time, their presence exacerbates local chauvinism (Perotti, 1994). The assertion of narrow national identities has caused a rise of xenophobia and racism and the subsequent exclusion of asylum seekers, immigrants and refugees through unemployment, racial disadvantage, deprivation and impoverishment (Gundara, 2000). In their attempt to include minority groups into education systems designed for majority populations, many ethnically plural societies introduced policies aiming to reduce such inequalities and accommodate the needs of minorities; however, the outcome was often the continuation of assimilation, discrimination and inequality, and sometimes the persistence of racist exclusion and inequities (Tomlinson, 2003). This article is an attempt to explore how this global picture translates in Greek-Cypriot education.

The island of Cyprus has been characterised by ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity throughout its history. Recent socio-political developments, like the partial lifting of the restrictions of movement across the Green Line and the accession of Cyprus to the European Union led to an increase of the population’s diversity. Out of a total of 867,600 inhabitants, the estimated percentage of ‘foreign’ residents was 13.7% (Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, 2006, p. 12). This reality is reflected on the pupil population. During 2005-2006 there were 3,759 non-Greek-Cypriot pupils, mainly from the former Soviet Union countries, in a total of 55,868 pupils in 341 primary schools – a percentage of 6.7% (Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, 2006). A more recent report states that the 7.3% of the pupils attending public primary schools do not speak Greek as a mother tongue (Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, 2007). Considering the constant arrivals
of asylum seekers and refugees from neighbouring countries in conflict, as well as economic migrants, this number is expected to increase. At the same time, as a member of the European Union, Cyprus is expected to ascribe to the European norms of human rights and anti-racism. Consequently, the Ministry of Education and Culture has introduced the concept of intercultural education in Greek-Cypriot schools.

This article discusses the preliminary findings of a study which is still in progress, aiming to explore Greek-Cypriot teachers’ understandings and practices of intercultural education. A description of the Greek-Cypriot education context is initially provided through a review of previous studies on diversity and education, which identify issues of nationalism and racism in need of further research and highlight the importance of the teachers’ role. Mapping the field of multi/intercultural education, the various approaches and criticisms provides the framework within which this study is situated and which informs the data analysis. Intercultural education in Greek-Cypriot primary education policy is then reviewed. Having described the methodological approach of this study, a discussion follows of a preliminary analysis of the findings in relation to the teachers’ understandings of intercultural education and the related school practices. In conclusion some remarks on the implications of these findings are made.

Diversity in Greek-Cypriot Education and the Teachers’ Role

Taking into consideration that intercultural education cannot be investigated outside the multiple contexts within which it is placed (Nieto and Bode, 2008), in this section I introduce the research setting in relation to diversity and Greek-Cypriot education and the teachers’ role. The field of intercultural education in Cyprus is under-investigated; however, there is a growing interest in the area, evident in a number of qualitative studies. Previous research in the Greek-Cypriot education system emphasised its nationalistic, ethnocentric, hellenocentric and monocultural character (Trimikliniotis, 2004) and pointed to the dominant ethnocentric ideology and lack of critical pedagogic principles which hinder mutual respect and reunification (Makriyianni, in press). Angelides et al., (2003) confirm the monocultural and monolingual framework in which the schools continue to function. Elsewhere they argue that the educational system assimilates non-Greek-Cypriot pupils into the Cypriot culture through the textbooks and the curriculum (Angelides et al., 2004). Spyrou’s (2004) study in schools with Turkish-speaking children identified the inappropriate curriculum, the lack of a common language with teachers and classmates, as well as prejudice and racism as serious problems facing these children. Similar research (Demetriou and Trimikliniotis, 2006) identified factors such as the language barriers and the lack of recognition of the contribution of Roma culture to society as contributing to the Roma children’s poor educational performance.
Research in relation to the teachers’ perceptions of diversity found evidence of University of Cyprus student teachers’ prejudices toward people from the African and Asian Mediterranean sub-regions (Theophilides and Koutselini-Ioannides, 1999). Other research accentuated that even teachers who were willing to implement intercultural education could not do so because of the lack of appropriate training and teaching materials (Trimikliniotis, 2001). According to the European Dilemma Research Project XENOPHOB (Trimikliniotis, 2005), the vast majority of teachers were either unaware or in denial about it despite the evidence of everyday racial discrimination. Similarly, in previous research (Papamichael, 2006) the concept of colour-blindness was identified in teachers’ understandings of diversity, which did not allow them to recognise and challenge racist incidents they observed among their pupils. Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou (2007) argue that educational practices they observed treat diversity as a type of deficiency which needs to be treated and point to racist incidents and bullying because of dress, financial status and skin colour that became evident in their interviews with the children.

Philippou’s (2005, p. 308) qualitative study on children’s construction of national and European identities, indicates that Greek-Cypriot children showed “no multiculturally sophisticated understandings of ‘Cypriot’ as inclusive of any other community of Cyprus, but was rather synonymous to Greek-Cypriot, an understanding encouraged by the Hellenocentrism of the school context”. Spyrou (2007, forthcoming) interviewed fifth and sixth grade children and investigated their views of Sri Lankan and Filipino domestic workers; the findings suggest that children’s understandings are filled with stereotypes, prejudices and ignorance. Spyrou also explored the nationalistic discourse of Greek-Cypriot education and society, which essentialise identities and lead to the identification of Turks as the eternal enemy (Spyrou, 2000; Spyrou, 2001; Spyrou, 2002; Spyrou, 2006).

The report of the Commission for Educational Reform (2004a, p. 4), evaluated the Cypriot educational system and concluded that:

“[t]he ideological-political context of contemporary Cypriot education remains helleno-cyprio-centric, narrowly ethnocentric and culturally monolithic. The current ideological context ignores the interculturalism and multiculturalism of Cypriot society, as well as the Europeanization and internationalisation of Cypriot education”.

Furthermore, in relation to the teachers’ role, the Commission (2004b) has reported that they are troubled about their abilities to respond to their duties, when working in diverse schools with traditional ethos. The teachers “acknowledge the danger that, in a traditional school, children with a different cultural background are at risk of falling behind and/or facing many psychological problems because of the ignorance or contempt towards their cultural specificities” and are “troubled by the
relations of the local children with the migrants’ children and the specific problems that the latter face in an unfamiliar environment which is not always characterised by elements of an open society” (Commission for Educational Reform, 2004b, p. 287). Considering that this report was a result of the Ministry’s initiative to provide an evaluation of the educational system, these findings establish the need for intercultural education and intercultural teacher training and also identify these issues as fields in need of further research.

Overall, the previous studies mentioned above identify nationalism, exclusion, racism and discrimination as key issues in the Cypriot educational system, in need of further research. They point to the responsibilities of the educational policies which promote assimilatory practices in relation to diversity and to the need that teachers should be equipped with the knowledge and strategies to work in multicultural environments. The Commission for Educational Reform (2004b), and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2006) suggest that the existing efforts in the field of intercultural education in Cyprus need to be emphasised and strengthened. The ongoing research presented in this paper explores some of the issues identified by previous studies in the Greek-Cypriot context, with an emphasis on the teachers’ understandings of intercultural education and diversity, which remain under-investigated. The need for further research in this area is strengthened by the emphasis in the international literature on the importance of the teachers’ role in the context of education for diversity.

Teachers’ identities are determined by their educational experiences, their professional training and their views of the school and wider educational communities, shaping their actions and priorities; therefore, their perceptions of their selves and their professional role and responsibilities are central on the research agenda (Starkey, 2007). Teachers can be agents of change from narrow nationalism to universalism, from ethnic and cultural prejudice to understanding and pluralism (Delors, 1996). Delors (1996, p. 93) highlights the significance of the teachers’ role as crucial in the development of their pupils’ ability “to be receptive to others and face the inevitable tensions between people, groups and nations”. Their role as political actors has also been emphasised, aiming to provide children with an education which will enable them to succeed socially, economically and personally (Wilkins, 2001; Cochran-Smith, 2004; Pearce, 2005). Teachers are in a position to build upon, acknowledge and value their pupils’ previous cultural knowledge and origin; eradicate preconceived ideas and stereotypes about cultural supremacy that generate racism and discrimination; develop strategies for the exploration of diversity and reflect on the learning process; and, design participative and dynamic activities, in which students engage and transfer what they learn to real-life situations (Aguado and Malik, 2001). In Gundara’s words (2000, p. 118), they need to “challenge the muteness that has been imposed upon the knowledge and images of oppressed civilizations”. Bartolome argues that teachers are human
beings with tremendous agency and if they “learn to unmask and question hurtful dominant ideologies as they manifest in their classrooms, they can work on behalf of their students to transform their schools into more humane and democratic places” (2008, p. xxi). However, the structural inequalities and political ideologies involved make such attempts extremely complex and challenging.

Having considered the importance of the role of teachers for intercultural education and previous studies in the Greek-Cypriot context, this study aims to provide some insights into the teachers’ understandings and practices of intercultural education. A review of the field is necessary before exploring the case of Cyprus.

**Mapping the Field of Intercultural Education**

Multi/intercultural education is an internationally established field, with a huge amount of literature. The recent, six-volume publication History of Multicultural Education (Grant and Chapman, 2008) and The Routledge International Companion to Multicultural Education (Banks, 2009) are examples of the breadth of literature and of the use of the concept internationally. The educational approach generally known as multicultural education is rooted in the beginning of the nineteenth century and the response by African American scholars to the negative schooling experiences of Black people (Banks and Banks, 2004) and developed during the period of the civil rights’ movement in the 1960s in the US (Banks, 2004b). Multicultural education emerged as a powerful challenge to the Eurocentric foundations of the US curriculum and became the product of “a particular historical conjuncture of relations among the state, contending racial minority and majority groups, educators, and policy intellectuals in the US when the discourse over schools became increasingly racialised” (McCarthy, 1993, p. 289).

It is necessary to make a note on the terminological issues surrounding the terms multicultural and intercultural education. Education for cultural diversity is described with various terms in the literature, often used interchangeably – the most common are multicultural, anti-racist, and intercultural education. Multicultural education is the term preferred in the literature of North America, Britain and Australia, describing the responses of these nations to issues of ‘race’, ethnicity, and intercultural interaction in education (Cushner, 1998a). In Britain, the discourse evolved mainly through the debate between multicultural and anti-racist education advocates (May, 1999; Banks, 2006 (1984)). Intercultural education is the term preferred by the Council of Europe (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers of Education, 2003), UNESCO (2006) and most European countries (Perotti, 1994; Dragonas, Frangoudaki and Inglessi, 1996); it was first significantly taken up by the Council of Europe in their No. 7 project in relation to the education of migrant children in 1981 (Fyfe, 1993). Coulby (2006) suggests that the terminological shift...
from multicultural to intercultural education in Europe “seemed to offer a fresh start and one less influenced by the previously dominant and self-contained theory and practice emanating from the USA and the UK” (p. 246). As the term intercultural education is the one used by Greek-Cypriot educational authorities and academia, it is the one being adopted in this article, unless referring to literature from Britain and the US.

Multicultural education, according to Banks and Banks (2004, p. 3), is “an idea or concept, an educational reform movement, and a process”. Gorski (2006) identifies five common key principles in the definitions of multicultural education provided by the main theorists in the field in the US (Sleeter, 1996; Grant and Sleeter, 1998; Nieto, 2000; Banks, 2004a). All support that multicultural education is “a political movement and process that attempts to secure social justice for historically and presently underserved students”; recognises that “social justice is an institutional matter and as such, can be secured only through comprehensive school reform”; “insists that comprehensive school reform can be achieved only through a critical analysis of systems of power and privilege”; aims to eliminate educational inequities; and is “good education for all students” (Gorski, 2006, pp. 164-165). However, each of the theorists that Gorski reviewed gives their own specific definition of multicultural education. Recent international efforts on a theoretical (Banks et al., 2005) and a policy level (UNESCO, 2006) to provide internationally agreed upon definitions of education for citizens in a multicultural world, concluded in sets of principles and concepts but not water-tight definitions. This indicates the great difficulty in defining such a broadly used and variously understood concept.

Multicultural Education Dimensions, Approaches and Criticisms

To refer to one of the most widely accepted definitions, I present the five dimensions of multicultural education, proposed by Banks (2001, pp. 8-15). The dimension of content integration refers to the extent to which teachers use examples and content from a variety of cultures to illustrate key concepts, principles, generalisations, and theories; the knowledge construction process relates to the extent to which teachers help their students understand and investigate how the implicit cultural assumptions, frames of references, perspectives, and biases within a discipline influence the ways in which knowledge is constructed within it; thirdly, the dimension of prejudice reduction focuses on the characteristics of students’ ‘racial’ attitudes and how these can be modified through teaching. This is a similar approach to the one identified by Sleeter and Grant (1988; Grant and Sleeter, 1998; Grant and Sleeter, 2004) as the human relations approach, which aims to promote positive feelings among all students and to promote group identity and eliminate prejudice and bias. The dimension of equity pedagogy is achieved when teachers modify their teaching, to respond to the wide range of learning styles and to ensure
that students from diverse racial, cultural and social class groups succeed academically; last, multicultural education requires an empowering school culture and social structure for students from diverse racial, ethnic and cultural groups by challenging grouping and labelling practices, disproportionality in achievement, and by examining the interactions between staff and students across ethnic and racial lines (Banks, 2001). These dimensions could be present in multicultural education approaches at various levels and implemented into practice in different ways and with varying outcomes. After all, as Banks and Banks (2004, p. 4) have put it, “[m]ulticultural education is also a process whose goals will never be fully realised”. Depending on their interpretation and implementation into practice, these dimensions may lead to the opposite results than the ones aimed for. Consequently, a number of approaches of multicultural education have been developed across various contexts: the contributions, the additive, the transformation and social action approach (Banks, 2006 [1988], pp. 140-143).

The contributions and additive approaches are the most criticised types of multicultural education. The contributions approach is the most frequent, especially in schools who attempt for the first time to work towards a multicultural curriculum. It is characterised by the insertion of ethnic heroes and heroines and cultural elements such as food, dances and music, with little attention paid to their meanings and importance, during special days, weeks or months that are related to ethnic celebrations or events. The additive approach involves the addition of ethnic content, concepts and perspectives, chosen based on Eurocentric criteria, to the curriculum without restructuring it; it requires little time and effort on behalf of the teachers and is therefore the easiest way of doing multicultural education (Banks, 2006 [1988]). Activities in the context of both these approaches have been heavily criticised and rejected for their often tokenistic character (Massey, 1991; Troyna and Hatcher, 1992; Gaine, 1995; Coelho, 1998; Leeman, 2003; Gaine, 2005; Pearce, 2005; Coulby, 2006; Parekh, 2006) and became known as the “3Fs: Food, Festivals and Famous men” in the US (Coelho, 1998) and the “3Ss: Saris, Samosas and Steelbands” in the UK (Troyna and Williams, 1986). In such ‘celebrations of diversity’, opening up minority cultures to examination and avoiding to criticise the dominant one results in the trivialisation of ethnic cultures; in the study of their strange and exotic characteristics; and, in the reinforcement of stereotypes and misconceptions of minority cultures as inadequate and simple (Phoenix, 1998; Banks, 2006 [1988]). As Ann Phoenix (1998, p. 867) explains, these types of multicultural education are based on Allport’s (1954) theory that prejudice results from individual ignorance and that if there is intercultural contact between groups of people, they begin to like each other and, therefore, racism is eliminated. However, “familiarity does not necessarily therefore breed liking” and, consequently, multiculturalism, by dealing only with individualised notions of prejudice, fails to deal with racism (Phoenix, 1998). In the words of Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 217), “the psychologizing of racism seems to misplace the problem”. Some other
approaches of multicultural education move further than the additive ones in terms of addressing social inequalities. For example, the transformation approach requires a change in the fundamental goals, structure, basic assumptions, and perspectives of the curriculum and aims to enable students to view issues from multiple perspectives, of which the mainstream point of view is merely one (Banks, 2006 [1988]). The social action approach moves a step further by requiring that students are educated for social criticism and are taught decision-making skills in order to become involved in social action. In this context, teachers become agents of social change aiming to promote democratic values and empower their students (Banks, 2006 [1988]). I am more sympathetic to this approach, which emphasises the dimension of empowering school culture and social structure mentioned at the beginning of this section, and thus takes into consideration structural inequalities at a school and a social level.

Multicultural education was criticised from a conservative/Right/nationalist position, which argued that school practices and knowledge should embody those of the state and only the state in terms of language(s), religion, culture or values (Coulby, 2006). It also had critics from within the field, known as advocates of radical or leftist critique, for failing to address and challenge social class inequalities (McLaren and Torres, 1999), structural inequalities, and institutional racism (McCarthy, 1990; Troyna, 1993; Gillborn, 2002; Tomlinson, 2008). Multicultural education has been criticised because the immediate context and the wider framework are too often under-theorised and effectively de-politicised (Coulby, 2006; Gorski, 2006). As Ladson-Billings (1998, p. 22) characteristically describes for the US context, “in its current practice iteration, multicultural education is but a shadow of its conceptual self”, because it fails to engage students in critical thinking about the actual social realities and ends up being manifested through the superficial ‘celebrations of diversity’ described above. The field could benefit from attempts to develop a cross-national perspective instead of only focusing on national contexts with their specific histories and ideologies (May, 1999). A third set of criticisms comes from a postmodernist perspective, arguing that multicultural education failed to consider the multiplicity of identities and, consequently, the multiplicity of racisms (Rattansi, 1999). Otherwise described as intercultural education from a narrow perspective, it has been criticised for failing to acknowledge the connections between ‘race’, class and gender, as opposed to a more critical approach, which places education in a broader social context, in which the teachers become reflective and socially and politically oriented (Leeman and Ledoux, 2003). A further criticism has been the inability of multicultural education to make effective connections between theory, policy and practice (May, 1999). Coulby (2006) suggests that the field may be reinforced theoretically by borrowing elements from the social sciences and comparative education, and by establishing links to related debates in the wider academic area, such as postmodernism, identity politics, and nationalism. Despite such concerns about the lack of
theoretical agreement on the concept of multi/intercultural education, on a policy level there are international treaties, recommendations and declarations from international and European organisations like the United Nations, UNESCO, the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the European Union, which bring obligations and responsibilities in each subscribing state to implement intercultural education (Batelaan and Coomans, 1999). The next section provides a brief review of the policy of intercultural education in Greek-Cypriot primary education.

Intercultural Education in Greek-Cypriot Primary Education

Intercultural education is not part of the Greek-Cypriot mainstream curriculum of Greek-Cypriot education, but is based on school initiatives. In 2001-2002 the Ministry of Education and Culture introduced for the first time the “rhetoric of multicultural education in order to acknowledge the ‘becoming multicultural’ of the Cypriot society”; however, “the welcoming of multiculturalism became the inspiration for an invocation to our historically ‘homogeneous’ society” and multiculturalism has been “addressed as an effect of global socio-economic change rather than as a question pointing to the re-appreciation of our historical ethnic diversity and ethnic divides” (Gregoriou, 2004, p. 245). This is also apparent in the definition provided by the first main policy document on intercultural education, the Ministry’s Report Intercultural Education in Cyprus (Roussou and Hadjiyianni-Yiangou, 2001), which defines intercultural education as:

“the education which prepares people for the social, political and economic situations that they will have to face in a multicultural society and at the same time offers them the opportunity to develop the necessary abilities for critical thought and way of behaviour in various cultural/social environments”, aiming to “create such circumstances which will help the other-language children to become naturally and evenly integrated in the Greek-Cypriot Public School, giving them, at the same time, opportunities to develop and nurture their own language and civilization” (p. 27).

The discourse used refers to minoritised children as “other-language” [“alloglossa”], indicative of the emphasis placed upon Greek language learning. While religious diversity is acknowledged in the policy by providing to non-Christian Orthodox pupils the right of exception from Religious Education, generally the Ministry’s discourse refers to all minoritised pupils in terms of ethnicity, religion, language and culture as “other-language”. The definition provided for intercultural education seems to be based on a pragmatic perspective of intercultural education as a means of preparation for life in a multicultural society, where critical thought and intercultural ways of conduct are valued as useful. However, as the definition concludes, the aim is the minoritised pupils’ ‘even’ and ‘natural’ integration into the majority culture – which points to the assimilationist assumptions of the policy.
A summary of this report (Roussou and Hadjiyianni-Yiangou, 2001) was disseminated to all schools through a Circular (Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture Primary Education Department, 2002). Intercultural education and an emphasis on diversity were set as the priority objectives and the schools were asked to become involved “in activities which reinforce this aspect of education and create attitudes of tolerance and respect for diversity in both pupils and teachers, at all levels of teaching and learning” (Nicolaides, 2005, p. 71). The circular offers guidelines for the linguistic, social and cultural support of “other-language” pupils. The linguistic support is identified with the teaching of Greek as a second language. This focus is confirmed when looking at the majority of aims and measures taken in the context of intercultural education, which deal with the teaching and learning of Greek as a second language. Concerning the social and cultural support of minoritised children, the suggestions include the promotion of their own cultural identity and respect for difference. The activities suggested include celebrations involving traditional dress, flags, maps, stamps, songs, folklore, fairy tales, food and dance. The circular emphasises that:

“such activities contribute to the foregrounding of the other-language children’s culture and civilization and to their easier acceptance by the native children and their parents, as well as to the fight against xenophobia and any racist tendencies” (Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture Primary Education Department, 2002, p. 10, original emphasis).

This approach falls into the category of the additive approach of multicultural education, with an emphasis on celebrations of diversity. As discussed earlier in the paper, such activities suggested do not necessarily challenge xenophobia and racist tendencies; on the contrary, by highlighting the minority cultures, they may reinforce the assumption that the dominant culture is the normal one (Coelho, 1998).

The Ministry of Education and Culture (2008) has recently disseminated further guidelines on intercultural education, through a circular which situates intercultural education in the context of the aims identified by the Commission for Educational Reform (2004b). It states that the aims should be the creation of “a democratic school which integrates and does not exclude. This means equality of opportunities for access, participation, success and ‘treatment’ within the school, by acknowledging the diversity and multiculturalism of the pupil population, as well as their personal needs”, and “a school system/education which respects diversity, pluralism (cultural, linguistic, religious) and multiple intelligence” (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2008, p. 1). The measures suggested for the attainment of these goals emphasise, similarly to previous policy documents, the teaching of, and teacher education for, Greek as a second language. It also includes new elements, such as the preparation of a Welcome Guide for newly arrived pupils and their
families in the eight most common foreign languages found in Greek-Cypriot schools. Additionally, the circular argues that since “intercultural education does not only address the other-language children, but also the children of the majority”, the Ministry is planning to add “intercultural elements in the new curricula and textbooks which are planned in the context of the changes in the structure and content of education” (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2008, p. 3). Similarly to other policy documents, there is no reference to challenging racism and discrimination, while the term “other-language” continues to be used, pointing to the continuous focus of the policy on the importance of learning Greek as a second language. It is important to note that the fieldwork which generated the data presented in this article was carried out before these additional guidelines were published. In the next section I discuss the methodology of this study.

**An Ethnographic Study of Intercultural Education in Cyprus**

Ethnography has been the main qualitative research approach employed to explore the diverse experiences of school life; it is “well-suited to the task, as a result of its open-ended orientation and concern with detailed investigation of diverse perspectives and of the complexities of human interaction” (Woods and Hammersley, 1993, p. 1). The first phase of ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in two highly diverse primary schools in a town centre at the south part of Cyprus for one month during May 2007. The schools were School A, with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Grades (6-9-year-olds) and School B, including the 4th, 5th and 6th Grades (10-12-year-olds). The schools are situated in the same space and share the garden, yard and sporting facilities. They have a common Parents’ Association, but are run separately by two Headteachers with separate teaching staff – with the exception of the PE teacher. Considering the general situation in Cyprus, the majority of teachers in both schools were, unsurprisingly, female.

The choice of schools was first based on the high ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity of the school population. Both schools are attended by a large percentage of non-Greek-Cypriot pupils (approximately 50% with one non-Greek-Cypriot parent and 30% with both non-Greek-Cypriot parents). This allowed the exploration of the everyday realities of teachers and children in a multicultural school environment and provided rich interview and observational data. Despite this diversity, the schools function like any other public primary school, with the provision of extra teaching periods for the teaching of Greek as a second language. The minoritised pupils mainly come from migrant workers’ families. The schools have gained a reputation of a ‘ghetto’, and so has the area in which they are situated, because of the low rents in the town centre. On the contrary, most Greek-Cypriot pupils come from higher social class backgrounds, including the children of the doctors, lawyers and businessmen who have offices close by. As noted in field notes: a characteristic of this school is that next to the Greek-Cypriot doctors’
daughters sit the sons of the doctors’ Pontian cleaning ladies. This was another reason for choosing the above as a setting for the current study, as it provided an opportunity to relate research in intercultural education with issues of social class, popular discourses on migrants, and ethnic stereotypes found, for example, in the mass media and political discourse.

The data collection methods included interviewing, observations at a classroom and whole-school level, and, collection of documents related to intercultural education (curriculum, policy documents, teaching material, children’s work, reports, pupil population demographics etc). The interviews include the recorded semi-structured interviews with the Ministry officials and Inspectors, unstructured conversations with the Heads and teachers, planned discussion groups with children, and the random casual conversations in the school corridors, the staffroom or the schoolyard. Recorded interviews provided more structured data, as did themes that were introduced in all conversations with the teachers, while the off-the-record conversations complement the interview data. The observations recorded in field notes also complement, and often contradict, the interview data. According to the social constructionism paradigm, all data collection methods that were employed aimed at providing accounts of how participants construct their everyday realities. In total, 27 periods of classroom observations were carried out in 15 classes; 17 interviews with teachers and the two Headteachers; 2 interviews with Ministry officials; 2 interviews with the Inspectors; and, 34 planned group discussions with 90 children from 9 classes. Interviews with adults on average lasted 31 minutes and in total 11.63 hours, while group discussions lasted around 9 minutes and in total 5.44 hours, and usually involved 3 children. The ethical guidelines for educational research of BERA were followed throughout the research process (British Educational Research Association, 2004).

The data analysis is informed by the constructivist grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006) and discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Both approaches are based on the theoretical orientation of social constructionism (Burr, 2003) and are suitable for analysing ethnographic data (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Charmaz, 2006). A series of codings were performed on the large body of transcripts by searching through the data for themes, which had either arisen from the research questions or emerged during the fieldwork or the transcription process. Atlas.ti software was used to organise and manage the transcripts and develop the codes into families. The Atlas.ti was chosen because it is designed on the basis of grounded theory approach and uses the same terminology. All interviews were transcribed in Greek and the necessary quotes were translated for this article, which deals only with the most frequently found codes, of ‘intercultural education aims/definitions’, ‘intercultural education practices’ and the relevant code of ‘teachers’ critical reflections’ in order to examine the participants’ definitions and practices of intercultural education.
“What Does Intercultural Education Mean to You?”
Aims of Intercultural Education for Greek-Cypriot Teachers

The data discussed in this section are drawn from interviews with the participants and refer to their understandings of what intercultural education is. The aims most frequently suggested by the participants were acceptance of diversity and challenging xenophobia, discrimination and racism.

Acceptance of Diversity
A number of teachers emphasise that acceptance as learning to live together is the aim of intercultural education. The aim of acceptance was presented in three ways: as a synonym to learning to live together, as achievable through learning about other cultures, and, as the opposite of assimilation into the majority culture. The most characteristic example of the first understanding of acceptance was given by Headteacher Anna² (School A, 39),³ who stated:

“our goals in intercultural education are acceptance and love. Through diversity. It's a goal of the school. That in this garden we all have a right to live. All kinds of flowers, all kinds of colours. And through this diversity harmony is achieved.”

Anna argues that the main aim of intercultural education is acceptance of diversity, through learning to live together. She draws on the discourse of human rights to emphasise the universality of everyone’s right to live, regardless of their differences from the majority. On a similar note, Stella (School B, 15) argued that intercultural education should promote acceptance, so that the Greek-Cypriot children will “learn to live with these children, to accept them, to be friends with them”, while Yiorgos (both schools, 7) considers that intercultural education needs “to cultivate acceptance of diversity in all the children. It is not just about the other-language children, it is also for the Greek-Cypriots”. Soula (School A, 16) emphasised that the children “must understand that we must not be racists, that we should accept everyone”. However, most teachers argued that the aim of acceptance as learning to live together is not fully realised at their school at the moment. Their statements in this paragraph are indicative of the assumption that Greek-Cypriot children at the moment do not accept the other-language pupils and of the recognition that teachers have a role in the process of promoting this acceptance.

Secondly, acceptance was perceived as achievable through knowledge of other cultures. Caterina (School B, 18) explains how awareness of cultural differences can help children focus on their similarities instead:
“To experience our celebrations and to tell us about theirs. To understand what unites us and what divides us, what brings us closer and that, in the end, differences bring us closer and make our life more interesting; they offer knowledge. A different language, religion or origin are not elements that divide us but they could also unite us.”

The reasoning behind this approach is made explicit by Anna who argues that “if I don’t get to know the other, get under their skin, understand the way they are thinking, I don’t accept them and I don’t want them”. Her argument emphasises the importance of the process and the outcomes of trying to understand each other. Additionally, Angela (School B, 21) argues that getting to know other civilizations is a strategy for challenging xenophobia and racism; she explains how she attempts to achieve this in her lessons:

“Like now we are teaching clothing. I bring images of Indians, of a woman from Afghanistan, of our own traditional costumes. From these they get to know the civilization, how important it is to dress, and to show that I am a moral human being – for example, in the primitive tribes of Africa walking around naked is not considered immoral; for us yes, for them no. This is intercultural education. To get to know my own civilization and that of those next to me.”

Angela’s aim is to promote respect for and understanding of other ways of life in order to challenge racist beliefs. However, anti-racist strategies may often have the opposite consequences if implemented based on false assumptions. Angela’s use of ‘primitive tribes of Africa’ might promote the view that while having different values is normal, the African civilization is considered to be inferior to the dominant cultures in Europe. Therefore, the pupils may learn to respect others’ moral values and understand why Africans might ‘walk around naked’, but will they consider this to be a culture of the same value as theirs? Angela’s lesson can be classified under the additive approach of multicultural education described earlier, where ethnic content which is chosen and judged based on Eurocentric values is added to the curriculum.

Zoe (School B, 11) views acceptance of minoritised pupils as the opposite of their assimilation into the majority culture:

“The pupil must not be assimilated; I will not take away from him any of his own elements, but, it doesn’t mean that he must impose anything on us, that we should terminate what we are and accept any element of his culture.”

This is a positive approach for the non-Greek-Cypriot pupils in Zoe’s class, as she does not consciously attempt to assimilate them into the group. However, she seems to view cultures as having rigid boundaries and specific elements that can either be maintained or lost when in contact with other cultures. Such an essentialist view can be an obstacle for meaningful intercultural exchanges in Zoe’s class.
Challenging Negative Attitudes and Beliefs

Another aim that informants attribute to intercultural education is challenging negative attitudes and beliefs such as xenophobia, cultural superiority, racism, and the perception of diversity as a problem. Some teachers consider these to be characteristics of Cypriots in general that need to be challenged through intercultural education. As Vaso (School B, 24) put it, “it must teach us to live with everyone … We haven’t accepted that there will be others next to us”. Rebecca believes that if intercultural education becomes an integral part of the mainstream curriculum and school policies, it might contribute to challenging Cypriots’ “snobbism towards the foreigners”. Similarly, Antigoni (School B, 14) argues that it can challenge the presence of racism in Cypriot society, and Marilena (School A, 10) thinks that intercultural education should be challenging the prejudices of Cypriots toward the foreigners. Very few teachers specifically referred to racism as a characteristic of children’s relations, with Stella stating that “there is intense racism at our school” and Caterina (School B, 18) arguing that intercultural education needs to challenge the “fear of the foreigner” and “the sense of superiority” that she observes among her pupils. They both argued that intercultural education has a role to play, but also acknowledged serious difficulties in its implementation.

Interestingly, however, these teachers provide justifications for the existence of xenophobia and racism in Greek-Cypriot society – specifically the small size of the island, the national problem and the ‘natural’ fear of the ‘foreign element’. Antigoni (School B, 14) sees the fear of the foreigners that leads to racism as “our defence” because “we have been one small island on its own, cut, divided. It is no accident that we are experiencing this phobia”. The perception of Cyprus as a small island, semi-occupied, enhances negative attitudes towards non-Greek-Cypriots. Some teachers argued that there is “not enough space” and that the continuous “national threat” makes accepting the “foreigners” even harder. These teachers do recognise the phenomenon of racism and are concerned about its causes and implications; yet their understandings of it are highly influenced by the discourses surrounding the national problem of Cyprus and the realities that persist in a still ethnically divided island.

Overall, the participants’ suggestion for intercultural education as an approach which should challenge negative attitudes in children reflects the dimension of prejudice reduction described earlier. However, as already discussed, such individualistic perceptions of racism may fail to challenge the racism and discrimination experiences by minoritised pupils or eliminate popular negative discourses on diversity.
Before presenting the practices for the implementation of intercultural education that teachers referred to in the interviews, it is useful to look at how they define and understand the nature of intercultural education as an educational approach. They consider it to have a cross-curricular character, with no implementation guidelines, ‘recipes’ or timetable provided, brought into the classroom whenever a teacher considers there is an opportunity to do so, mainly through discussions with the pupils. Consequently, most teachers stated that they “insert intercultural education” into their teaching, when opportunities arise, depending on the characteristics of the pupil population of their classrooms. For Soula (School A, 16), intercultural education consists of finding the opportunities to tell her pupils that “we all have to be united, to play and to be a family. We are few children in the class and it doesn’t matter if they are from another country”. She is addressing the Greek-Cypriot children in order to convince them that they should accept the children from other countries. Such discussions, as Caterina (School B, 18) explains, are the main way through which the message of acceptance of diversity may be “transmitted” to the children:

“I can’t imagine that this is something that happens through written speech or with an exercise that they are going to write. It’s more about conversation and the creation of a climate through which these messages will pass into their consciousness.”

Other teachers said that their usual intercultural education practice is to find opportunities in the mainstream curriculum where the minoritised children may “say something or bring something from their own culture” (Zoe, School B, 11) or “transfer something from their own space” (Yiota, School A, 13). Most of them, however, argued that they “don’t do anything special”, as Lydia put it. Angela (School B, 21) also said that “if I didn’t have foreign children, I wouldn’t have followed this programme”, expressing the perspective of intercultural education addressing only diverse classrooms – an approach that has been heavily criticised as inappropriate even in culturally homogeneous schools (for example, Gaine, 2005).

In terms of intercultural education practices, teachers often referred to teaching Greek as a second language to newly arrived children. Additionally, both Headteachers emphasised collaborative learning as a way of promoting acceptance for diversity. The schools organise activities in which the children play in groups that are mixed in terms of gender, ethnicity and achievement. Andreas (School B, 34) argues that “there is no antagonism in games or in the classroom; there is collaboration everywhere. Because, in order to collaborate with someone, first you have to accept them”. He considers acceptance a precondition for
collaboration, and Anna (School A, 39) similarly emphasises that “in a group you will accept everyone and everything” and considers team sports to be the most appropriate strategy for this aim.

The main practices for intercultural education in both schools were events for the celebration of diversity. These provided opportunities for diverse children in whole-school and classroom events to present their culture through exchanging phrases and songs in their language, sharing customs and habits, cooking of traditional foods and presenting information about their country. As Headteacher Anna described:

“I dedicate during the whole year at Christmas and at Easter a little something for these children as well. To sing a song from their country, to say a recipe for Christmas or to mention the customs of their country for Easter or Christmas, to tell me their prayer, for me to accept the way they are praying”.

Interestingly, the whole-school events that are referred to as opportunities for non-Greek-Cypriot children to contribute with their own cultural experiences are Christmas and Easter. The majority of non-Greek-Cypriot pupils at the schools come from Eastern European countries and are Greek-speaking and Christian-Orthodox. This might justify why Christian celebrations present opportunities for intercultural exchanges. However, despite the fact that Muslim and Catholic pupils also attend the schools, there was no mention of any celebrations related to other religions. Presentations of other countries were also added to the mainstream events as part of the weekly assemblies at one of the schools. As Caterina (School B, 18) explained, “every Friday morning, during assembly, some child from a different country, not from Cyprus, would present something to everyone”. This could involve pictures, poems or reading a few lines about each country.

The use of other languages parallel to the mainstream lessons is another practice that some teachers referred to as part of intercultural education. Apart from learning to say good morning in all the languages spoken by her pupils, Lydia (School A, 2) finds learning words in new languages to be a strategy to deal with Greek-Cypriot children’s negative reactions whenever they hear someone not speaking Greek: “if a child says something and the others are about to react negatively, I try to present it as a lesson, as learning something new”. Additionally, Nadia (School A, 9) mentioned that when they come across a word with a non-Greek root, she explains how languages borrow words from each other and asks the bilingual children in her class to translate it in their language for the rest: “For example the word humour is in English, so I ask ‘What is it in Russian, Marko?’ ‘In Polish Aleksy, how do you say it?’ So each child gets the opportunity to use their language a little bit”. Songs in other languages were a popular activity among the children, according to Yiota (School A, 13), who asked her Russian pupils to teach the rest of the class a Christmas song and observed positive outcomes:
“I believe that at a classroom level we have achieved something because the children accepted this very positively. They didn’t make fun of the other children that sang in Russian. And the children were happy as well because they gave something from their homeland and the others received.”

Cooking of traditional foods is part of the agenda for intercultural education in both schools. Angela (School B, 21) told me about a Romanian mother she had asked to come and cook with the children before Christmas:

“We brought to the school a Romanian mother, who was embarrassed to come to the school even, and she made some Christmas foods that they make. We wrote the recipe on the board in Greek and in Romanian and we found that there are common words – for flour she wrote farina (also used for flour in Greek), for eggs she wrote oa (Ancient Greek for eggs). The children made observations. They got to know Romania.”

According to Angela, identifying common words in both languages is a way for the Greek-Cypriot children to “get to know” Romania. The question raised here is whether what the children learnt about Romanian cooking and language was worth asking a Romanian mother to become the representative of her culture. As Angela explained to me, the mother was “so embarrassed to come to the school” that she had to “convince” her to do this with the children and “could not understand” why she felt uncomfortable. Zoe (School B, 11) seems to view these events from a different perspective:

“The Ministry asks us to devote two weeks to intercultural education, with fancy slogans and temporary activities, for the pupils’ parents come and cook something, to talk about diversity, so that they [the children] will supposedly come closer to each other. I think that by emphasising diversity you pull them apart. At least this has been my experience so far …”

Even if such practices promote cultural understanding, are they the appropriate way to go about it if they require asking members of cultural minorities to go under the spotlight and become representatives of their whole cultures? And most importantly, how can teachers become equipped with the necessary critical tools to be able to distinguish between what could have more negative than positive implications? Overall, the practices described by the participants fall into the category of the additive approach of multicultural education, described earlier. Even though they do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes, they are usually a first step towards the transformation and social action approaches, especially when schools attempt to implement intercultural education for the first time. Some examples of teachers’ critical reflections on their schools’ practices are discussed next.
Teachers’ Critical Reflections

Considerably few teachers, all younger than 40-years of age, critically questioned the concept of intercultural education and its ability to promote social justice as it is currently implemented. Some teachers argued that intercultural education cannot be effective in challenging social inequality on its own, as this depends on a holistic social intervention. Constandinos (School B, 11) clarified from the beginning that our conversation would be referring to the school practices only, as he believes that the social level is “a completely different issue”. Yiorgos (both schools, 7) emphasised that “the school is not the only solution, there are many things in the game ... it’s about all of the social situations. But I have no suggestions about what should happen in order to save the world”. While he recognises the school’s role in promoting social equality, he seems to underestimate his role as a teacher in this aspect. Yiota (School A, 13) argued that intercultural education “helps very much, but does not fight xenophobia on its own”. These quotes are evidence for at least some teachers’ broader understandings of social inequality. The positive aspect of such statements is that teachers do reflect on their roles as professionals and citizens not just on a school and a local level, but perhaps on a national or global level. However, there is an apparent risk in Yiorgos’ words, that when absorbing the big picture, teachers may feel powerless, inadequate, or out of place; thus, they might be unable to take over the responsibility of being active in the promotion of social change.

Lydia (School A, 2) was the only teacher who argued that intercultural education needs to challenge the view that diversity is a problem and promote the idea that it is normal:

“Children should understand that this diversity is not a problem, in terms of the fact that the other is different, doesn’t speak the same language, or follow the same religion or dress code. This is what I want them to comprehend.”

For Lydia this is the primary aim for intercultural education. As opposed to other teachers, she was the only one to be critical of the perception of diversity as a problem that needs to be “treated”, despite the practical problems she faces in her diverse classroom.

In relation to the aims of intercultural education, Constandinos (School B, 11) was the only teacher who referred to challenging nationalism in the curriculum and explained how he tries to “minimise” it in History lessons by telling the pupils that “it’s not just the Greeks who began a revolution, there are other peoples that have a history behind them”, and in Maths also by mentioning “the Russian villagers” along with “Pythagoras the Greek”. Similarly, Zoe (School B, 11) was critical of the curriculum, arguing against the “one-day or two-week celebrations of diversity” and suggested that:
“Since we know that in Cyprus we have Russians, Polish, Moldavians, and in our school we have an Indian boy, the right thing to do would be to have texts in the Language books from the countries of origin of our foreigners; they could include texts of their own literature. By teaching these texts, we would include their cultures in the class as well.”

Zoe’s suggestion is not simply an add-on approach for intercultural education. She argues for a reform of the curriculum, so that diversity comes to the centre of teaching and learning and becomes mainstreamed. No other teacher made such a suggestion. However, two teachers did express their discomfort with the practices adopted at the school for the acceptance of diversity. As Marilena (School A, 10) put it,

“Sometimes you’re troubled about what should be happening in school. They [the foreigners] are supposed to feel that they are maintaining the elements from their countries, their traditions, and their customs. I think it’s good for them to know – that is, where they’re coming from – but it shouldn’t happen in a way that makes them feel they are being stigmatised and that they are different.”

Antigoni (School B, 14), referring to the overall attitude of the Cypriot schools when welcoming newly arrived children, said:

“I believe that we deal with these children very empirically; that is, we welcome them the way we know, we are not trained as to how you welcome a foreign-language child. It’s more with our love, with acceptance, but perhaps if there was something … How are we supposed to welcome them? How long should it take? How should we communicate with the parents? Let’s not leave it to trial and error.”

Both teachers are reflecting on their practices and show an understanding of the complexity of the situation. Marilena said that she had some experiences that have made her consider the possibility of the stigmatisation of diverse children during celebrations, while Antigoni argues that love is simply not enough in their effort to accept them. It seems that even the few teachers who are self-reflective have difficulties in formulating, let alone answering, such questions.

Concluding Remarks

“Intercultural education cannot be a fashionable ornament stuck on to an otherwise unchanged school; it is a profound and deeply difficult demand, internalising the drama of the coming-together of the world” (Wimberley, 2003, p. 208).
Teaching and learning in the increasingly culturally diverse Greek-Cypriot schools is happening in the context of globalisation, and, at the same time, in a mainly assimilationist framework, which ‘treats’ multiculturalism with additions and occasional contributions to the curriculum and school practices. It is important to acknowledge that the monocultural character of education is directly related to the island's modern history and anti-colonialism, which may explain the insistence on ethnocentric curricula (Charalambous and Papamichael, 2008). This article focused on teachers, as their role is crucial for the implementation of intercultural education. Some conclusions can be drawn from the preliminary findings presented, not for the purposes of generalisation, but to provide some insights into teachers’ understandings of intercultural education.

That most teachers view acceptance and challenging xenophobia and racism as the primary aims for intercultural education reflects the dimensions found in the literature. So does their perception of intercultural education as a flexible educational approach which needs to permeate all lessons, and does not work in the same way in all contexts. In its implementation, intercultural education needs to inform the teaching and learning of all subjects (Cushner, 1998b) and at all phases of education (Coulby, 2006). There is no formula that will work in all situations, but the successful innovations are the small, shared and closely monitored projects based on an adaptation of current knowledge on cultural issues and school effectiveness by the educators to their own specific context (Cushner, 1998b). Nevertheless, the activities reported by the teachers as implemented in the schools in the context of intercultural education belong to the additive approach; they are sometimes tokenistic and, according to some teachers, unsuccessful in the aims they set out to achieve. The key issue is the teachers’ ability to reflect on their own practices and evaluate the results of their practices in a broader context of social inequality and discrimination. While concerns for the current status of diversity at their school were only mentioned by a few teachers, this is a positive step towards a reconsideration of intercultural education in Greek-Cypriot schools and a critical questioning of teachers’ own assumptions and teaching practices.

With the recent changes in the Ministry’s discourses and policies, and the current efforts to implement the educational reform, Greek-Cypriot education is moving closer to a transformation approach of the curriculum, which bring diversity and respect to its centre and supports teachers who are able to contribute to social action and change for equality. The research presented in this article is ongoing. Seeking to investigate issues of diversity in Greek-Cypriot primary schools, it attempts to explore teachers’ understandings of intercultural education and diversity and how these affect their everyday practices. The aim is to develop a picture of intercultural education in Greek-Cypriot schools by drawing on similar ethnographic studies and by taking into consideration the multiple perspectives of the everyday realities of all school actors.
Notes

1. Others include cross-cultural education, intercultural learning, inclusive education, education for social justice, multicultural citizenship education, multicultural anti-racist education and international education.

2. All names used in this paper are pseudonyms.

3. The numbers in brackets indicate years of service.

Bibliography


GREEK-CYPRIOT TEACHERS’ UNDERSTANDINGS OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION


Abstract
This paper sets out to critically evaluate the situation as regards the current state of affairs on combating discrimination in Cyprus. It concentrates primarily on the legal aspects of the struggle to put an end to discriminatory ideologies, policies, practices and prejudices on all grounds recognised by the EU antidiscrimination acquis apart from gender, the grounds of race or ethnic origin, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation. Moreover, it also examines other grounds recognised by the constitution and international conventions but the legislative measures to counter gender discrimination are dealt with foremost because they provide the pivotal dimension which created the groundwork for anti-discrimination in those other fields. More often than not legislative measures are treated separately from other grounds but if a comprehensive picture of the anti-discrimination framework is to be understood, then an integral approach must be taken to view the system operating as a whole; legal development in one ground or field both influences and has a knock-on-effect on the other.

Keywords: direct and indirect discrimination, anti-discrimination acquis, ethnic conflict, national question.

Introduction
This paper draws on research conducted over the last five years as part of the EU Network of Non-discrimination experts,¹ along with various other research papers undertaken since 2004 on the subject of discrimination. The paper begins with a historical introduction of the ethnic conflict framed within the complex constitutional structure of the Cyprus Republic, and a brief outline of the background to the political situation, which led to the ethnic conflict and violence in the 1960s and the de facto partition of the country since 1974. If the issues surrounding the implementation and impact of various reform measures are to be understood in the
field of anti-discrimination since accession to the EU in 2004, a contextualisation of the situation is essential.

**Historical Background**

The historical setting of Cyprus has been dominated by the ethnic relations between the two constitutionally recognised Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities, as well as the role of foreign forces, something also reflected in the political, economic, ideological, social and cultural life of the country. Historically, the research agenda on Cyprus which focused on the central political problem, still dominates Cyprus and the restoration of the unity and constitutional order of the country has inevitably resulted in the relative neglect to initiate studies on the various grounds of discrimination. Indeed, tackling discrimination on grounds other than ethnic or racial origin has somehow been subsumed in the ‘national question’; there, the emphasis has been on studying relations between the two communities, undervaluing discrimination as such, or looking at the treatment of smaller minorities. Even though the Cyprus problem remains unresolved and there is currently another initiative for its resolution, following the rejection of the 2004 Annan plan, the situation has changed dramatically. As regards the question of knowledge, research, institutions, and actual policies, there has been enormous development since the first Expert Report was written to confront discrimination in Cyprus as a result of transposing the anti-discrimination acquis. In the daily lives of people there is, however, widespread intolerance as several studies have shown, and a great deal more needs to be done before various forms of discrimination are halted and society is free from bigotry. Good practices can be utilised, but these measures need further enhancement if they are to be effective instruments in the struggle against victimisation.

**Ethnic Conflict, Discrimination and the Cyprus Problem**

The Cyprus constitution, adopted under the Zurich-London Accord of 1959, contains rigorous bi-communalism, whereby the two ‘communities’, the Greek-Cypriot population who make up 78% and 18% who are the Turkish-Cypriot population, share power in a consociational system of power-sharing. Citizenship is strictly communally divided. There are also three other minority groups who have the constitutionally recognised status of ‘religious groups’: the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins. A small Roma community also exists, registered as part of the Turkish-Cypriot community. This system has been criticised by the Council of Europe (2001). The Constitution provides for a system of separate elections; separate majorities are required in both the executive (Council of Ministers) and legislature (House of Representatives) and both the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-president have separate veto powers. A system of quota participation by the two major Cypriot Communities in all areas of public life is also provided for in the Constitution. Parliamentary seats are allocated
by the Constitution on a 70% to 30% basis between the Greek and the Turkish communities. Furthermore, laws of ‘personal’ nature (education, religion, and family) are organised along communal lines, under the supervision of separate communal chambers.

In 1963, following a Greek-Cypriot proposal for amendment of the Constitution, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the Government. Since then, the administration of the Republic has been undertaken by the Greek Cypriots. While inter-communal strife ensued until 1967, the Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that the functioning of the government must adopt the “doctrine of necessity” and continue despite the constitutional deficiencies created by the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal from the administration. Since 1974 the northern part of Cyprus – some 35% of its territory – has been under Turkish occupation and outside the control of the Cyprus Government. Since the war only a few hundred Greek-Cypriots inhabit the northern territory, with only a few hundred Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled south (see ECRI Report, 2001, 2006; Kyle, 2000). However, since the end of May 2003 the regime in the occupied territories has allowed Turkish Cypriots to visit the Republic-controlled south on condition that they return before midnight and the Greek Cypriots have been allowed to visit the north, following passport inspection and the adherence to restrictions on their stay. This paper refers only to the Cyprus Government controlled area.

As is often repeated, the starting point for the new negotiations is the rejection of the comprehensive plan put forward by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The plan failed to provide a settlement due to the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriot community in the referendum held on 24 April 2004. The plan contained a new constitution, which if implemented, would have dramatically transformed the current structure of government and constitutional provisions. On 1 May 2004 Cyprus acceded to the EU as a de facto divided country, having failed to resolve its long-standing problem. Meanwhile, since the partial lifting of the restrictions of movement, which commenced in April 2003, there have been millions of crossings to and from the Government-controlled area (hereinafter referred to as “the south”) to the area not under the control of the Government (hereinafter referred to as “the north”) and vice-versa. Across the country and cutting through its capital, Nicosia, runs what is referred to as a ‘soft EU border’ or ‘the Green Line’, which is governed via an EU Regulation. Since April 2003 a few hundred Turkish Cypriots have moved to the Government-controlled area, where they now reside, while several thousand cross to the south on a daily basis to work.

Problems between the relations of the two communities began directly after the newly formed Republic was established in 1960; in fact the first inter-communal incidents began in 1957. The imposed constitution was extremely rigid and
complicated and quickly led to conflict between the two communities as the Report by the UN special envoy, Mr Galo Plaza, makes clear. This Report was written for the UN Secretary-General by Mr. Plaza in his capacity as United Nations Mediator on Cyprus. The community leaderships viewed the provisions of the Constitution quite differently concerning their respective participation in the Government. The social lives of the two communities, including the question of discrimination, were inevitably shaped by the turbulent political history of the island that brought the two communities into conflict. There has been very little research on the question of discrimination as such, given the apparent dominance of the political question and the widespread ethnic violence. The Plaza Report makes some reference to underlying ethnic divisions and the fact that individual human rights, including the right not to be discriminated against, were deficient between the 1960-1965 period. Under the heading “The protection of individual and minority rights”, Mr. Plaza notes the difficulty in applying the principle of equality of treatment and human rights without discrimination due to “the fact that the population of the island continues to consist of two principal ethnic communities, the further fact that they are unequal in numbers and finally the gravity of the conflict which has developed between them”. The same Report noted the difficulty involved in the task of rebuilding a “progressive re-birth of confidence and the re-establishment of social peace”, as the obstacles “are no less psychological than political”. The way forward in Cyprus, according to the Report, is “the establishment of the most rigorous guarantees of human rights and safeguards against discrimination”, which illustrates, if in an indirect manner, the prevalence of discriminatory practices that inevitably go hand-in-hand with the ethnic conflict and turbulence that existed, not only during the particular period of 1963-1967, but also throughout the short life of the Cyprus Republic.

The rigorous bi-communal provisions of the Constitution did not prove very useful in the end. When examining relations between the two communities, given that Greek Cypriots are almost entirely Greek Orthodox and Turkish Cypriots entirely Muslim, ethnic discrimination in Cyprus can be viewed interchangeably in prejudicial practices against members of each community on the grounds of ethnicity and religion. ‘Religious’ discrimination is not exhausted there, however, as the treatment of Jehovah Witness conscientious objectors refusing to serve in the military illustrate.

The current de facto division of the island creates an awkward situation (see ECRI, 2001, 2006; Kyle, 1997). The opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities concludes that there is reason for concern about Reports from Turkish Cypriots on cases of ill treatment by police officers, as well as difficulties in instituting criminal proceedings against officials under suspicion. The Committee recommends that the Cyprus authorities ensure that these proceedings are properly conducted. The situation has radically changed, however, with the recent partial lifting of restrictions on freedom
of movement by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities, which has resulted in thousands of Turkish Cypriots crossing over into the territory controlled by the Republic. The police authorities may no longer be able or interested in monitoring so closely the lives of Turkish Cypriots living in the south.

The Dominance of the ‘National Question’ and Ethnic Conflict Resulted in a Weak Anti-discrimination Tradition in Operation

Given the background of ethnic conflict and war, it is hardly surprising that historically there has been very little said about the general discriminatory practices in Cyprus. The dominance of the ‘national question’ resulted in a very weak tradition of anti-discrimination laws and policies being in operation, with the exception of sex anti-discrimination, where some measures did exist. Prior to accession to the EU, research on discriminatory practices was virtually non-existent as the monitoring systems are either archaic or non-existent. Recent studies on the subject, however, show a new interest in unjust and unfair treatment with the development of research centres working on migration/discrimination and the RAXEN and FRALEX, gender and migration, gender equality, labour and employment issues, NGOs, researchers and a more pluralistic media.

In reality anti-discrimination has never been a priority issue for the government, whose measures are limited to only a handful of one-off events where awareness is raised. It is not a pressing concern for civil society either, with the exception of a few NGOs who are usually vulnerable groups themselves. There are no NGOs to act on behalf of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots or the Roma, and only two or three NGOs to handle the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. By far the most organised of all anti-discrimination NGOs are those dealing with disability, whose actions are coordinated by a national confederation, recently afforded the status of a social partner, who regularly makes use of the procedure before the Equality Body. There is only one gay rights NGO, with only one or two of its members being ‘out of the closet’ to fight openly for gay rights. Discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is widespread amongst Cypriot society, despite decriminalisation of homosexuality since 2000, to the effect that homosexuals make little or no use of the rights and the procedures created under Directive 2000/78. So far, only two complaints have been submitted to the Equality Body alleging discrimination on sexual orientation grounds, and one was made by a non-Cypriot. An opinion survey carried out for the Equality –Body in early 2006 revealed very high levels of intolerance amongst Cypriot society against homosexuals; unfortunately the momentum was not seized by the Equality Body to create a code of conduct aimed at eradicating prejudice against them.

In general, dialogue between policymakers and NGOs and/or social partners remains at low levels and is inexistent in most fields of discrimination apart from disability. During the year 2007, a consultation NGO group was set up by the Justice
Ministry for coordinating preparatory actions for the European Year for Equal Opportunities 2007, but this mostly concerned the allocation of funding for events during the year. The organised occasions were predominantly one-off events to raise general awareness or were of a ‘celebratory’ character, with little sustainability element. The group was dissolved at the expiration of the Year.

The specific legal provisions are examined in the next section.

Legislative Framework

Legal Developments in Combating Discrimination
The current reality means that the legal system is essentially dealing with a society that was forcibly divided further in 1974, following the military interventions by Greece and Turkey. The three ‘religious groups’ stayed in the south with the Greek Cypriots, and the Roma joined the Turkish Cypriots in the north until early 2000, when many of them returned to the south and settled in specifically designated Roma settlements, renowned for their squalor, poverty and lack of basic hygiene. The housing segregation inevitably led to the schooling isolation of Roma children, who had no choice but to attend schools close to their residence. The only measure introduced by the government that aims at integrating the Roma community is the introduction of the teaching of Turkish language in one school where a large number of Roma pupils attend, but there are no classes on Roma history and culture. Expert reports show discrimination against Turkish speaking pupils in general and against the Roma in particular.

The partial lifting of the ban on freedom of movement in April 2003 allowed several thousands of Turkish Cypriots to cross the dividing line from north to south on a daily basis to work, to access public services or just to visit. This has resulted in a novel situation, which opens up the possibility for on-going discrimination against Turkish Cypriots on the grounds of language as well as ethnic origin in the field of access to public services and employment and housing, resulting from the non-use of the Turkish language, inter alia, official state documents, and from the suspension of other constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots, such as the right to their properties. An ECHR decision pursuant to a successful application from a Turkish Cypriot ruled that the ‘doctrine of necessity’ must be exercised in a manner that does not violate the nucleus of rights or the principle of equality; this principle, however, has not been consistently followed either by the Courts in Cyprus or by the Equality Body, as both have issued decisions upholding the ‘doctrine of necessity’ as legal justification for suspension of the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots, including voting rights. As mentioned earlier, anti-discrimination has not been a pressing concern for the government or for civil society and little has been done other than organise a few one-off events to raise some awareness. There are only a handful of NGOs engaged to protect the rights of the Turkish
Cypriots, the Roma, migrants, asylum seekers and homosexuals, but the rights for people with disabilities are more organised and this area fairs better.

The Republic of Cyprus has recently introduced a comprehensive system of anti-discrimination that covers six grounds overall, as will be examined below. The system is operating effectively but there is considerable room for improvement and for better implementation in the public sector, whilst unfairness in the private sector is widespread because legislation has so far not changed matters on that front. As for the situation in the occupied north of the island, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the government of Turkey is responsible for restrictions imposed on Greek Cypriot residents in the north with regard to access to their places of worship and participation in other areas of religious life. Recently, however, there have been some moves by the EU, NGOs and some policymakers to introduce legislation in line with the acquis, particularly as hopes for a resolution of the political problem of the division have been rekindled.

Below we set out analytically the various legal instruments to confront discrimination which, although a dynamic area of law, it unfortunately remains underutilised by legal practitioners, activists and scholars, despite the impressive possibilities in redressing prejudice in the country.

**Constitutional Provisions on Human Rights and Equality**

The Constitution: A Consociational Power-sharing System

The Cypriot constitution sets out a consociational power-sharing system, communally divided strictly between the ‘Greeks’ and the ‘Turks’. When the Republic of Cyprus was initially established the three main religious groups existing at that time were asked to decide which of the two communities they would exercise their civic rights and obligations with – all three opted to belong to the significantly larger Greek community with whom they also share a common religion. The Constitution provides for a system of separate elections for the ‘Greeks’ and the ‘Turks’; separate majorities are required in both the executive and the legislature; a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-president with separate veto powers and a system of quota participation by the ‘Greeks’ and the ‘Turks’ in all areas of public life. The Constitution contains a general anti-discrimination provision in Article 28 but at the same time Article 6 specifically prohibits discrimination against any person on the ground of belonging to one or the other community.

Prior to Cyprus’ EU accession the legal regime in the field of discrimination was based on the Cyprus Constitution to a large extent. Article 28(1) of the Cyprus Constitution, which corresponds to Article 14 of the ECHR provides that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law, the administration, and justice, and are entitled to equal protection thereof and treatment thereby” whilst Article 28(2) enshrines the
enjoyment of rights and liberties by all persons without any direct or indirect
discrimination on the grounds of community, race, religion, language, sex, political
or other conviction, national or social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social class or
any ground whatsoever. Part II of the Constitution which applies in full to natives
and non-natives alike, sets out the “Fundamental Rights and Liberties”,
incorporating verbatim and in some instances expanding upon the rights and
liberties safeguarded by the ECHR. However, Article 11 of the Constitution allows
for the detention of aliens with a view to deportation or extradition. Article 30 of Part
II of the Constitution guarantees the right of access to the Courts as one of the
fundamental rights and liberties. This is afforded to everyone, non-citizens and
citizens alike and irrespective of ethnic origin.

Age, disability and sexual orientation are not covered by the Constitution. The
Constitution does not recognise any groups as ‘national minorities’. It recognises
only two ‘communities’ (Greek and Turkish) and three ‘religious groups’ (Latins,
Maronites and Armenians). The stay of migrants is considered to be too short-term
and precarious to be afforded ‘minority’ status. In practice this means that the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has no applicability
in Cyprus even though ratified. Most major international conventions on
discrimination have also been ratified by Cyprus.

In July 2006, the Cypriot Constitution (until then the supreme law of the country)
was amended to give supremacy to EU laws. The amendment adds a new article
to the Constitution providing that nothing therein stated shall nullify laws, acts or
measures rendered necessary as a result of Cyprus’ obligations as an EU member
state, or to prevent Regulations or Directives or other binding legal measures
enacted by the EU or its bodies from having force in Cyprus. This development is
significant vis-à-vis the national anti-discrimination legislative framework because,
prior to its enactment, the anti-discrimination provision of Article 28 of the Cypriot
Constitution was interpreted by the Courts to mean that any positive measures
taken in favour of vulnerable groups were violating the Constitution’s equality
principle.27 The new amendment renders the positive measure provisions of EU
directives superior to the Constitution and thus unchallengeable on the basis of
Article 28. This development has not as yet led to the reinstatement of quotas in
employment in the public service in favour of persons with disabilities, as the
disability movement was hoping, even though the law transposing the disability
component of Directive 2000/78,28 which is now deemed to be superior to the
Constitution, includes provisions legalising “the creation of employment
opportunities by introducing schemes for the employment of disabled persons with
motivation to the employers ... and the creation of posts in the public and semi-
public sector to be filled in exclusively by persons with a disability”.29
International Conventions on Human Rights

General Anti-discrimination Laws
Cyprus has ratified a number of international conventions on human rights which include anti-discrimination provisions, although not necessarily creating complaint procedures for victims. By the end of the year 2000, when the second ECRI Report on Cyprus\textsuperscript{30} was adopted, Cyprus had signed but not ratified: the Additional Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which widens the scope of application of Article 14 of the Convention; the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; the Convention on Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level; and the European Convention on Nationality. The European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers had not been signed and still waits to be signed. In 2002 Cyprus ratified Protocol 12 to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms\textsuperscript{31} which will enter into force three months after the date on which ten member states of the Council of Europe will have ratified the Protocol. Also in 2002 Cyprus ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by means of a ratification instrument deposited on 26 August 2002. The Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life and Local Level has not been ratified yet, in spite of recommendations from the Ombudsman to proceed with ratification and despite the Ombudsman’s criticisms for the lack of governmental policies towards social integration of migrants.\textsuperscript{32} In spring 2007, Directive 2003/109/EC was finally transposed, after more than a year’s delay, by amending the existing Aliens and Immigration Law Cap. 105. The scope of the amending law (Law 8(I)/2007) covers third country nationals staying lawfully in the areas controlled by the Republic for at least five uninterrupted years.\textsuperscript{33} Excluded from the scope of the law are the foreign students, persons on a vocational training course, persons residing in the Republic under the Refugee Law, persons staying in the Republic for reasons of a temporary nature and foreign diplomats.\textsuperscript{34} A decision by the Supreme court has, however, stalled the process as it excludes the vast majority of third country migrants residing in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{35}

Council Directive 2003/86/EC was transposed into Cypriot law in 2007 (Law 8(I)/2007) without making use of the provision found in Article 4/3 of the Directive. The effect is that the right to family reunification is not extended to the unmarried partner of the sponsor with whom the sponsor is in a duly attested stable long-term relationship, or to a person who is bound to the sponsor by a registered partnership. The current legal framework essentially excludes homosexual partners of the sponsor, although the question remains whether the right to family reunification may cover the homosexual spouse of the sponsor – lawfully married in accordance with the laws of another jurisdiction remains open – as recognised by the recent Equality Body Report on the subject (see File No AKP 68/2008).
Ratification of Convention on Cybercrime
The entry into force on 1 March 2006 of the law ratifying the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of Racist or Xenophobic Nature committed through Computer Systems\(^\text{36}\) has created new offences in the field of combating discrimination and has for the first time in Cyprus legislated on issues such as the holocaust denial and dissemination of racist material through the internet. There is no case law yet invoking the said law.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
With the ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,\(^\text{37}\) as well as with the subsequent amendments introduced to the basic law,\(^\text{38}\) Cyprus established a number of offences relevant to combating racism and intolerance, in conformity with a recommendation of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The offences include incitement to racial hatred, participation in organisations promoting racial discrimination, public expression of racially insulting ideas and discriminatory refusal to provide goods and services. As a result of these amendments, it is no longer necessary that the incitement to racial hatred is intentional for the corresponding offence to be committed; in addition, for the refusal to provide goods and services to constitute an offence it is no longer necessary that race be the sole ground of discrimination. Article 2A of the amended law\(^\text{39}\) renders criminally liable those persons who:

(a) Incite acts which are likely to cause discrimination, hatred or violence against persons on account of their racial or ethnic origin or religion;
(b) Establish or participate in organisations that promote propaganda aiming at racial discrimination;
(c) Express ideas that insult persons by reason of their racial or ethnic origin or religion;
(d) Refuse to supply goods or services to people by reason of their racial or ethnic origin or religion.

The penalty is up to two years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to CYP £1,000 (approximately €1,720).

Article 2A (4) of the same law reads: “Any person who supplies goods or services by profession and refuses such supply to another by reason of his racial or ethnic origin or his religion, or who makes such supply subject to a condition relating to the racial or ethnic origin or to the religion of a person is guilty of an offence and is liable to imprisonment not exceeding one year or to a fine not exceeding four hundred pounds or to both such punishments”. This section has resulted in at least one conviction.\(^\text{40}\)
Criminal Provisions on Racial Crime

Under the Cypriot Criminal Code (Cap.154) a number of discriminatory acts are punishable offences:

(a) Article 47: publication with a seditious intention;
(b) Article 48: “intention to promote feelings of ill will and hostility between different communities or classes of the population of the Republic”;
(c) Articles 51 and 51A: the calculated statement, printed or published to “encourage recourse to violence on the part of any of the inhabitants” or to “encourage recourse to violence or promote feelings of ill will between different classes of communities or persons in the Republic of Cyprus” or which “procures the inhabitants to acts of violence against each other or to mutual discord or foments the creation of a spirit of intolerance”.
(d) Article 138: the destruction, damaging or defiling of any place of worship or any object which is held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion.
(e) Article 142: the publication of a book or pamphlet or any article or letter in a newspaper or magazine which is perceived by a group of people as a public insult to their religion, with intent to ridicule such religion or to shock or insult its followers. Prosecution based on this provision can be instigated only by the Attorney-General or with his consent.
(f) Article 149: the uttering of any word or the making of any sounds with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person in the hearing of that person, or any gesture in the sight of that person, or the placing of an object in the sight of that person.

The Criminal Code contains two more provisions which may, in the opinion of the Cyprus Expert of the Legal Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, indirectly lead to a conviction for discriminatory acts:

(g) Article 105 provides that civil servants (i.e. government employees) may be held guilty for “abuse of power” and may be sentenced to imprisonment of up to two years and/or a fine of up to CYP £1,500 (approximately €2,580). Abuse of power may well include using their position to discriminate against persons in the course of their duties.
(h) Article 136 provides that any person who violates the law on purpose, in relation to an act involving the public or part of the public, is guilty of an offence and is liable to up to two years imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding CYP £1,500 (approximately €2,580). It can therefore be inferred that an act violating the anti-discrimination provision of the Cypriot
Constitution (article 28) or any other law, may constitute a criminal offence under Section 136 of the Criminal Code if committed with a racist motive.

Legal Provisions in Employment
In the area of employment, the Law on Unfair Dismissal No. 24/1967 renders dismissal on grounds such as race, colour, family condition, religion, political opinion, national origin or social descent ‘unfair’ and therefore actionable. However, a recent decision by the Limassol Labour Tribunal has thrown doubt as to whether the courts themselves would interpret their jurisdiction in the context of the ‘employment relationship’, as covering combating discrimination in cases of advertising, recruitment and selection, even when the laws on discrimination empower them to do so. The first case under anti-discrimination acquis on the ground of age was decided by the Limassol Labour Tribunal (Avgoustina Hajiavraam vs. The Cooperative Credit Company of Morphou no. 258/05 delivered on 30 July 2008) regarding the claim that the maximum age limits for an advertised job post of secretary amounted to unlawful age discrimination. However, the court considered it had no jurisdiction: since there was no employment relationship between the parties there was no labour dispute at all. This very restrictive definition of the scope of ‘employment’, if adopted by the Cyprus Supreme Court in the upcoming appeal, will mean that there is no protection from discrimination prior to appointment and in the process of advertisement, selection and hiring as the employment tribunal has no jurisdiction.

Gender and Sex Equality and the EU Anti-discrimination Acquis
As the only legal anti-discrimination was essentially on gender, it is worth referring to some of the key cases that form part of the jurisprudence of Cyprus, prior to accession to the EU. A number of cases have been decided by the Supreme Court that have established the right to equality between men and women, as provided for in Article 28 of the Constitution, as a fundamental right that the Courts are obliged to uphold. Save for some exceptions, the way the Court approaches the right to equality is similar to that of the European Court of Justice, as the relevant case law indications. However, the most important legislative measures relating to sex equality came with the enactment of Law 205(1) of 2002 on the equal treatment of men and women in employment and vocational training and Law 177 of 2002 on equal pay for men and women for similar work or work of equal value. These were adopted within the framework of harmonisation of Cyprus law with the EU acquis prior to accession in May 2004. They transpose EU Directive 76/2007/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working condition and Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex.
The Disability Laws and the EU Anti-discrimination Acquis

In 2000 the basic disability law came into force which included the prohibition of discrimination. The term ‘disability’ is defined in the Law concerning Persons with Disabilities No. 127(I)2000 enacted prior to the new anti-discrimination laws of 2004. The scope of the Law on Persons with Disabilities excludes activities where, by virtue of their nature or context, a characteristic or ability which a person with a disability does not have, constitutes a substantial and determining precondition, provided the aim is legitimate and the precondition is proportionate, taking into consideration the possibility of adopting ‘reasonable measures’, within the meaning which these take in this law. Also the same law does not apply to the armed forces, to the extent that the nature of the occupation is such that it requires special skills which cannot be exercised by persons with disabilities. The disability law was amended in 2007 to impose an obligation on employers to provide reasonable accommodation so long as the burden on the employer is not disproportionate. In addition to that provision, the law provides for the duty to adopt ‘reasonable measures’ to the extent and where the local economic and other circumstances allow. These measures are not restricted to the work place but cover also: basic rights (right to independent living, diagnosis and prevention of disability, personal support with assistive equipment, services etc, accessibility to housing, buildings, streets, the environment, public means of transport, etc, education, information and communication through special means, services for social and economic integration, vocational training, employment in the open market, etc); supply of goods and services, including the facilitation of accessibility for safe and comfortable use of such services; and telecommunications. The duty to adopt ‘reasonable measures’ is so widely phrased that it falls short from creating a mandatory regime. The law does not provide that failure to meet the duty of reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination. However, a person who without due cause commits or omits an act which amounts to discrimination against a person with a disability is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine and/or to a prison sentence, none of which has ever been imposed so far.

The Laws Transposing the EU Anti-discrimination Acquis on the Five Other Grounds

Until the eve of its EU accession, Cyprus lacked a comprehensive primary anti-discrimination legal framework: the pre-accession anti-discrimination framework did not provide an effective enforcement mechanism, even though there was one case that provided that human rights created rights against the state and individuals. This ineffective regime was noted by the Second ECRI Report on Cyprus (2001), as well as the European Commission Report of 2002, under the heading On the issue of human rights and the protection of minorities, states that significant work still needs to be done in the area of anti-discrimination.
On 1 May 2004 three laws came into force purporting to transpose Directives 43/2000/EC and 78/2000/EC: (a) The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law purporting to discharge the Republic’s obligation to appoint a national Equality Body under Article 13 of the Race Directive (hereinafter Law No. 42(1)); (b) The Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic Origin) Law purporting to transpose the Race Directive; and (c) The Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation Law purporting to transpose the Framework Directive. Cyprus did not take the option to defer implementation of the provisions of Directive 78/2000/EC relating to age and disability to 2 December 2006. The relevant laws came into force on or before 1 May 2004, the date of Cyprus’ accession into the EU.

Law No. 42(1) appoints the Commissioner of Administration or Ombudsman, an independent officer appointed by the President of the Republic, as the specialised body to (i) combat racist and indirectly racist discrimination as well as discrimination forbidden by law and generally discrimination on the grounds of race, community, language, colour, religion, political or other beliefs and national or ethnic origin; (ii) promote equality of the enjoyment of rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Cyprus Constitution (Part II) or by one or more of the Conventions ratified by Cyprus and referred to explicitly in the Law irrespective of ‘race’, community, language, colour, religion, political or other beliefs, national or ethnic origin and (iii) promote equality of opportunity in the areas of employment, access to vocational training, working conditions including pay, membership to trade unions or other associations, social insurance and medical care, education and access to goods and services including housing.

The Law vests the Ombudsman with powers beyond those prescribed by the two EU Directives as the designated Equality Body of Cyprus: the power to receive and investigate complaints of discriminatory treatment, behaviour, regulation, condition, criterion or practice prohibited by law; the power to issue Reports of findings; the power to issue orders (through publication in the Official Gazette) for the elimination within a specified time limit of the situation which directly produced discrimination, although such right is somewhat limited by a number of exceptions. The Ombudsman’s decisions can be used for the purposes of obtaining damages in a district court or at an employment tribunal. The Ombudsman is further empowered to impose small fines, to issue recommendations to the person against whom a complaint has been lodged, and to supervise compliance with orders issued against persons found guilty of discrimination. However, all orders, fines and recommendations issued or imposed by the Ombudsman under this Law are subject to annulment by the Supreme Court of Cyprus upon an appeal lodged by a person with a ‘vested interest.’ The Ombudsman may also investigate issues on his/her own right where the Ombudsman deems that any particular case that came to his/her attention may
constitute a violation of the law. Also, the Ombudsman may investigate cases following applications by NGOs, chambers, organisations, committees, associations, clubs, foundations, trade unions, funds and councils acting for the benefit of professions or other types of labour, employers, employees or any other organised group, local authorities, public law persons, the Council of Ministers, the House of Parliament etc. In such cases, the Ombudsman is empowered to issue recommendations to the person or group found guilty of discriminatory behaviour as to alternative treatment or conduct, abolition or substitution of the provision, term, criterion or practice. The findings and Reports of the Ombudsman must be communicated to the Attorney General of the Cyprus Republic who will, in turn advise the Cyprus Republic on the adoption or not of appropriate legislative or administrative measures, taking into account the Republic’s international law obligations and who will at the same time prepare legislation for the abolition or substitution of the relevant legislative provision.

Main Principles, Definitions and Material Scope: Evaluating Anti-discrimination Law

Main Principles and Definitions of Anti-discrimination Law
All definitions of ‘discrimination’ contained in the Directives are virtually replicated in the national laws. Thus, discrimination is defined as less favourable treatment afforded to a person due to [any recognised ground] than the treatment afforded to another person in a similar situation. In the case of disability, direct discrimination is ‘unfavourable treatment’ when compared to ‘a person without disability in the same or similar situation’, or on the basis of ‘characteristics which generally belong to persons with such disability’, or ‘alleged characteristics’, or ‘in contravention of a code of practice’. Discrimination by association is not explicitly covered in the law. Also, the grounds for discrimination are not defined anywhere in the national law.

Indirect discrimination also copies verbatim the wording of Directives, as an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice which would put persons having a particular racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation at a disadvantage compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

Harassment is defined as ‘unwanted conduct related to any of the [recognised] … grounds … with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’. Instructions to discriminate and victimisation, also prohibited on all five grounds, again follow verbatim the definition of the Directives.
The laws transposing Directive 2000/78 allow for differential treatment based on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation when the nature of the particular occupational activities or the context within which these are carried out is such that a specific characteristic constitutes a substantial and determining employment precondition, provided that the aim is legitimate and the requirement proportionate. With regard to age, these provisions do not apply to the armed forces, to the extent that the fixing of an age limit is justified by the nature and the duties of the occupation. In the case of occupational activities of churches or other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based on a person’s religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination when, due to the nature of the context of these activities, religion or belief is a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos.

There is no provision in the Cypriot legal order for multiple discrimination and no plans for the adoption of laws or regulations to deal with situations of multiple discrimination as yet.

Material Scope: What Fields Does the Law Cover?
The scope of the anti-discrimination laws cover both the private and the public sector and include all fields provided in the Directives. Thus, discrimination on all five grounds is forbidden in employment, access to vocational training, working conditions including pay, membership of trade unions or other associations. In addition, discrimination on the ground of racial/ethnic origin is forbidden in the field of social protection, medical care, social provision, education and access to goods and services available to the public including housing. Subject to conditions, the disability law provides for the right to equal treatment in the provision of goods, facilities and services. The mandate of the Equality Body, however, goes well beyond the two Directives and includes the right to promote equality of opportunity in all the fields provided in the two Directives. On all six grounds plus some additional ones (please see, Equality Bodies: The Designated Bodies beyond the Courts to Combat Discrimination, p.16).

Enforcing the Law
Victims have the option of submitting a complaint to the Equality Body or to the courts. Litigation could either be in the field of administrative law, via recourse to the Supreme Court to set aside an administrative act, or to the district court in accordance with the laws transposing the two Directives, or to the district court for violation of the constitutional anti-discrimination provision. For various reasons, but mainly due to the high cost and length of time involved, litigation is hardly ever used by victims of discrimination. The Equality Body may complete its investigation and issue a decision in a few months or sometimes with a delay of a couple of years,
depending on the subject investigated and the complications involved. A large
number of complaints are withdrawn before final determination due to compliance
by the perpetrator or an alternative outcome satisfactory to the complainant. In
other cases, the Equality Body exercises mediation in order to reach a solution.
Until recently the Equality Body would restrict itself to issuing non-binding
recommendations, but very recently it started to follow the consultation process
provided in its mandate which will lead to the issue of binding decisions.

Victims may address complaints either to NGOs or trade unions, who may then
submit them to the Equality Body on their behalf, or directly to the Equality Body,
where the procedure is cost-free, simple and flexible. The national laws transpose
verbatim the Directives’ provisions regarding the right of organisations to engage in
procedures on behalf of their members. There are a number of NGOs available to
initiate and support victims’ complaints in the field of disability, including the
confederation for all disability NGOs. There are fewer NGOs (2-3) supporting the
complaints of migrants and asylum seekers but none to support the complaints of
Turkish Cypriots or Roma. Regarding the other grounds, there are few or no NGOs
to take up cases on behalf of their members. In the case of sexual orientation,
victims are unwilling to submit complaints so as not to make their sexual orientation
known to the public. In general, more complaints are submitted by individuals rather
than by organisations acting on their behalf. Whether the party initiating the
complaint is the victim him/herself or an organisation representing him/her, the
outcome of the case is not affected by it.

Equality Body decisions are occasionally reported in the media, but this is an
exception rather than the rule. Some of these decisions are uploaded on the
Ombudsman’s website and some appear in the Equality Body’s Annual Reports
which, although made available to the public upon request, are not widely
disseminated.

There is no mention in the legislation, or in case law, or in any decision of the
Equality Body on the use of situation testing and statistical data. If an argument in
favour of admitting such evidence is used in Court, it is likely to be allowed if it is
shown that it was deemed admissible in other EU jurisdictions. The general rules of
evidence for criminal and civil procedure apply. The admissibility of situation testing
as a method of proving discrimination in courts will presumably be subjected to the
general test of ‘relevance’ and ‘the best evidence rule’. However, it is not possible
to state with certainty whether the courts will consider this as admissible evidence
in order to prove discrimination. It may well be that it might be relied upon as a
methodology that merely indicates a tendency as to the ‘general’ or ‘systematic’
behaviour of the defendant, which is based on previous and/or similar occasions,
and would be persuasive but not necessarily binding.

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Although in 2004, upon transposition of the two Directives, the burden of proof provision was incorrectly transferred hence amending legislation was introduced in 2006 and 2007 that brought national law in line with the Directives. As the law now stands, the burden of proof is only reversed in Court and not in procedures before the Equality Body, since the latter’s mandate includes the right to carry out its own investigation to establish the facts.

The sanctions which Courts can impose against physical persons found to be guilty of discrimination cannot exceed CYP £4,000 (€6,835.27) and/or imprisonment of up to six months. For legal persons the maximum penalty is CYP £7,000 (€1,196.72). An offence committed, under the same law, out of gross negligence carries a penalty of up to CYP £2,000 for physical persons. If the offence has been committed out of gross negligence, a fine of up to CYP £2,000 (€3,417.63) is levied for physical persons; for legal persons, there is a fine of up to CYP £2,000 (€3,417.63) for the managing director, chairman, director, secretary or other officer if it can be proven that the offence was committed with his/her consent, plus an additional fine of up to CYP £4,000 (€6,835.27) for the company or organisation. The aforesaid fines, however, can only be imposed by the Courts; the Equality Body can only impose small fines which cannot exceed CYP £350 (€598) and such powers have so far been used only in one case concerning gender discrimination. Generally speaking, the fines are very low, offer little deterrence to potential perpetrators, and they are hardly ever imposed by the Equality Body.

The Equality Body does not have the power to award compensation to victims of discrimination, but its decisions may be relied upon to seek damages for unlawful discrimination in a district Court or a labour tribunal.

There are penal remedies available against discrimination. With the adoption of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as with the subsequent 11 amendments, a number of offences relevant to combating racism and intolerance, such as incitement to racial hatred, participation in organisations promoting racial discrimination, public expression of racially insulting ideas and discriminatory refusal to provide goods and services. The scope of this latter provision is stated to extend to goods or services supplied by a person in the course of his/her profession, but it is not defined any further and may thus be presumed to apply, inter alia, to health, education and training. Refusal to provide goods on the ground of racial ethnic origin is an offence. Under the Criminal Code some discriminatory acts are punishable offences.

Equality Bodies:
The Designated Bodies beyond the Courts to Combat Discrimination
In 2004, the Ombudsman was appointed as the national Equality Body,
empowered: (i) to combat racial discrimination as well as discrimination forbidden by law and generally discrimination on the grounds of race, community, language, colour, religion, political or other beliefs and national or ethnic origin; (ii) to promote equality of enjoyment of rights safeguarded by the Constitution or by the Conventions ratified by Cyprus (which include Protocol 12 of the ECHR and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) irrespective of race, community, language, colour, religion, political or other beliefs, national or ethnic origin; and (iii) to promote equality of opportunity irrespective of the aforesaid grounds plus the grounds of special needs and sexual orientation. The scope of this provision covers not only the fields of Directive 2000/78 but additionally social insurance, medical care, education and access to goods and services including housing.

The Equality Body does not have the power to award compensation but its decisions may be relied upon to seek damages in Court. The Court may award all types of damages available in civil procedures, like pecuniary, nominal or punitive damages but no case of discrimination relying on the new laws has yet been decided in Court. A victim of discrimination may apply to the labour tribunal seeking reinstatement to a position from which s/he was unlawfully dismissed, a remedy rarely sought or used. There are certain weaknesses in the present framework which affect its overall effectiveness. Insufficient funds to the Equality Body’s office resulted in inadequate staffing arrangements and in delays in issuing decisions. Moreover, the Equality Body is reluctant to adequately deal with cases that are considered to touch upon the so-called ‘doctrine of necessity’ or the ‘Cyprus problem’.

Distortions and State of Implementation of the EU Anti-discrimination Acquis

The “Doctrine of Necessity”: A Distortion and Flaw in the System

The so-called ‘doctrine of necessity’, which has been operative since 1964 is a major obstacle to its proper anti-discrimination operation in Cyprus and as such it needs to be dealt with in more detail. In 1963 the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution which, by and large, removed the consociational element from the Constitution by limiting the communal rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the administration of the state in protest; since then, the administration of the Republic has been carried out by the Greek Cypriots. Even though it has never been officially proclaimed Turkish ceased, in practice, to be used as an official language from 1963 onwards, as the relevant provisions in the Constitution that required the use of both languages in all legislative, executive and administrative acts discontinued to be implemented. Instead, Greek is the only language used by the state in official
documents, including laws, Ministerial decisions and the official Gazette. In 1964 the Supreme Court ruled that the functioning of the government must continue on a “doctrine of necessity” basis. The situation that emerged gave rise to a number of claims of discrimination by Turkish Cypriots but this number rose sharply following the 2003 partial lifting of the restrictions of movement between north and south of the country. A typical manifestation of this irregular situation which has been in place since 1964 is the fact that all Turkish Cypriot properties located in the south of the country are placed under the control of the Interior Minister who acts as property “guardian” or “custodian”, essentially denying the Turkish Cypriot owners of any rights in relation to their properties, including the right of access, the right to sell or rent, the right to receive compensation when expropriated, until the “resolution of the Cyprus problem”. This has resulted in a number of law suits by Turkish Cypriots against the Republic as well as a number of applications by Turkish Cypriots to the ECtHR, although the ECtHR has not yet issued any decision.

Following the adoption of legislation to transpose the directives, a crucial concern is the possibility of direct discrimination against Turkish Cypriots on the ground of ethnic origin as well as indirect discrimination on religious grounds. A key manifestation of these instances of discrimination is the fact that there are hardly any translations in Turkish language to enable Turkish-Cypriots to have access to public services, jobs, opportunities and to pursue their rights. The enactment of the new anti-discrimination legislation in May 2004, combined with the partial lifting of restrictions on movement in April 2003, has resulted in thousands of Turkish Cypriots working, seeking employment and access to public services in the south, which is a totally original situation and opens up the possibility for on-going unjust employment practices. The reason frequently offered for the non-use of the Turkish language since 1963 is the ‘doctrine of necessity’, but the legality of suspending Constitutional provisions on the basis of a Supreme Court judgement is questionable. An Equality Body decision pursuant to a complaint regarding the non-use of the Turkish language in the official Gazette recognised that a bias against Turkish Cypriots does seem to exist at the level of access to public services, but it concluded that it could not interfere on the issue of a Turkish publication of the Gazette, invoking the “doctrine of necessity”. In another case the Supreme Court, in an interim decision, allowed the Turkish-Cypriot litigants to submit their pleadings in Turkish as provided in the Constitution, rejecting the Attorney General’s arguments that Turkish Cypriots should not be allowed to do so.

Pursuant to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Aziz vs. The Republic of Cyprus, a law came into force in 2006 which granted Turkish Cypriots residing in the south the right to vote and to stand for election. As a consequence, in the Parliamentary Elections of 21 May 2006, Turkish Cypriots voted for the first time since 1964. The ECtHR decision that the ‘doctrine
of necessity’ in the case of Aziz must be exercised in a manner that does not violate the nucleus of rights or the principle of equality, was not consistently followed either by the Courts in Cyprus or by the Equality Body, as both have issued decisions upholding the ‘doctrine of necessity’ as legal justification for the suspension of the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots.

State of Implementation: An Overview
We now summarise the key areas where national law is in breach of the EU Directives, which result in defective implementation of anti-discrimination law and practice.

Cyprus has enacted four laws which entered into force on the date of its accession to the EU (1 May 2004): the law amending the existing disability law,\textsuperscript{70} the law transposing (roughly) the employment directive,\textsuperscript{71} the law transposing (roughly) the race directive\textsuperscript{72} and the law appointing the Ombudsman as the specialised body (hereinafter “the Equality Body”) empowered to investigate complaints of discrimination under all three of the aforesaid laws and beyond.\textsuperscript{73} The national laws enacted for the purpose of transposing the two Directives are more or less in compliance with the said Directives. However:

- The duty to ensure that discriminatory laws and provision contained in contracts, collective agreements, internal rules of undertakings or rules governing independent occupations and professions and workers and employers’ organisations have been explicitly repealed and not fully complied with\textsuperscript{74} by way of a general provision in the two main anti-discrimination laws.\textsuperscript{75} No review of the existing laws was made to ensure compliance with the Directives. Practice suggests that the process of formal repeal of older laws which do not comply with the Directives is somehow ‘triggered off’ only after a complaint is submitted to the Equality Body. There is no procedure for continuous reviewing of existing legislation for the purpose of assessing compatibility with the anti-discrimination directives.

- According to the law appointing the Ombudsman as the specialised body, the latter has the right to refer laws, regulations and practices containing discriminatory provisions to the Attorney General, who has an obligation to advise the competent Minister or the Council of Ministers of measures to be taken, and prepare the corresponding law.\textsuperscript{76} Although some cases of discriminatory laws/regulations/practices have been referred by the Equality Body to the Attorney General, no change in any discriminatory law/regulation/practice has resulted so far. Meanwhile, unless and until the discriminatory law/regulation/practice is expressly repealed by law, it continues to remain in force, in contravention of article 16 of Directive 2000/78 and of article 14 of Directive 2000/43. As a manifestation of the above problem, article
"4 of the Termination of Employment Law which entitles employers to dismiss employees over 65 years of age without compensation, was found by the Equality Body to amount to discrimination on age grounds, in violation of article 8(1) of the Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation Law N.58(I)/2004, transposing Directive 2000/78/EC (see later in this paper). Although the law was referred to the Attorney General for revision, no new law has emerged repealing the discriminatory provision, which continues to remain in force.

Initially, when the disability component of Directive 2000/78 was transposed in 2004, the scope of the test of reasonableness as regards reasonable accommodation was much wider in the Cypriot law than in Directive 2000/78. In particular, whilst article 5 of the Directive provided only for the test of “disproportionate burden on the employer”, the Cypriot disability law provided for a long list of prerequisites which need to be taken into account before a mandatory obligation to provide reasonable accommodation is created: the nature and the required expense for taking the necessary measures; the financial resources of employer; public finances and other obligations of the state, in the event that the measures are to be taken by the state; the provision of state aid or other contributions toward the cost of the required measures; and even the socio-economic situation of the person with disability (albeit only in the non-employment field). Employers could escape liability for not providing reasonable accommodation where their failure or omission was justified by ‘reasonable cause’. “Reasonable cause” is defined as a case where reasonable accommodation measures had not been taken because one or more of the said prerequisites were not met. In 2007, amendments to this provision were implemented and employers are now obliged to adopt all appropriate measures so that a person with a disability can have access to the workplace, to promotion and to vocational training as long as these measures are not disproportionately onerous on the employer.

The principle of reversal of the burden of proof, as contained in Article 8 of the Race Directive and in Article 10 of the Employment Directive was initially transposed into Cypriot law inadequately. This was pointed out to the Cypriot government by the European Commission and amendments have since been introduced to all three laws. As things stand now, reversal of the burden of proof applies only with regard to the procedure before the Court and not to any other (administrative) procedure such as the procedure before the Equality Body. The provision governing the extent of the Equality Body’s power to investigate the facts of the case, falls under article 10(5) of Directive 2000/78 or article 8(5) of Directive 2000/43.

Certain provisions of the two Directives which require the Member States to take measures other than the enactment of legislation have not been fully implemented. These measures include the promotion of dialogue with social partners and NGOs and the obligation to bring all anti-discrimination provisions to the attention of the persons concerned. Since the adoption of the
legislation, which was rushed through Parliament on the eve of Cyprus’ accession to the EU, there has been little initiative or positive action taken by the Government or other public body with the exception of a few seminars that did not target vulnerable groups specifically. A small number of publications issued by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Justice to raise awareness were neither published in the languages of vulnerable groups nor were they disseminated to them especially.

Since its inception in 2004, the Equality Body has been greatly understaffed and underfunded by the government, which accounts for the fact that it has not made full use of the powers granted to it by the law, i.e. the power to collect data, to conduct independent surveys concerning racial or ethnic discrimination, or to draft codes of conduct intended to combat discrimination on the grounds provided by the Directives and others. Thus, the Equality Body has not utilised the opportunity to issue such a code on discrimination against homosexuals at the workplace, when an opinion survey, commissioned in 2006, demonstrated extensive homophobia in Cypriot society. Given the fact that prejudice against homosexuals in Cyprus is so predominantly high, only one Cypriot homosexual (and one other non-Cypriot homosexual living in Cyprus) has ever filed a complaint to the Equality Body, the issue of a code of conduct is crucial.

Cyprus did not take the option to defer implementation of the provisions of Directive 2000/78 relating to age and disability to 2 December 2006. The relevant laws came into force on or before 1 May 2004, the date Cyprus acceded to the EU.

Conclusions

General Assessment

General protection from discrimination on all six grounds was not comprehensive prior to accession; it was uneven and under-developed in certain areas, and was considered inadequate. As matters currently stand there has been some improvement but discrimination has not been stemmed:

- Protection against religious discrimination is provided for by the constitution and courts have regularly made declarations to this effect. However, the rigorous bi-communalism of the Republic, the role of religion in the education system and the recognition afforded to the ‘established’ religious groups shows little societal tolerance of other religions, particularly those which engage in proselytising. In the past, Jehovah’s Witnesses have particularly been the target of discrimination. Cypriot authorities prosecute conscientious objectors, as in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses because they refuse to perform reservist exercises; however, a new amending law has been recently introduced.
The issue of gender discrimination is the argument with the longest legal history in Cyprus. The introduction of the Law for Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Employment and Occupational Training of 2002 (Law 205(I)/2002) marks an important qualitative step in the history of anti-discrimination and serves as a model for the further development of other areas of discussion. The introduction of the new law has not, however, had any great effect on redressing gender discrimination in society, particularly when it comes to pay and working conditions in the employment field.88

On the question of disability some progress over the past twenty years can be reported. Nevertheless, despite the change in attitude, a great deal remains to be done as the vast majority of persons with disabilities aged 15 and over (73%) reported that they were not in work, with only 25.2% working and 1.2% reported as unemployed (ILO 2002). The Law concerning Persons with Disabilities (Law 127(I)/2000) introduced a comprehensive framework for tackling disability discrimination.

There is very little data available in Cyprus on discrimination based on sexual orientation. Progress on the issue of sexual orientation discrimination has been slow due to the attitudes on the subject, which is still very much treated as taboo. A more enlightened approach and progress can be noted following the successful challenge by Mr. Alexandros Modinos at the European Court of Human Rights (Modinos vs. Cyprus 16 E.H.R.R 485). Prior to 2004, there was no history of legal protection against discrimination of lesbians and gay men, because this remained an outlawed and unacceptable subject. There were, however, two recent positive decisions by the Equality Body in 2008 and there are two recent Reports on Homophobia89 to add to the scarce Cypriot literature on the subject.

Similarly, prior to accession there was no provision to prohibit age discrimination, or any study on the extent of age discrimination in Cyprus. Some Equality Body Decisions have been made on the subject and there has been a recent court decision of the Labour tribunal, referred to above, which examined the claim that the maximum age limits for an advertised job post of secretary amounted to unlawful age discrimination.90

Currently, there is no provision in the Cypriot legal order for multiple discrimination and no plans as yet for the adoption of laws or regulations to deal with situations of multiple discrimination.

Weaknesses of the System

The duty to ensure that discriminatory laws and provision contained in contracts, collective agreements, internal rules of undertakings or rules governing independent occupations and professions and workers and employers’ organisations, have been explicitly repealed91 by way of a general provision in the two main anti-discrimination laws,92 and these fail to comply
fully with Directives. No review of existing laws has been made to ensure compliance with the Directives, and practice suggests that the process of formal repeal of earlier laws which do not conform to the Directives is somehow ‘triggered off’ only after a complaint is made. In some cases, the Equality Body examines the complaint and issues a report which is usually a mere recommendation rather than a binding decision. There is no procedure for continuous reviewing of existing legislation for the purpose of assessing compatibility with the anti-discrimination directives.

- The scope of the test of reasonableness as regards reasonable accommodation is much wider in the Cyprus law than in the Employment Directive which provides only for the test of “disproportionate burden on the employer” and clearly falls short of creating a full-blown mandatory regime.

- The Equality Body has rejected a complaint that a law, providing that persons who have reached retirement age lose their right to compensation for unfair dismissal, amounts to discrimination.93

- The principle of reversal of the burden of proof, as contained in Article 8 of the Race Directive as well as in Article 10 of the Employment Directive has been inadequately transposed into Cypriot law. This was pointed out to the Cypriot government by the European Commission and an amendment has since been introduced94 that only partially remedies the problem. As things stand, Article 8 of the Race Directive is transposed only with regard to social protection, medical care, social advantages, education and access to goods and services. Also, reversal of the burden of proof is stated to apply only with regard to the procedure before the Court and not to any other procedure, such as the procedure before the Equality Body.95 The transposition of Article 10 of the Employment Directive suffers from the above inadequacies in addition to three others: a victim of discrimination has to prove facts from which a violation can be inferred; the perpetrator is absolved from liability if his violation had no negative consequences on the victim; and the rule applies only to civil procedures and not to administrative ones.

- Certain provisions of the two Directives which require the Member States to take measures other than the enactment of legislation have not been fully implemented. These measures include the promotion of dialogue with social partners and NGOs96 and the obligation to bring all anti-discrimination provisions to the attention of the persons concerned.97 Since the adoption of the legislation, which was rushed through Parliament on the eve of Cyprus’ accession to the EU, there has been little initiative or positive action taken by the Government or other public body with the exception of a few seminars.98 The Labour Department of the Ministry of Labour has published a “Guide to Law No 58(I) of 2004 on the Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation” as well as a “Guide on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Workers”; however the dissemination of these leaflets to the vulnerable groups appears inadequate
as most of the organisations representing groups at risk were not aware of the existence of these leaflets.

- A great deal more could be done for the dissemination of information to the discriminated groups themselves. When it comes to policymaking, dialogue or consultation with non-governmental organisations, it is either non-existent, very limited or appears to have little impact over the outcome of the process; there is little feedback or proper engagement in debates in order to identify the best possible ways of tackling discrimination.

- There are, however, certain weaknesses affecting the overall effectiveness of the system. The apparent reluctance of the government to allocate human and financial resources to the Ombudsman’s office is foremost; to allow it to cope with the increased volume of work it faces, as a result of investigating ever more complaints, many of which are urgent in nature. In its third Report on Cyprus, ECRI stresses the need for resources to be made available to the Ombudsman to enable her to respond to her tasks. The lack of resources is also the reason why little or no measures have been taken in order to bring to the attention of vulnerable groups (members of the Turkish-Cypriot community, the Roma, the Pontians, migrant workers and asylum seekers) the new legal developments and complaint procedures open to them. By way of example, to date the Ombudsman’s website continues to be displayed only in Greek.

- Another weakness is the fact that the maximum fines which the Ombudsman/Equality Body is entitled to impose range from CYP £4,000 (approximately €6,900) to CYP £7,000 (approximately €12,000); in some cases penalties can include, in addition to the fine, imprisonment of up to six months. In fact, the fine for racial or indirect racial discrimination in the enjoyment of a protected right or freedom (€436) is lower than the fine for “discrimination prohibited by law” (€610). The amounts are clearly not high enough to constitute a deterrent. Theoretically victims may use the Ombudsman’s decision in order to claim compensation from the Courts but in practice this has not happened so far, perhaps because victims of racial/ethnic discrimination very rarely have the means to instigate a legal suit. However, the biggest drawback is not in the institutional framework but the way the Ombudsman has chosen to utilise it. Since it commenced its work as the national Equality Body in May 2004, the Ombudsman’s office has neither issued any binding orders, nor has it imposed any fines, restricting itself to mere recommendations; this policy is at least partly responsible for its low decision compliance rate, particularly on the part of the police.

- The Equality Body’s power to collect data and conduct independent surveys concerning racial or ethnic discrimination has neither been utilised sufficiently, nor have structures been put in place for the collection of such data. The Equality Body (consisting of the Equality Authority and Anti-discrimination Body) has not yet progressed to drafting codes of conduct intended to combat discrimination on the grounds provided by the Directives, even though the
relevant Cypriot law authorises it to do so. The Equality Body has conducted a research survey and found extensive homophobia in Cypriot society but has drafted no codes of conduct.

- The limitations in the mandate of the Equality Body can be located in the ways in which its functions are carried out. Firstly, sanctions in the form of the maximum fines it can impose are so minor that it is questionable whether they can act as a genuine deterrent of discrimination. Secondly, whether the duties of the Equality Body are properly discharged by the Ombudsman is a matter that is open to dispute. The Equality Body seems to be submerged under Ombudsman logic: it neither has a separate budget, staff or website, nor is the public aware of its distinct role or powers. Moreover, after four years of operation and investigating over 900 complaints, one branch of the Equality Authority, the Anti-discrimination body has so far failed to impose any sanctions or make any binding recommendations, preferring to act in a mediating role as though it were a toothless mediating institution. Only the Equality Authority, in exceptional circumstances, has imposed some fines and made its decisions binding. It seems that the ethos, practice and operation of the Ombudsman create some confusion as regards the ‘dual’ role played by the Equality Body/Ombudsman. The fact that these bodies are headed by one person, and the same offices are used by officers of the Ombudsman, who also appear on behalf of the Equality Body, makes matters even more perplexing. Overall, the benefits of having a large office are outweighed by the apparent inability of the Equality Body to assert itself by creating its own identity and profile as a public institution for citizens and vulnerable groups to recognise and develop trust. Most importantly the Equality Body has failed to make its decisions binding and to impose sanctions, except for one case involving gender discrimination. It has overall failed to take any actions that make the practice of discrimination dissuasive, preferring general remarks and advice. For this reason the authors are of the view that the Equality Body cannot be genuinely independent and comply with the aim of the Anti-discrimination acquis, unless it is separated from the Ombudsman to carry out its duties in a more effective way. The situation in Cyprus is not comparable with other countries where the Ombudsman has always undertaken the function of an Equality Body.

The Key Issues for Improving Anti-discrimination

- The national specificities of Cyprus are the result of what can be termed as country-specific structural problems. These include various issues that derive from the unresolved ‘Cyprus problem’, which creates practical discriminatory problems originating from the de facto division of the country, and leads to practices amounting to discrimination against Turkish-Cypriots mostly (e.g. failure to use Turkish as an official language of the Republic of Cyprus; discrimination against Turkish-Cypriots in access to property and various other
constitutional rights; the violation of Greek-Cypriot rights by Turkey and a
certain tendency of the authorities and the courts to “seek revenge”). The
continuous, if not rigorous, application of the ‘doctrine of necessity’ by both
government and courts engenders a legal vacuum within which several
discriminatory policies are established and practiced.

- There is a visible lack of legal anti-discrimination tradition, owing, at least partly,
to the predominance that ‘the Cyprus problem’ has enjoyed for the past forty
years in terms of prioritisation of issues to be addressed in the public sphere.
This phenomenon manifests itself in several fields such as the lack of consumer
awareness or consumer-consciousness, the authorities’ tendency to ‘hide’
problems of racism and discrimination and label as ‘unpatriotic’ any person who
‘exposes Cyprus’ to the European fora, or the lack of monitoring mechanisms
and the service failures of agencies and institutions of the state (e.g. police and
immigration authorities that consistently refuse to comply with the Equality
Body’s recommendations). The relative weakness of civil society and their lack
of training and skills often allow these service failures to go undetected and/or
to be tolerated.

- Even though the Directives highlight the importance of consultation, little, if any,
takes place in practice. A way to address this might be an annual consultation
process with NGOs, experts, trade unions, employers and policy/law makers.

- There is no procedure in place for regular reviewing or revising of discriminatory
laws/regulations. In practice, a review is only triggered once a complaint is
submitted to the Equality Body. In this case, the law requires the Equality Body
to refer discriminatory laws/regulations to the Attorney General who is then duty
bound to prepare the amending legislation. In spite of several referrals to the
Attorney General, none of the laws found by the Equality Body to be
discriminatory have been amended and they continue to remain in force. In
order to comply with the Directives’ requirements, a procedure should be
institutionalised to accommodate the regular review of all laws and regulations.
In addition, the Equality Body should be given powers to suspend the
application of laws which are found to be discriminatory, until an amending
legislation is enacted.

- The mandate and the sanctions of the Equality Body are unsatisfactory and
should be expanded. In particular, the sanctions within the Equality Body’s
mandate are too weak to act as effective deterrents.

- There are challenges for civil society such as dealing with shortcomings in
victim support, organisational problems, weak campaigns, lack of coordination
and solidarity between NGOs, and weak advocacy skills/lobbying. Personal
agendas, competition for funding and various other problems stand as
obstacles in the way of NGOs, preventing the building of alliances and co-
operations to be effected fruitfully. There is a need to develop coalition building
at national, regional and European level.
Apart from limited and short-term financing provided by EU projects like EQUAL or ERF, there is no public or private funding available for anti-discrimination NGOs, which renders their sustainability very difficult in terms of infrastructure and personnel, and prevents the development of skills, expertise and professionalism. There is also no regular consultation process in place between the government and NGOs.

Regarding discrimination in the workplace, there is an inequality of power between the strong employers’ lobby and the weak representation of vulnerable groups, despite the apparent strength of trade unions. To accentuate this problem, Cyprus has a very large Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector, whose individual members lack professionalism and awareness generally on issues of labour rights and discrimination.

Litigation is not used sufficiently, partly due to the cost and length of time involved and partly to the lack of awareness of new laws among the legal profession. Given the fact that the Equality Body’s decisions have so far been mere recommendations, victims of discrimination are, in practice, not afforded the mandatory legal protection foreseen in the Directives.

The legal aid law covers only cases where the sentence foreseen in the law for the actual complaint exceeds one year. This excludes acts of discrimination, for which the maximum sentence foreseen in the law is six months.

There is no law explicitly providing that an authority’s failure to act on complaints of discrimination amounts to discrimination or imposing a general anti-discrimination public duty on authorities. Many complaints directed against various governmental departments are simply not addressed or dealt with, resulting in no consequences for the departments concerned and serious instances of discrimination go unpunished.

The recent emergence of anti-immigrant and ultra nationalist far right groups has not been addressed by the government. There are no convictions against perpetrators in cases of racist attacks.

Although the Equality Body takes a very brave stand regarding some issues (e.g. immigrants’ rights), it is very reluctant to address discrimination against Turkish Cypriots and adopts the governmental position of endorsing the ‘doctrine of necessity’, hence denying Turkish Cypriots their constitutional rights by invoking a court decision of 1964. The Equality Body also appears reluctant to take up issues of anti-Turkish public discourse in the media, particularly when this is expressed by politicians (there are complaints pending since 2004). A more courageous and impartial approach is needed by this Body, which effectively is the only institution that can pursue issues of discrimination against the most vulnerable of victims, given the failures of the court system.

Awareness of anti-discrimination laws amongst the legal profession is very low and there is an apparent unwillingness by its members to undergo training. There is no coordination between NGOs and lawyers for effective handling of cases.
Unless anti-discrimination enters the school curriculum, the process of developing a culture and tradition without prejudice will be inept and slow.

Notes


2. Only the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot people are recognised by the constitution as ‘communities’, endowed with specific power-sharing rights; three other ethnic groups (Armenians, Latins, Maronites), who only have certain minority rights (see note 4), are treated by the constitution as religious groups.


4. Studies that expand on this are beyond the scope of this paper, but see the ECRI reports 2001, 2006 and several studies produced for RAXEN 2004-2008 by Trimikliniotis and Demetriou.

5. In an area of 9,251 sq. kilometres, the total population of Cyprus is around 754,800, of whom 666,800 are Greek Cypriots (living in the Cyprus Republic-controlled area). In 1960 Turkish Cypriots constituted 18% of the population, whilst the smaller ‘religious groups’ – Armenians, Latins, Maronites and ‘others’ – referred to in the Constitution, comprised 3.2% of the population. For the purpose of the Constitution a ‘religious group’ means a group of persons ordinarily resident in Cyprus, who profess the same religion and either belong to the same rite or are subject to the same jurisdiction thereof. The number, on the date the Constitution came into operation, exceeded one thousand out of which at least five hundred became citizens of the Republic on that same day. The Constitution recognised two Communities, the Greeks and the Turks, and three ‘religious groups’ (Maronites, Armenians and Latins). These groups could exercise their civil duties and enjoy political rights as members of either of the two communities but they were obliged to opt for one or other of the communities. They opted to belong to the Greek community.

6. For more on the Maronites see Iacovou (1994).

7. For more on the Armenians of Cyprus see Ashdjian (2001).


9. The term ‘Rroma’ tends to be used to describe the Cypriot Roma population (see
Kenrick and Taylor, 1986; Williams, 2000). This paper, however, uses the more general ‘Roma’ to describe this population of Cyprus which is said to have been over a thousand. In 1960 they were classified as part of the Turkish-Cypriot community due to their Muslim faith; however the ‘mantides’ (μαντίδες), who were Christian Roma, were classified as part of the Greek-Cypriot community (Kenrick and Taylor, 1986; Williams, 2000; Kyrris, 1969, 1985). In fact they were never politically organised to have any voice in their affairs, although there is certainly an important internal social arrangement.

10. The 2001 report reads: “A number of problematic issues still need to be addressed considering at the same time that there are particular circumstances, including constitutional matters, to be taken into account in the case of Cyprus. These issues include the obligation for religious groups and their members to choose adherence to the Greek-Cypriot or to the Turkish-Cypriot community, and the impossibility for Turkish Cypriots to cast a vote in elections and to conclude civil marriages, including with Greek Cypriots”. Since then the law has been changed and Turkish Cypriots can now vote and run in all elections in the south (provided that they are residents there, so the above now applies to those resident abroad or in the north). The problem with this law is that (a) the Turkish-Cypriots are placed on the same electoral roll as Greek-Cypriots and (b) the exception to the rule is that they cannot run in the presidential elections.

11. The case was Attorney General of the Republic vs. Mustafa Ibrahim and Others (1964) CLR 195. See Negati, 1970; Loizou, 2001; Nicolaou, on such date 2000.

12. Over 300,000 visits have taken place so far. The restrictions on freedom of settlement and stay are, however, still enforced, and Greek Cypriots evicted from their homes during the 1974 Turkish army invasion, still cannot enjoy their houses and property in the occupied northern area. The treatment of displaced Greek Cypriots who have visited their homes over the last few months by average Turkish-Cypriot people who live in them has, on the whole, been quite remarkably welcoming and friendly.

13. The figure represents the number of crossings and not the number of persons who have crossed the dividing line; many have crossed the line several times. The number is derived from Nicos Trimikliniotis’ own estimates.


15. The Report is illuminating: “It is enough to observe that the difficulties in implementing the Treaties began almost immediately after independence ... The events which have taken place since December of 1963 have created a situation which makes it impossible to return to the previous situation” (para 129). See [http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/ galo_plaza_Report.htm], accessed on 20 October 2008.

16. As the Plaza Report notes, the restrictions enacted by the Constitution were viewed by both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government as a means to secure the treatment of Turkish Cypriots as a “community with distinct political rights”, and not as a minority, whereas Greek Cypriots saw the very same provisions as a hindrance to what they considered exercising their ‘legitimate’ majority rights, including the right to self-determination. 

17. The same Report notes: “The violent sharpening of ‘national’ sentiments over the months of crisis will for some time make it extremely difficult for officials at all levels to
impose or even exercise strict impartiality towards all the citizens of the country, and without that impartiality and understanding there will be a constant risk of acts of discrimination, even if laws are respected in the formal sense. Furthermore, there are personal hatreds, which will last beyond any political settlement”.

18. See endnote 3.

19. Such as the Centre for the Study of Migration, Interethnic and Labour Relations.

20. Such as MIGS.

21. PIC.

22. E.g., the Cyprus Labour Institute.


24. The negotiations between the community leaders began on 3 September 2008.

25. See article 2(1) and 2(2). In 1960 Turkish Cypriots constituted 18% of the population and Greek-Cypriots 78%.

26. As referred to in the Constitution, the ‘religious groups’, consisting of Armenians, Latins, Maronites and ‘others’, constituted 3.2% of the population. For the purposes of the Constitution a ‘religious group’ means a group of persons ordinarily resident in Cyprus, who profess the same religion and either belong to the same rite or are subject to the same jurisdiction thereof. The number, on the date the Constitution came into operation, exceeded one thousand out of which at least five hundred became citizens of the Republic on that same day. The Constitution recognised two Communities, the Greeks and the Turks, and three ‘religious groups’ (Maronites, Armenians and Latins). These groups could exercise their civil duties and enjoy political rights as members of either of the two communities but they were obliged to opt for one or other of the communities. They opted to belong to the Greek community.


29. Law on Persons with Disabilities 127(I)/2000 as amended, article 5.


33. Aliens and Immigration Law, as amended by Law 8(I)/2007, article 18Z(1).
34. Aliens and Immigration Law, as amended by Law 8(I)/2007, article 18Z(2).
35. The case of Motilla stands out amongst these as a most significant development in the transposition and implementation of Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residency of third country nationals, affecting many thousands of migrants who will not be able to access the residency rights provided in the Directive.
40. In criminal case No. 31330/99 (12 December 2001) where the accused was actually convicted and a term of imprisonment was imposed. This is a District Court decision and is unreported; no additional details are available publicly.
41. The wording reads “any person who publishes any words or documents or makes any visible representation whatsoever with a seditious intention is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for five years”.
42. This is deemed to be seditious intention for the purposes of the above offence under article 47.
43. A person who commits any of those acts is “guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable to imprisonment for twelve months or to a fine of one thousand pounds or to both such penalties and, if a body corporate, to a fine of three thousand pounds” [CYP £1,000 amounts approximately to €1,700; CYP £3,000 amounts approximately to €5,000].
44. See Opinion on Racial Profiling, submitted to the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights by the Cyprus Expert Achilleas Demetriades, 31 August 2006, pp. 4-5.
45. This law uses the term ‘disability’ and not ‘special needs’, as used in the Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law of 2004.
46. The Attorney General’s office holds the view that a Supreme Court judgement of 2001 (Yiallourou vs. Evgenios Nicolaou) establishes a precedent whereby any person suffering discrimination in the enjoyment of his/her Constitutional rights on the grounds, inter alia, of, race, community, colour, religion, language or national origin, can sue the state or private persons and claim damages or other civil law remedies. The Attorney General’s office also considers this remedy to be “… additional, and of wider ambit …” than the procedure offered by the law transposing the Race Directive: Information on developments since the Second Report on Cyprus (adopted on 15 December 2000) pp. 2-3.
prohibiting discrimination on any grounds. Whereas Art. 28 (2) of the Constitution prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on the grounds of his community, race, religion, language, sex, political or other convictions, national or social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social class, or any ground whatsoever, there is no specific implementation legislation for the EC non-discrimination directives adopted in 2000."


49. The Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic Origin) Law No. 59(1)/2004 (31 March 2004).


51. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 3.(1).(a), Part I.

52. These Conventions are: Protocol 12 of the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; the Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

53. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 3(1).(b), Part I.

54. Which time limit shall not exceed 90 days from publication in the Official gazette [The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 28].

55. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), section14(2) and section 14(3), Part III, list the limitations to the Commissioner’s power to issue orders as follows: where the act complained of is pursuant to another law or regulation, in which case the Commissioner advises the Attorney General accordingly, who will advise the competent Ministry and/or the Council of Ministers about measures to be taken to remedy the situation [The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Sections 39(3) and 39(4)]; and where discrimination did not occur exclusively as a result of violation of the relevant law; where there is no practical direct way of eradicating the situation or where such eradication would adversely affect third parties; where the eradication cannot take place without violating contractual obligations of persons of private or public law; where the complainant does not wish for an order to be issued; or where the situation complained of no longer subsists.

56. The fine to be imposed cannot exceed CYP £350 for discriminatory behaviour, treatment or practice [The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 18(a)], CYP £250 for racial discrimination in the enjoyment of a right or freedom [The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 18(b)], CYP £350 for non-compliance with the Commissioner’s recommendation within the specified time limit [The Combating of
Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 26(1) (a)] and CYP £50 daily for continuing non-compliance after the deadline set by the Commissioner [The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 26(1) (b)]. Generally speaking, the fines are considered to be very low.

57. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 24(1).

58. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Section 23.

59. Term used in Section 146 of the Cyprus Constitution, which sets out the procedure for appeal to the Supreme Court of Cyprus.

60. Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), art. 33.

61. Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), art. 34(2).

62. Article 3 of the Constitution.


64. The initials ECtHR refer to the European Court of Human Rights, whilst the ECHR refers to the European Convention of Human Rights.

65. Given that Greek Cypriots are almost entirely Christians and Turkish Cypriots entirely Moslem.


69. Law on the Exercise of the Right to Elect and Be elected by the Members of the Turkish Community who have their Normal Residence in the Government-Controlled Area (21 January 2006).

70. Law on Persons with Disabilities No. 57(I)/2004 (31 March 2004). This law was subsequently amended in 2007 to introduce more favourable provisions for persons with disability and in order to rectify the wrong transposition of the reversal of the burden of proof.

71. Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation of 2004 No. 58 (1)/2004 (31 March 2004). This law was subsequently amended in 2006 in order to rectify the wrong
transposition of the reversal of the burden of proof.

72. The Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic Origin) Law No. 59(I)/2004 (31 March 2004). This law was subsequently amended in 2006 in order to rectify the wrong transposition of the reversal of the burden of proof.

73. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law N. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004).


75. Article 16(1) The Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation Law No. 58 (1)/2004 (31 March 2004) and Article 10(1) The Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic Origin) Law No. 59(I)/2004 (31 March 2004).

76. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law N. 42(1)/2004, articles 39(1) and 39(3) respectively.

77. Law on Persons with Disabilities N. 127(I)2000, article 9(2).

78. Article 9(3) of the Law on Persons with Disabilities N. 127(I)2000.


80. Law amending the Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic origin) No. 147(I)/2006; Law amending the Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation Law N. 50(I)/2007; Law amending the Law on Persons with Disability N. 72(I)/2007.

81. The Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic Origin) Law No. 59(I)/2004 (31 March 2004) Article 7(2).

82. Directive 2000/78, Paragraph 33 of the Preamble; Articles 13 and 14. Also, Directive 43/200/EC, Preamble paragraph 23. During the drafting of the various National Action Plans, the trade unions were consulted but were neither informed whether any or all of their proposals had been accepted or not, nor were any reasons given; they viewed the final National Action Plans published. The only NGO dealing with racism and racial exclusions at the time (KISA) was not consulted in the formation of National Action Plans (for Employment, Social Inclusion, Education).

83. Directive 2000/78, Article 12 and Directive 43/200/EC Article 10. Although Turkish is one of the two official languages of the Cyprus Republic, none of the new instruments (or indeed any former ones or even the Official Gazette) are translated into Turkish, thus rendering it difficult for members of the Turkish-Cypriot community to be informed about and utilise the new procedures available. No alternative means are used, for example Braille, to inform disabled people of non-discriminatory measures.

84. With the exception of two seminars, little other Government organised activity has taken place. A number of civic initiatives and the collaboration of NGOs with government departments have emerged recently, mostly in the form of EU-funded projects. One such project is the national campaign with the slogan “For Diversity Against Discrimination”. See [http://www.stop-discrimination.info/index.php?id =5514].

85. In his 2006 Report (dated 29 March 2006), the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, expresses regret that the necessary increase in funding to deal with the extra work-load has not been provided to the ombudswoman and recommends that greater resources be devoted to this office to enable it to deal
effectively with its new competencies. Similarly, in its third Report on Cyprus dated 16 May 2006, ECRI also stresses the need for resources to be made available to the Ombudswoman to enable her to respond to her tasks.

86. As provided by Directive 43/200/EC, Article 13. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Article 44 empowers the specialised body to conduct research and collect statistics, however, no such research or statistics have been collected, or any definition of the categories verified for the collection of such relevant statistics.

87. Some of them have been convicted and imprisoned.


90. See Avgoustina Hajiavraam vs. The Cooperative Credit Company of Morphou (no. 258/05 delivered on 30 July 2008).


92. Article 16(1) The Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation Law No. 58 (1)/2004 (31 March 2004) and Article 10(1) The Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic Origin) Law No. 59(I)/2004 (31 March 2004).

93. Letter from Director of Labour Department of Ministry of Labour to the authors. Discussed further in Article 4.7.4.(e).

94. Law amending the Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic origin) No. 147(I)/2006.

95. The Equal Treatment (Racial or Ethnic Origin) Law No. 59(I)/2004 (31 March 2004) Article 7(2).

96. Directive 78/2000/EC, Paragraph 33 of the Preamble; Articles 13 and 14. Also, Directive 43/200/EC, Preamble paragraph 23. During the drafting of the various National Action Plans, the trade unions were consulted but were neither informed whether any or all of their proposals were accepted or not, nor were any reasons given; they viewed the final National Action Plans published. The only NGO dealing with racism and racial exclusions at the time (KISA) was not consulted in the formation of National Action Plans (for Employment, Social Inclusion, and Education).

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102. Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004, art. 18.

103. In October 2004, the Ombudsman, Eliana Nicolaou, presented a Report to a Committee of the House of Parliament, where she criticised the police as having the lowest rate of compliance with her decision (Reported in Hadjivasilis, M. (2004) “Ston kalatho ta 40% ton ektheseon tis Epitropou” in Phileleftheros (28 October 2004). However, since 2005 a special Police complaints authority has been set up which has effectively removed jurisdiction from the Ombudsman, but not necessarily the Equality Body.

104. As provided by Directive 43/200/EC, Article 13. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Article 44 empowers the specialised body to conduct research and collect statistics, however no such research or statistics have been collected, or any definition of the categories verified for the collection of such relevant statistics.

105. As provided by Directive 43/200/EC, Article 11.

106. The Combating of Racial and Some Other Forms of Discrimination (Commissioner) Law No. 42(1)/2004 (19 March 2004), Article 40. The Specialised Body declined an offer to participate in an EQUAL project to develop such codes of conduct for employment, preferring instead of to leave it to other Government departments to participate.

107. Even MPs, who are lawyers by profession do not seem to be aware that the Equality Body can make binding decisions, as was discovered during the debates on the rights and freedom of movement of homosexual partners of EU citizens in Cyprus following a report by the Anti-discrimination body (see File No AKP 68/2008).


110. Ibid.
MARRIAGE AND MIGRATION: REPRESENTATIONS AND ATTITUDES OF GREEK CYPRIOTS TOWARDS INTER-SOCIETAL MARRIAGE

Mihaela Fulias-Souroulla

Abstract
This article tackles a questionnaire survey-based study of Greek Cypriots’ attitudes towards inter-societal marriage between non-nationals and Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus. The study draws working hypotheses from a preliminary analysis of data from official population statistics on inter-societal marriage and immigration in Cyprus and further explores theoretical assumptions about three central factors to the propensity for inter-societal marriage: attitudes, opportunities and exchange. Four key findings resulted: different social distances for diverse groups of non-nationals; a hierarchy in Greek Cypriots’ perceptions of different nationalities living in Cyprus that accounts for economic, racial and religious separation lines; gendered patterns of marital preferences for non-national spouses and more acceptance for nationalities that are perceived as having similarities with the Greek Cypriots.

Keywords: inter-societal marriage, attitudes, Cypriot society, non-national spouses, international migration

‘Mixed Marriage’ between Reality and Perception

The term ‘mixed marriage’ is commonly employed in the European tradition of research and literature on migration and ethnic relations. The goal herein is to provide an argument as to why this concept is a contested one (like other terminologies of hybridity that assume some ‘purity’, which is highly problematic in social theory), especially in its meaning as social construct.

In modern/post-modern societies which ‘value’ the equality of their members, it is difficult to explain why certain marriages are perceived as ‘mixed’. In this manner, the sociologist is confronted with a dilemma: how to study ‘mixed marriage’? Should he/she consider them as a reality or should she/he consider the fact that these marriages are perceived as ‘mixed’? (Philippe, 1991). In this context, the term
‘mixed’ assumes a difference of identity and implies inequalities that are incompatible with ideals of equality.

In relation to migration and integration processes, the main dilemma in analysing this issue is how to avoid the polarisation in the opposition ‘national/non-national or <foreigner>’ that translates the obsession of a society in crisis analysing everything in terms of in-group – out-group. In fact, every membership in a certain community is ambiguous and provisional. The individuals do not ‘belong’ to any form of social association or to a particular culture as is the case of an artefact or an institution; instead, individuals create cultures, and continuously change them.

In Europe today, the ‘mixed’ characteristic is perceived whenever marriage partners have different nationalities. In the case of the Republic of Cyprus, a marriage is perceived as mixed when Greek Cypriots enter into marriages with non-Greek Cypriots. It should be mentioned here that there is a wider question of inter-ethnic marriages in Cyprus, i.e. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as well as Turkish Cypriots with overseas partners, but this article is confined to Greek Cypriots and overseas partners.

In the specialised literature, the term ‘mixed’ is used less in connection with social class; one interpretation could imply that class identity, through the effect of democratisation is becoming weaker than the conscience of belonging to a historical, ethnic or religious community (Philippe et al., 1998).

In everyday life, the term ‘mixed marriage’ is used when the norm of social/cultural proximity is sensed, one way or another to be crossed. Merton (1941) put forward a sociological definition of ‘intermarriage’ as “a marriage between persons belonging to different groups”. In fact, the first generation of sociologists who studied mixed marriage, defined the notion in terms of deviance from the norm of homogamy.

In a context of mixing populations, the dichotomy ‘mixed – non-mixed’ or ‘normal’ vs. ‘mixed’ becomes more difficult to sustain. In some instances, the term ‘mixed couple’ is used as a designation, opportunistically sometimes, mostly as a category in socio-political discourses, and not as a specific sociological category. However, the ‘mixed’ indicators are not taken into account as long as couples are doing well; however, when the reverse applies, they are invoked as causes for divorce. Thus, an analyst could interpret the conflicts of a ‘mixed couple’ in terms of their membership to different national, religious, ethnic or cultural communities, and not in terms of personal incompatibility. In order to avoid these kinds of culturalistic and nationalistic perspectives of conceiving a marital union between two people, the term ‘mixed marriage’ is deliberately avoided in this article. Instead, the term inter-societal marriage is employed to denote the marital union between two
individuals coming from two geographically separated societies: a Greek Cypriot and an overseas partner. The choice of term is motivated by the purpose of this study, which is to uncover some representations of Greek Cypriots about marriages of their co-nationals with partners migrating from overseas societies. The voluminous literature on marriages that take place across societies shows how marriages which involve the migration of one spouse are often the target of suspicion regarding their ‘validity’, while attitudes to such marriages reveal prejudices about the motivations of the partners. For example, in some cases negative attitudes towards ‘miscegenation’ in the host society are based on a set of stereotypes and prejudices towards immigrants who come from poor countries (seen as delinquents, opportunists) or on historically rooted and recreated prejudices and stereotypes based on skin colour (Garcia, 2006). Women entering countries/societies as the spouse of a citizen are often viewed as conforming to several negative stereotypes. They may be seen as the victims of patriarchal societies that use marriage migration to maintain control and gender roles or as economically dependent women who enter affluent countries as spouses but are really motivated by financial gains for themselves and their family back home. These attitudes reveal firmly held views of women as either powerless victims of male oppression or as calculating, rational and manipulative agents (Robinson, 1996). The reality of these marriages is, of course, far more complex, but herein the purpose is to identify their representations at public discourse level.

At this point it is worthwhile mentioning that there are two usages that characterise the term ‘mixed marriage’: an official usage (legal and administrative) and a social and mediated usage (based on the representations of ‘Otherness’). The latter is the most susceptible to different interpretations and variations, subject to prejudice, but also the most prominent in everyday life (Philippe et al., 1998). The second usage will be the ‘object’ of this investigation, through identifying the perceptions, representations and attitudes of Greek Cypriots in relation to inter-societal marriages in the Republic of Cyprus.

### Changing Marriage Patterns in Cyprus

Following the general movement toward globalisation and individualisation, family and marriage processes in contemporary Greek-Cypriot society are undergoing change. The Cypriot family is more recently seen as a mix of ‘well-established’ cultural codes and alternative lifestyles. Family and marriage in Cyprus are experiencing significant adjustments owing to mass tourism, mass media, international labour force migration and internationally changing social patterns (Hughes, 1999).

In these conditions of changing social context, the analysis of marriage-related patterns poses additional challenges. One determinant factor in marriage pattern
formation is the constraints of the marriage market in which individuals are searching for a spouse. Kalmijn (1991) claims that contact opportunities in a marriage market are shaped, among other reasons, by the demographic composition of the population as a whole. In Cyprus, the local marriage market is greatly influenced by tourism and by the increasing number of migrant women and men in search of employment, usually from the former USSR and countries from the European east, plus a large number of Asian maids and workers who come to Cyprus independently or through various employment agencies (Agathangelou, 2004: Hughes, 1999).

Population data – as analysed in the following section – show an increasing propensity for Cypriots to marry non-nationals as a result of the rise in immigration to Cyprus beginning with the early nineties. The immigration flow to Cyprus includes three main sources of foreign spouses for Cypriots: tourism, employment immigration flow and foreign countries where Cypriots study/studied. On average, concerning the third source, three-quarters of these Cypriots study every year in Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States; and one-quarter study in Bulgaria, Hungary, the Russian Federation, Germany, France and other countries.²

Nevertheless, simply because people migrate to another area or country does not necessarily mean that they are able or want to form close relationships with other groups. There are many studies which show how migrant groups often have restricted access to relationships with receiving-society groups, either through their own excluding practices or, more often, through those of the dominant group (Breger and Hill, 1998). By questioning Greek Cypriots about ‘mixed marriages’ the aim here is to identify why some ethnic groups are chosen as potential spouses, whereas others are not; moreover, what factors create or lessen the social distance between groups?

A further question to be discussed relates to inter-societal marriage as a shifting marriage pattern. Does inter-societal marriage constitute a ‘threat’ to local ‘endogamous’ marriage patterns? And, to what extent does inter-societal marriage provide a changing model of marriage partner selection? In order to address these questions, the extent of such social phenomena, i.e. inter-societal marriage and immigration (as a major source of spouses entering into marriages with Cypriots) are discussed with reference to Cyprus.

Patterns and Tendencies Revealed by a Statistical Data Analysis: Opportunity – Immigration; Preference – Inter-societal Marriage³

Inter-societal marriage and immigration are both new and interrelated phenomena in contemporary Cyprus. One of the consequences of international migration and the permanent settlement of migrants in southern EU countries is the number of
mixed marriages and the formation of transnational families (Garcia, 2006). In order
to identify the underlying themes and main tendencies, an analysis of statistical
data has been conducted from annual Demographic Reports (No. 27-42, Statistical
Service, Republic of Cyprus, 1989-2004), as no previous studies are available on
this topic.

Data analysis, covered by this study, reveals that the number of inter-societal
marriages in Cyprus has increased considerably over a sixteen-year period (1989-
2004). A median increase of 29% in inter-societal marriages was recorded, from a
low of 14% in 1991 to a high of 43% in 2004 (concerning all marriages entered into
by Cypriots). The overall average rate of entering an inter-societal marriage was
27% (10% for Cypriot women and 21% for Cypriot men) for all marriages involving
Cypriots during the sixteen-year period under study. As data shows, there was a
greater tendency for Cypriot men to marry other nationalities during this period
(their numbers are more than double those of Cypriot women).

The marital choices made by Cypriot men and women revealed some patterns
in inter-societal marriage mate selection. The most frequent combinations were:
Cypriot grooms and ‘Eastern-European’ brides; Cypriot brides and ‘Euro-American’
grooms.

The statistical data available shows intra and inter-societal marriages by type
(eclesiastical and civil marriages) and nationality. For the purpose of the analysis
herein, the nationalities with tabulated/existing data in the official statistics are
clustered into three groups: the Euro-American group (including the nationalities:
Greek, British, US, German and Irish), the Eastern-European group (including the
nationalities: Russian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Yugoslavian
and Moldavian) and the Asian-African group (including the nationalities: Iranian,
Israeli, Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian, Sri-Lankan, Chinese, Pakistani, Indian and
Filipino).

When data was, therefore, analysed by the groups of nationalities, more clear
patterns resulted for the period 1994-2004 (with data available). The most frequent
out-marriage group for Cypriot women was Euro-American – 23% of the civil
marriages and 70% of the religious marriages involving Cypriot women.

In relation to Cypriot men, the most frequently represented out-marriage groups
were Eastern European for civil marriages – 55% of the civil inter-societal marriages
involving Cypriot men, and the ‘Other nationalities’ category (the nationalities
included are not made known in official statistics). For religious unions the latter
combination (Cypriot grooms – ‘other nationalities’ brides) made up 77% of all the
religious inter-societal marriages involving Cypriot men.
The marriages between Cypriot women and men from the Asian-African group accounted for 19% of all civil inter-societal marriages entered into by Cypriot women. Furthermore, the Asian-African group of nationalities was ranked in third position (7%) among the preferences of Cypriot men, and the combination of Cypriot men – Euro-American spouses made up 9% (for the period 1989-2004 compared to 17% for 1994-1999) from the number of civil inter-societal marriages entered into by Cypriot men (for details see Appendix 1 – Summary Tables with Cypriots’ Marital Choices for Different Nationalities, Resulting from the Statistical Analysis of Existing Data). Overall, the statistical data from 1999 onwards shows an increasing tendency for Cypriot women to marry other nationalities.

It is evident from the statistical data that a great rise in the immigration rate to Cyprus took place after 1990. On average, the lowest immigration sex ratio for the period 1997-2004 is registered for the non EU Eastern-European countries (67 men for each 100 long-term immigrant women – the excess of the latter predicting more opportunity for inter-societal marriage). Nevertheless, the highest immigration sex ratio is registered for the African countries whereby for each 100 female immigrants to Cyprus there were 141 men – here the excess of immigrant men predicts more opportunity for foreign male marriage partners.

In order to test the hypothesis about a positive relationship between immigration and inter-societal marriage a Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient analysis was developed. The values obtained show that the two variables are strongly associated. The volume of migrants is, therefore, a somewhat better predictor of non-national marriage partners for Cypriot men ($\rho=0.75$) than for Cypriot women ($\rho=0.53$). In other words, the variation in the number of international migrants to Cyprus determines the variation in the number of grooms and brides for Cypriot spouses.

By this token, the statistical data analysis (for 1997-2004) revealed that the largest number of migrants not only came to Cyprus from Eastern European countries, but that this group also supplied the highest number of marriage mates for Cypriot men during the same period.

In general, the relationship between the immigrant sex ratio and the marriage sex ratio, as measured by the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient ($r = 0.32$), indicates a positive association between the two ratios. The patterns contoured by the values of the two ratios considered are very well defined: there are two main groups of countries providing inter-societal marriage spouses for Cypriots. The first one is the group of Euro-American countries with both immigrant and inter-societal marriage sex ratios being in favour of immigrant men, and the second one is the Eastern-European group with both ratios in favour of migrant women.
This section identified patterns emerging from statistical data analysis in relation to trends of inter-societal marriages in Cyprus. Overall, gender-specific differences were identified between the marital choices of Cypriot men and women respectively. In comparison with Cypriot women, the rates of Cypriot men marrying migrants are higher and gender-differentiated patterns exist in regional preferences when selecting migrant spouses. Cypriot men chose wives from Eastern European countries and Cypriot women chose husbands from the Euro-American group of countries. The aim of the statistical analysis was to contextualise the questionnaire survey presented in the following sections and to provide it with a working hypothesis.

Quantitative Research Design

Theoreticians emphasise three factors as central to the propensity for exogamy (i.e. inter-societal marriage): attitudes, opportunity and exchange (Lieberson and Waters, 1988). These factors herein form the focus of the questionnaire survey presented. From these factors, attitudes are the most theoretically intriguing. Different studies show that marriage between individuals of diverse ethnic, racial, or religious identity is usually met with reluctance or rejection (Barbara, 1989; Botev, 1994). Because no prior investigation on attitudes towards marriages between non-nationals and Cypriots has been undertaken, a questionnaire survey was designed to appraise Cypriot opinions, perceptions and attitudes toward mixed marital unions in Cyprus.

The working hypotheses have, as a source, the findings from the statistical analysis of the existing population data discussed earlier. The three hypotheses are presented below:

1. **Exposure and tolerance towards non-nationals**: With increasing interaction/contact and exposure towards people from other countries and cultures (see the increase in the immigration stream to Cyprus during the period 1989-2004), Cypriot attitudes towards marriage with non-nationals become more favourable.

2. **Social distance** – that refers to similarity or closeness based upon social variables or network connections – plays a certain role in terms of mate selection. Foreign nationalities are perceived as arranged in a hierarchy reflecting their desirability as mates (Kalmijn, 1998). Which foreign nationalities constitute a more socially accepted pool of mates for Cypriots? There is less social distance for the Euro-American and Eastern European groups of nationalities, compared to the Asian-African group. The smallest social distance is between Greek Cypriots and Greek nationals as spouses. This hypothesis is based on the previous analysis of statistical data that identified the Euro-American group and the Eastern European one as the
two main sources of spouses for Greek Cypriots. Questionnaire data is expected to shed more light on reasons for such preferences, however, different factors might be at play such as post-colonial attitudes, religion and racial stereotypes. In the specialised literature, processes of racialisation of international migrants in Cyprus are discussed in relation to the labour market. People from different geographical areas are concentrated in different occupations, with ‘whites’ (northern/central Europeans/Americans) concentrated in more office type work, with a large number as managers. On the other hand, ‘black’ people (northern Africa/Arabs and South East Asians) are more likely to be concentrated in manual labour jobs. Eastern Europeans, depending on their class position, generally occupy jobs at the lower end of the market (Trimikliniotis, 1999).

In the same vein, Agathangelou (2004) shows that not only are racial biases and stereotypes a constant element of the public and private discussion about immigrant women, but a division of reproductive labour along racial lines has taken shape in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus whereby women of colour, for example from Sri Lanka or the Philippines, are deemed fit only to do domestic work, whereas the ‘not quite white’ women from Eastern Europe are preferred as sexual mates.

3. The third hypothesis expresses the pattern identified in statistical data about gendered regional preferences in selecting migrant spouses. Cypriot men prefer Eastern European brides and Cypriot women prefer Euro-American grooms. Some reasons for these gendered preferences are to be identified in the questionnaire data. The preference of Cypriot men for eastern European women might, therefore, relate partly to their sexualisation (as mentioned above, Agathangelou, 2004) and as statistical data shows, there is more opportunity for encounters in the marriage market as there are large numbers of women from the European east migrating to Cyprus for jobs. On the other hand, the Cypriot women’s preference for Euro-American men clusters on two nationalities: Greek from Greece and British (of Greek-Cypriot origin). A possible interpretation for these choices is provided by ethnographic texts which extensively record that endogamy principles are not uniformly dictated to males and females: men taking brides not belonging to their national group are more tolerated than women who marry outsiders, precisely because wives and mothers supposedly disqualify the authenticity of cultural legacy through ‘impure’ kinship ties (Athanassiou, 2001).

There is also an element of exchange imbedded in this hypothesis with regard to inter-societal marriages. The interpretation of status hypergamy considers the assumption that people in migratory context (mostly labour migrants), due to their disadvantaged social position in relation to ‘natives’, have an incentive to improve their socio-economic status (i.e. monetary, prestige in the community, comfortable
life style and access to social and cultural capital) through marriage. For example, although the practice is weakening, feminist research shows that some women still tend to court and marry men with higher social standing and resources than themselves, using their physical attractiveness as an exchange (Coltrane, 1998). Another example of hypergamous unions (‘marrying up’) concerns Africa-born men marrying indigenous women in Spain (Garcia, 2006).

On the other hand, an increase in the volume of inter-societal marriages could be explained partly by a restrictive legal framework for settlement migration (Garcia, 2006). This is also the case for Cyprus where the immigration and settlement legislation is restrictive with regard to citizens from non EU-member countries (for more details see Trimikliniotis and Fuliás-Souroulla, 2006). Fake marriages constitute one of the consequences of restrictive immigration policy which social actors try to counteract by developing strategies and practices aiming at the legalisation of their migration status (i.e. obtaining a renewable residence and work permit by entering into a marriage with a citizen).

As a sample selection method for the survey, probability sampling or random sampling was used. The national sample selected (N=400, 95% confidence level) is representative of the age, gender and residence structure of the population of interest (i.e. the population of Greek Cypriots in the government-controlled area of Cyprus). In other words, the sample reflects the age distribution and the gender distribution of the population by place of residence. The most frequent demographical characteristics for sample respondents were: male (50.2%), young age (between 15-34–37%), of tertiary education (44%), private sector employee (25.2%), married/engaged/cohabitating (70.2%), residence in urban areas of Cyprus (68%) and medium approximate annual income (between Cy£6,000-Cy£20,000/or approximately €10,000-€35,000, 53.8%).

The research instrument was a self-administered questionnaire: mostly closed questions, with predetermined answers. Given the exploratory character of the research, open-ended questions have been included, in order to gain more insight on topics difficult to quantify.

Since the variables employed could not be assumed to be more than nominal and ordinal scale, the form of analysis used was parametric tests. Chi-square was used as the statistical test of significance, with the null hypothesis rejected at the 0.5 level of probability. The answers given to open-ended questions were analysed using the procedure of qualitative content analysis.
Inter-societal Marriage Questionnaire Survey Findings

Cypriots’ Opinions and Representations about the Number of Non-Nationals in Cyprus
Most Cypriot respondents believed that the number of non-nationals in Cyprus is high or extremely high and expressed concern about this perceived trend when considering the small size of the Greek-Cypriot community (86% of respondents agreed, and generalising to the population of interest, the Cypriots living in rural areas are more likely to give a similar response). Even if the numbers of both ‘foreigners’ and migrant workers were estimated as high, the respondents’ attitudes were more favourable in the case of migrant workers in Cyprus. A clear difference was identified in the perception of outside of the nation/‘foreign’ influence. Where the numbers of migrant workers were viewed as high or extremely high, they were regarded by ‘natives’ as people coming to Cyprus to maximise, as necessary, their financial resources before returning to their countries of origin. Moreover, the ‘foreigners’ who come to Cyprus to settle down are perceived as possible threats because many of them marry Cypriots and it is, therefore, believed that a shortage of marriageable ‘native’ partners is created while at the same time employment vacancies are filled, perpetuating the common social viewpoint that the ‘foreigners’ contribute to the increasing unemployment rates of the ‘native’ population. According to survey questionnaire findings, 58% of the respondents expressed this opinion, and more Cypriot women than men tend to share it.

Cypriots’ Exposure to Outside of the Nation Influence
The findings regarding Cypriots’ exposure to ‘foreign’ influence accounted separately for those respondents who lived abroad (translated to maximum exposure to foreign influence) and for those with relatives who have married non-nationals (understood as high exposure to foreign influence). The Cypriots who were exposed to maximum foreign influence are likely to be those who lived abroad as students, in one country, between one and five years, and aged 35-54 years (this group represents 50% of the respondents who lived abroad).

Confirming the statistical findings presented earlier, the survey outcome once more proved that inter-societal marriage is a new phenomenon in Cypriot society, since relatively large percentages of respondents have a cousin (45%), an aunt/uncle (23%) or a sister/brother (23%) who have married non-nationals. In addition, only a few Cypriot respondents declared that they have parents (2%) married to non-nationals and none of them had grandparents married outside the national group.

In most cases, more than half of the respondents have relatives married to other nationalities, and nearly half of these have a cousin married outside the national group. The Cypriots aged 15-34 years old are more likely to have an
aunt/uncle (41%) or a cousin (52%) married to a non-national. Over half of the respondents who have relatives married to overseas spouses characterised these marriages as being successful or very successful.

It was found that the increased exposure of Greek Cypriots to other nationalities as relatives diminished the social distance, so that the non-national relative is perceived and accepted per se as a family member. Moreover, the non-national as a family member is not part of an ‘anonymous’ mass of other nationalities that are unfavourably judged by Cypriot public opinion. In other words, a ‘well-known foreigner’ is not a stranger for Cypriots anymore; he/she is tolerated and accepted as a family member because of an increased exposure to assimilation factors such as knowledge of the Greek language, participation in community activities, different common celebrations and leisure activities.

**Social Distance between Greek Cypriots and Non-nationals**
The Cypriot respondents’ most favourable attitude is towards the non-national as a visitor in Cyprus, and the most unfavourable attitude is towards the non-national as a spouse. The social distance increases from left to right, as follows:

- Non-national as visitor / Non-national as neighbour / Non-national as work colleague / Non-national as relative / Non-national as citizen / Non-national as spouse.

Non-nationals as visitors in Cyprus are most likely to be accepted by respondents so long as the Cypriot economy is based on tourism, whereas, non-nationals as Cypriot citizens are less likely to be accepted. This finding is verified by the previously mentioned fact that Cypriot respondents classified unfavourably the ‘extremely high’ and ‘high’ numbers of migrants in Cyprus.

It could be said that the Cypriot respondents are likely to accept ‘foreigners’ as long as they do not interfere with two highly valued entities by Greek Cypriots: their family and homeland. On one hand the respondents are less likely to accept other nationalities as relatives, citizens in Cyprus and spouses – statuses that signify a certain degree of permanence, but on the other hand, visitors, neighbours and work colleagues belong to statuses that are perceived as short-term and transient and therefore are more likely to be accepted by indigenous people.

A further difference has been identified in the perception of various categories of non-nationals: although Cypriot respondents favourably estimate their relatives’ inter-societal marriages, they declare that they are not likely to readily accept non-nationals as members in their families.

The Cypriots who are most favourable to their own hypothetical inter-societal marriage belong to at least one of the following demographical categories: male,
educated (of tertiary education), intellectual or artist and with medium to high income. These demographical categories coincide with those categories of Cypriots who are most likely to have lived abroad and have been exposed to maximum foreign influence. The introduction of control variables that measure the exposure to foreign influence (e.g. ‘Respondents’ life abroad’ and ‘Respondents’ relatives married to non-nationals’) revealed more aspects concerning Cypriot attitudes toward their hypothetical marriage to a non-national. In this sense, the Cypriots (either men, or women) who have never lived abroad (i.e. 62% female and 40% male), and Cypriot women who have relatives in inter-societal marriages are more likely to disagree with their hypothetical inter-societal marriage (49% shared these opinions). Moreover, the Cypriot men who have relatives married to non-nationals are more likely to agree with their hypothetical inter-societal marriage (41% agreed with these opinions).

Furthermore, those respondents who are less likely to accept their hypothetical marriage to non-nationals have at least one of the following demographical characteristics: female, primary education, worker, constructor or farmer, with low annual incomes. Once more, these categories coincide with those of the Cypriots who have never lived abroad.

Overall, the Cypriots are more likely to disagree, than to agree with entering a hypothetical inter-societal marriage, despite their increasing exposure to ‘foreign’ influence (see e.g. the increase in immigration stream to Cyprus), a tendency that is confirmed by their degrees of acceptance of hypothetical marital choices for different nationalities living in Cyprus (as analysed below).

Cypriot Representations and Attitudes toward Inter-societal Marriage at Societal and Personal Levels

More than half of the Cypriot respondents estimated the number of inter-societal marriages in Cyprus as being ‘extremely high’ and ‘high’ and almost half of the respondents classified the ‘perceived as high’ and ‘extremely high’ number of inter-societal marriages in Cyprus as neither good, nor bad. Both Cypriot women and men tend to share this opinion (i.e. 43% males and 44% females).

The fact that Cypriots are more likely to adopt a neutral attitude towards the perceived as high number of inter-societal marriages supports the favourable opinion expressed regarding relatives’ inter-societal marital unions, marriages they already have some knowledge about. Nevertheless, most of the Cypriot respondents said that they are not willing to enter into marriages with non-Cypriots. Therefore, although they perceive inter-societal marriages already concluded by their relatives to be “successful”, they would not be willing to marry outside their national group.
On the one hand, most of the people questioned would be unwilling to accept a marriage by their parents to other nationals and more than 60% of respondents would be unwilling to accept inter-societal marriages by their siblings, children, aunts or uncles. On the other hand, more than half of the respondents are likely to accept inter-societal marriages within their circle of friends and cousins. As previously reported by respondents, the most frequent relative married outside the national group is the cousin. One out of four respondents has a cousin married out and one out of two respondents is willing to accept his/her cousin’s decision to marry a non-Cypriot. Young Cypriots and those living in urban areas tend to share this opinion.

It is worthwhile mentioning that Cypriots regard the cousin as a distant relative, part of their extended family. Cousins and friends are not regarded as part of the respondents’ immediate close family/relatives. The Greek-Cypriot conception of ‘cousin’ therefore embraces a broad category that covers large numbers of blood, marriage, and fictive kinship. This may explain the increased acceptance of a cousin’s inter-societal marriage in comparison to that of a close kin. More than three-quarters of respondents accept their relatives’ or friends’ decision to marry a non-national. Cypriot men, those aged 35-54 years and educated Cypriots are more likely to share this opinion.

Once again, the questionnaire outcome illustrates that Cypriot men are more favourable to inter-societal marriage than their female counterparts (as the statistical data on inter-societal marriage has proved). The introduction of control variables that measure respondents’ exposure to foreign influence (as in ‘If respondent has ever lived abroad’ and ‘If respondent has any relative married to a non-national’) reveal additional aspects in relation to the contrasting attitudes towards inter-societal marriage as adopted by Cypriot men and women. More precisely, the Cypriot men who have never lived abroad are more likely to agree with the idea of inter-societal marriage (42% supported this) and their Cypriot women counterparts are more likely to disagree (39% agreed). Also, the Cypriot men who have relatives married to non-nationals are more likely to agree with the idea of inter-societal marriage (61% confirmed this response) and their Cypriot women counterparts are more likely to disagree or to adopt a neutral position (32% and 32% respectively).

More reasons were expressed by Cypriot women respondents against inter-societal marriage. These reasons gravitate around the following interpretations of ‘difference’: non-nationals have different cultures, languages, and religions. These differences all determine a ‘mentality gap’ that leads to conflict. Their belief is that, in the case of inter-societal marriage, a conflict is more likely to arise than in the case of in-marriage between two Cypriots, whereby the former may be more likely to fail. Moreover, because of the above differences, inter-societal marriages
(according to their representation) are not only destined to dissolution, but can also have disastrous societal consequences.

A second category of hostile reasons towards inter-societal marriage (as invoked by respondents) emphasises the material motivations of some overseas spouses, such as: “Some foreigners marry Cypriots for material reasons and destroy Cypriot families”, “No to blank marriages, for material reasons”. This category supports, to some extent, the exchange theory assumptions that inter-societal marriage spouses exchange material and non-material resources and accounts for exchange factors that influence exogamy.12

A third category of reasons opposing inter-societal marriage accentuates xenophobic motivations, for example, “In general I don’t like foreigners, especially Eastern Europeans because they are the cause for high unemployment and extra-conjugal relationships”;13 “Papoutsi apo ton topo sou che an einai balomeno” [“Better the shoes from one’s homeland even if they are patched”], “Foreigners gain rights and Cypriot land”, “Foreigners bring to Cyprus the worst from their countries”, “A large number of foreigners in Cyprus make us feel foreigners in our country”, “Foreign mentalities will change Cypriots’ pure and honest mentality”, “Cypriots trust more only Cypriots”, “It’s better for spouses to have the same nationality”. ‘Foreigners’ are therefore identified with all the social ‘evils’ and problems adjudged by Cypriots as negative influences, such as alienation, unemployment, and extra-conjugal relationships.

Half of the Cypriot male respondents gave positive reasons that approved of inter-societal marriage. The most frequently emphasised reasons were: free choice in choosing a marriage partner, love and mutual understanding as motivation for considering inter-societal marriage, the equality of human beings (irrespective of ethnicity or religion), and the well matching of partners. This constitutes a more liberal and open-minded perspective on inter-societal marriage, based on the universal principles of liberty and equality applied to the mate selection process. It ‘equates’ inter-societal marriage with endogamous marriage and stresses individual factors influencing the former. Differences of any type are deleted, love and mutual understanding are placed above any material reasons and non-nationals are recognised as equal human beings. This is the picture depicted as most favourable by responses to open-ended questions.

There are other considerations that reveal interesting aspects – part of a favourable perception of inter-societal marriage in Cypriot society. In this sense, there is a category of reasons that presents inter-societal marriage as a beneficial change that contributes to cultural revitalisation in Cypriot society, for example: “Mixed marriage gives the chance to escape from the Cypriot mentality and habits”; “I consider that mixed marriage is a good thing because in Cyprus the marriage is
an acquaintances affair". Moreover, through inter-societal marriage, Cypriots have the opportunity to learn about other ethnicities and improve their social acceptance: “This type of marriage allow us to know other customs, traditions or behaviours”, “Mixed marriage makes easier the acceptance of other foreigners”, “Mixed marriage helps to improve relations between different ethnic groups”.

Another group of reasons favourable to inter-societal marriage is formed from those emphasising biological/genetic factors. In other words, the marriage is conceived as a way of renewing the genetic code of the native population. Such reasons were expressed by participants as follows: “I agree with mixed marriage because it generates new races”, “Mixed marriage improves culture, human relations and human health because of new genes”, “Mixed marriage makes our people good-looking”. The underlying racism is evident as long as ‘mixed marriage partners’ are racialised based on phenotypical differences which are considered desirable and contribute to ‘whitening up’ the indigenous population.14

An anti-xenophobic perspective on inter-societal marriage is revealed by the following favourable reasons invoked by other respondents: “I agree with mixed marriage because I like foreigners and I am not racist”, “If we were foreigners in a foreign country, we wouldn’t like not to be accepted”, and “Foreigners shouldn’t be deprived of their human rights”.

A final category of favourable reasons regards inter-societal marriage as a frequent and widely encountered phenomenon: “In the current context of globalisation mixed marriage should be a normal phenomenon”.

**Ideologies of Love Marriage and Inter-societal Marriage**

There were also a handful of reasons that support inter-societal marriage choices encountering opposition from third parties like nuclear or extended families. Partners’ mutual feelings and choices are ranked above any other opposition or social pressure and the control from third parties is denied: “Two people in love must marry, even if others are against” and “If partners think they will have no problems and don’t care what people say, then it’s all right”. There is an ideology around love marriages here, as opposed to marriage out of interest (personal or familial). In this context, Greek Cypriots seem to have adopted Western patterns of marriage partner selection where emotional aspects, ‘affective individualism’ and the formation of marriage ties on the basis of personal attraction, guided by norms of romantic attachment prevail (Berger, 1966; Murstein, 1976; Coltrane, 1998).

Moreover, the same love ideology is at play when a quarter of the people questioned believed that nationality does not influence Cypriots’ marriage decisions. These reasons coincide with those invoked as reasons in favour of inter-societal marriage. Love, psychological traits and free choice of marriage partner are
three categories providing the most frequent reasons which emphasise the primacy of personal marital decisions or free choice of a marriage partner, without any other interference. Of course, this is an ideal case that denies societal structural influences. Love is perceived as a primordial principle that overcomes any influence of nationality: “If there is love, there are no nationalities” (women and young people are more likely to give this reason). Moreover, “If Cypriots marry foreigners, this is out of love”. But “love can be dangerous” as sometimes “When Cypriots fall in love, they don’t see things clearly”.

The questionnaire data informs more about predominant love marriage ideology when considerable numbers of respondents (almost one-quarter) seem unaware of any nationality influence in the Cypriot marriage decision-making process. The most frequent reason given is the following: “If it is out of love, nationality plays no role; if it is a marriage of convenience, then it does”. Also, “It depends on how much they love each other”. The above exposes a two-sided reality of inter-societal marriage and of inter-societal marriage decisions, as perceived at Cypriot public opinion level. There is a socially accepted inter-societal marriage ‘out of love’/‘marriage of love’ and an inter-societal marriage that is regarded as an extreme ‘blank’ marriage out of interest, i.e. a ‘marriage of convenience’ which is socially rejected in Cypriot society, although some decades ago the common mate selection pattern used to be based on the familial economic interests; furthermore, research shows that the custom of providing Cypriot women with dowries is still alive (see more details in Fulias-Souroulla, 2006).

Cypriot Contacts with and Preferences for Different Nationalities Living in Cyprus
An important finding is that the majority of people questioned (i.e. 70%) were of the opinion that nationality is either ‘important’ or ‘very important’ in inter-societal marriage. The respondents who shared this general opinion are likely to have at least one of the following demographical characteristics: female, inhabitant of rural areas, older than 55 years and less educated. These categories are identical with those who expressed an unfavourable opinion about migrants and marriages of Greek-Cypriots with non-nationals up to now. Instead, the respondents who are more likely to believe that nationality is not important in inter-societal marriage belong to at least one of the following demographical categories: male, educated, inhabitant of urban areas and young. Again, these categories are identical with those that were identified as more favourable to migrants and inter-societal marriage in Cyprus, so far.

According to the findings concerning respondents’ preferences for eleven nationalities living in Cyprus (and listed in the questionnaire) there are four groups of nationalities:
(a) The most preferred nationalities living in Cyprus: Greek, British and Russian;
(b) Preferred nationalities: German and Romanian;
(c) Less preferred nationalities: Bulgarian and American;
(d) Least preferred nationalities: Israeli, Iranian, Filipino and Lebanese.15

The majority of the respondents have met and know ‘very well’ and ‘well’ Greek nationals living in Cyprus. The percentages of those respondents who prefer (87%) and those who know (87%) Greek nationals are identical. Thus, it seems that respondents’ preferences are based on the experience of direct contacts with Greek male and female nationals living in Cyprus.

The outcome illustrates differences in Cypriot preferences by respondents’ gender or, in other words, a gendered difference in Cypriot preferences for different nationals. Cypriot men prefer mostly Russian, Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, and Cypriot women more often prefer British, German and American nationals living in Cyprus. The responses given by the people questioned, therefore, confirm the identified patterns given by the statistical data analysis that reveals similar differences in the marital choices made by Cypriot men and women (for details, see Appendix 1).

The least known and preferred by Cypriots are the Israeli and Iranian nationals living in Cyprus. Together with Filipino and Lebanese nationals, they constitute the Asian group of nationalities. As questionnaire data shows, the greatest social distance is between Cypriots and the Asian group of nationalities:16 there is less contact and preference for non-European nationals in Cyprus.

Cypriot Preferences for Spouses’ Nationality in Inter-societal Marriage
Half of the Cypriot respondents would not marry non-nationals. Male respondents were keener to marry outside the national group, than their female counterparts. This tendency is verified by the statistical data analysis that shows a large difference between the number of inter-societal marriages entered into by Cypriot men and women (as previously discussed).

The male respondents would prefer Russian brides (40% – this also represents the most frequent out-marriage combination for Cypriot men), followed by British (31%), German (30%) and Romanian (29%) brides. As statistical data shows, when Cypriot men entered into marriages with Eastern-European brides, they chose mostly Russian and Romanian brides, and Bulgarian brides less often. From the Euro-American brides, Cypriot men chose British, American and German brides (see also, Appendix 1).
Simultaneously, the Cypriot female respondents’ preferences for spouses match the existing statistical data on inter-societal marriage entered into by Cypriot women; they would prefer British, American and German grooms and they also married these nationalities most frequently (same hierarchies for both Cypriot women’s hypothetical mate choices and the registered number of inter-societal marriages entered into by Cypriot women).

The people questioned once more replied in concordance with the existing statistical data on inter-societal marriage in Cyprus (for details see Appendix 1). The great majority of the respondents recorded ‘No’ to Israeli and Iranian grooms and brides, while in the Asian group of nationalities the smallest percentage registering ‘No’ answers were recorded, by both male and female respondents, for Lebanese.

A significant finding, therefore, is that Cypriot men are more likely to marry women from countries in Eastern Europe whereas the Cypriot women are more likely to choose men from the Euro-American group of countries. Also, Cypriot men prefer mostly Russian brides (less German, Bulgarian and Romanian brides) and Cypriot women prefer British and American grooms. Neither Cypriot men nor women prefer people from Israel, Iran, or the Philippines as marriage partners.

As mentioned earlier, almost three-quarters of the respondents believed that nationality is ‘important’ or ‘very important’ when entering an inter-societal marriage. When questioned, more than half of the people reported that nationality influences marriage decisions made by Cypriots.

The reasons most invoked in support of the statement that “<foreign nationality> influences the marriage decisions made by Cypriots” are the following: difference as disadvantage, commonality as advantage, and prejudices about other nationalities. These reasons coincide with those raised to accent the disagreement with inter-societal marriage in Cyprus. Different cultures, economic backgrounds and religious faiths might negatively affect the offspring of an inter-societal marriage, and also influence marital behaviour and favour tendencies towards divorce. On this pretext respondents argue that it is better for Cypriots to choose nationalities with which they share some perceived commonalities: “We search to see which ethnicity is closer to ours”.

Some respondents thus state clearly that “Common ethnical features constitute an advantage for the mixed married couple and the opposite”. Religion is a case in point, as respondents defined: “If foreigners are Christians, there is no reason to disagree with inter-societal marriage”; among Christians, the Orthodox Christians are favoured: “Only Orthodox foreigners are accepted”. Moreover, a religious gap might be a serious obstacle: “The religion plays a very important role in a family, so Muslims and Christians cannot live together”. 
In words formulated by the respondents, a conclusion might be that, the nationality of a non-Cypriot ‘should influence’ a Cypriot’s marriage decision: “In order to avoid large contrast and oppositions leading to later problems”; this viewpoint is expressed by most Cypriot interviewees.

Moreover, other factors that concern ranked perceptions of different nationalities in the spouse selection process support the opinion that nationality influences the marriage decisions of Cypriots: “It is about subjective preference for different nationalities”, “Each nationality differs from the other, so that Cypriots will choose”, “It is not hard for Cypriots to decide when the partner is British or American”, “I don’t like some nationalities at all”.

Preferences for material resources in a marital partner were invoked as the rationale behind nationality influencing marriage decisions: “Lots of these girls have as purpose money, Cypriot citizenship and residence in Cyprus”. While “Cypriot women take into account nationality and Cypriot men don’t”, this motive can prove ‘disastrous’. The above explanation supports assumptions of the exchange theory about resource exchanges between spouses. By contrast, “Cypriot men take into account mostly only foreign spouses’ physical appearance”. This indicates a construction of ‘beauty’ on a racial basis, with non-national women of colour being framed by racial biases and stereotypes as ‘appropriate’ to undertake domestic work, whereas ‘not quite white’ women from Eastern Europe are preferred as sexual partners (Agathangelou, 2004). Vassiliadou also discussed this topic in relation to stereotypes about Greek-Cypriot women in Cyprus in so far as “compared to Western women, Cypriot women are considered as ‘naturally’ less attractive, less sophisticated and less sexual” (2004, p. 62).

There is another sizeable category of reasons that are frequently mentioned by the respondents when they argue why nationality influences the marriage decisions of Cypriots. These reasons relate to prejudice, xenophobia, and third party influences in spouse selection. Hence, foreign nationality influences marriage decisions made by Cypriots because “The Cypriots judge mixed marriage based on their prejudices about each nationality”, “Because deep inside we are racist” and “Because there is enough prejudice and xenophobia in Cyprus”.

Third party influences (i.e. close family and relatives) on mate selection are also reported to have an effect on Cypriot marriage decisions concerning overseas spouses: “Because a Cypriot will be influenced by his/her relatives” and “Because mixed marriage is considered to be a taboo in Cyprus”.

On the same question of how or why nationality influences the marriage decisions of Cypriots, the interviewees also emphasised the opportunity (or lack of)
to make contacts in the marriage market: “Those who marry foreigners perhaps cannot find Cypriot partners”.

Some respondents no longer perceive nationality as an impediment in the current changing context, since “Cypriots now enter into marriages with lots of nationalities” and “There are differences, but in our times, these are not obstacles anymore”. Some respondents are aware of the high frequency of inter-societal marriage in contemporary Cyprus (as their estimates regarding the number of inter-societal marriages in Cyprus have shown) and given this notable rise, the phenomenon of inter-societal marriage is not considered a form of deviation from the endogamous rule.

The reasons given to support the idea that nationality is not a determinant factor in the marriage decisions of Cypriots are very similar overall to the reasons voiced by those respondents who were receptive to the idea of inter-societal marriage of Cypriots.

**Conclusions and Discussion**

This article forms part of a larger study17 that inaugurates a path of sociological research in the domain of marital unions between Greek Cypriots and partners originating from overseas societies. As a starting point in the investigation of this relatively new phenomenon in Cypriot society, the present analysis quantified the tendency of Greek Cypriots to marry outside their national group.

Because no previous research is available on the topic of inter-societal marriage and immigration in Cyprus, it has been necessary to take into account the picture given by the statistical data available. Although data was sometimes incomplete, the information it provided constituted a suitable cornerstone from which the topic under study could be explored. These findings show that Cypriot women prefer men from the Euro-American group of nationalities as spouses, while Cypriot grooms favour Eastern European brides as their first choice. The existing statistical data regarding the marriages between Greek Cypriots and non-nationals, and also the volume and composition of the immigration stream to Cyprus, offers an image of the inter-societal marriage market and its dynamics in Cyprus.

The survey questionnaire findings identified different social distances for diverse groups of foreign nationals living in Cyprus. Hence, if the Cypriot attitude towards ‘foreigners’ in Cyprus is unfavourable, their attitude towards migrant workers in Cyprus is less unfavourable and the attitude towards their relatives’ marriages to non-nationals is favourable. As a result the Cypriot attitude towards non-nationals is becoming more favourable as the social distance decreases between Cypriots and different nationalities living in Cyprus. It could be explained
that this shortening of social distance is due to a gradual personalisation of the ‘foreigner’. In this sense, respondents’ high exposure to ‘foreign’ influence (measured through indices such as whether the respondents lived abroad or whether they have non-national relatives) has been found to heighten favourable attitudes toward the inter-societal marital union (especially in relation to Cypriot men) and vice versa.

In general, the survey’s findings identify a first hierarchy in the respondents’ perceptions of different ethnicities living in Cyprus. The basic axis in this hierarchy is given by the racial categorisation white-non-white and the religious separation Christian-Muslim. These constitute the main ‘difference’ that has been invoked as the prime reason against inter-societal marriage. Several survey findings clearly illustrate that ‘race’ constitutes a core and defining cultural category that structures and shapes everyday motivations and common sense, social practices and perceptions of Greek Cypriots.

The geographical distance, most often in people’s minds, refers to social, cultural, political or religious distance. Geographically, Cyprus is closer to the Middle East than to Europe, however, Cypriots aspire to a ‘European identity’. According to their representations, this is a ‘superior’ identity or one that is perceived as such because of material and non-material assets: the ‘Western identity’ represented by the Euro-American group of countries (as considered by the present analysis). In the same vein, Argyrou (1996) argues that in Cyprus, people are predisposed to view the countries of Western Europe and North America as the site of the highest culture. He further explains, however, that the West as a superior cultural identity has been constituted in the context of colonialism and neo-colonialism and serves to legitimate the domination of one block of nations over the rest of the world.

In relation to the first hierarchy of perceptions as identified herein, Agathangelou (2004) shows that racial biases and stereotypes constitute a constant element of public and private discussion about immigrant women in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. The research here corroborates these findings statistically, for the case of Cyprus, and goes further to argue that there are differences in perceptions between men and women. A significant survey finding is that, Cypriot men are more favourable towards inter-societal unions than their female counterparts. This is supported by the fact that Cypriot men married non-nationals more often than Cypriot women. Overall, the study findings (from statistical data analysis and questionnaire survey) picture two opposite and gendered stands of Greek Cypriots on inter-societal marriage: of Cypriot women and of Cypriot men.

What this study thus reveals, is the significance of various boundary-ranking measures; that is, indicators of perceived ‘social distance’ in influencing the marital decisions about which group could provide potential spouses, and which groups
were simply not considered by Cypriot men and women because of religious or racial criteria. For example, a Cypriot woman might consider marrying a British, Greek or American man, but under no circumstances would she consider marrying a Filipino man, because of the various hierarchies of acceptability of ‘foreign-ness’ in relation to migrant groups in Cyprus.18

Questionnaire findings depict Cypriot women as being more likely to choose spouses from the Euro-American group of countries while Cypriot men show a preference for spouses from the Eastern European group of countries (these preferences coincide with the marital choices made by Cypriot men and women, as statistical data illustrates).19 These choices constituted a second hierarchy that accounts for economic/material differences and inequalities. In terms of socio-economic status, the Euro-American group is perceived by Cypriots as a ‘higher’ status migrant group, also representing the most culturally desirable origin for the spouse of a Cypriot bride. The second group of Eastern-European countries is regarded as a ‘lower’ status immigrant group, viewed as inferior because of its average socio-economic standing, in addition it also represents a major provider of brides for Cypriot men. Due to the fact that there are marriages between Eastern-European women who worked in a Cypriot cabaret-type venue and Cypriot men (as the qualitative part of this study has shown, see Fulias-Souroulla, 2006), many Cypriots display ‘doubts’ about the ‘moral integrity’ of these women and tend to bestow a ‘prostitution halo’, on all their co-nationals, socially stigmatising and marginalising them as economic and opportunistic immigrants.

The analysis of the reasons (or representations) against inter-societal marriage reveal that the Cypriot respondents are ‘aware’ of artificial inter-societal marriages entered into by migrant women. However, what seems to be unclear for most Greek Cypriots is that these women are coerced into marriages with Greek-Cypriot citizens because there might be no other way for them to prolong their stay on the island. In this case, a marriage to a citizen is the solution to the problem created by the lack of policies concerning migrant settlement on Cyprus. Migrants arriving from countries outside of the EU are constrained by the regime of short-term/temporary residence permits that allow them the possibility of obtaining only a fixed-term work visa. Furthermore, the Cypriots’ negative representations depict how inter-societal marriages entered into for ‘material reasons’ by migrant women, and labour migrants with poor economic standing, contribute to high unemployment rates among nationals. These images are partly created by the mass-media and some political groupings, based on self interest.

Nevertheless, Cypriot men and women agree with marital choices for Greek nationals. As the findings show, to the great majority of respondents (87%), Greek nationals from the mainland are well-known and preferred as marriage partners. Hence, this is the only combination almost unanimously accepted by Cypriots
because of the common ethnic identification of the two partners. In this sense, Argyrou (1996) formulates the argument about a Greek-Cypriot identity constructed in a context of a historical continuity with classical, glorious Greek civilisation. However, the identification is not true in today’s context of Greek identity since “the practice implies that there are two ways of being Greek and that the Cypriot way is superior” (ibid., pp. 54-56).

According to existing social prejudices and stereotypes (positive and negative) about each nationality (as mentioned by the respondents), Cypriots are, therefore, expected to judge inter-societal marriage as well as viewing the spouses favourably or less favourably/unfavourably. The general criteria/markers are: religion, economic standing and racial characteristics, such as skin colour. A nationality that possesses many ‘similarities’ to Greek Cypriots, on these markers, is most likely to be identified as closer in terms of social distance and implicit acceptance, as the questionnaire outcome portrays. For this reason, Cypriots easily accept nationals from European countries as marriage partners, but not Asian or African. The large number of inter-societal marriages and the diverse nationalities of people that enter into marriages with Cypriots contribute to a greater but gradual social acceptance of this phenomenon in Cyprus.

Notes

1. Greek Cypriots use the word ‘foreigner’/ksenos to denote non-nationals, both in public discourses and everyday language.
2. According to data from Statistics of Education (Report No. 36/2004) for the year 2003/2004, the first group of countries registered 90% (15,882) of total Cypriot students abroad and the second group of countries made up only 10% (1,749) of total Cypriot students abroad.
3. This section is part of a more detailed statistical data analysis on marriage, inter-societal marriage and immigration in Cyprus (in Fulias-Souroulla, 2006).
4. It is important to mention that population data for marriages between Greek Cypriots and non-nationals is made available for a limited number of nationalities (i.e. considered by the Statistical Service as ‘main nationalities’). A large number of nationalities are clustered under the category of ‘other nationalities’. Regarding civil marriage, data is available for (A) five nationalities (i.e. Greek, British, American, Israeli and Lebanese) that had married in Cyprus between 1989 and 1994. From 1994, (B) six more nationalities (i.e. Romanian, Bulgarian, Russian, German, Iranian, and Filipino) are tabulated regarding marital unions with Greek Cypriots. (C) For the years 2002 and 2003 there are three more nationalities registered: Irish, Moldavian and Ukrainian (but no data is reported for the German and Iranian nationalities). (D) For the year 2004, eight new nationalities are added: Belarusian, Sri-Lankan, Chinese and Yugoslavian (for
There is a racially-based assumption here that these groups share similar characteristics. It should be clearly understood that the viewpoints expressed do not represent those of the author. Agathangelou (2004) would argue that indeed these groups share similar positions on a racialised hierarchy of perception: Euro-Americans enjoying the most ‘respect’, followed by eastern Europeans, then Africans/Asians.

The statistical data available shows only the number of marriages entered into by Greek-Cypriot women with Egyptian men for the year 2004 (no other African nationality appears in the statistics to have entered into marriages with ‘natives’).

See Appendix 2 for a graph of marriages: Greek Cypriots – non-Greek-Cypriots by gender and year. The amendment of the citizenship law in 1999 allowed those descendants with a Cypriot mother and a non-Cypriot father, the right to citizenship.

For more details see Fulias-Souroulla (2006).


For more details, see Fulias-Souroulla (2006), pp. 117-199, 318-320.

The language of the auto-administrated questionnaire was Greek and the terms employed to denote immigrants were ‘foreign workers’ (kseni ergates) and foreigners (ksenos/i). The opening paragraph of the questionnaire defined the term ‘foreigner’ as a person who entered Cyprus with the intention to settle down, and/ or to stay for one year or more.

Exchange theory is based on an economic metaphor that uses a profit motive as a basis of social interaction. As Smith (1995, p. 21) shows “economists have used exchange principles to identify the use of resource in marital interactions in Third World settings”. Early presentations of the theory formulated by anthropologists also demonstrated its applicability in various cultural contexts. Levi-Stauss (1969) emphasised that exchange behaviour is regulated by social norms and values; thus, exchange interactions are not restricted to direct interaction among individuals but include “complex networks of indirect exchange among various social groups” (Sabatelli and Shehan, 1993, p. 404).

In Cyprus, Eastern - European women (especially those working in night clubs) are regarded as a direct threat to the marriage between indigenous people, both by the state authorities and public opinion (Vassiliadou, 2004). This is being confirmed by the present research and further research conducted in the FeMIPol project at [www.femipol.uni-frankfurt.de].

It is a common practice for Greek-Cypriot relatives when learning about the birth of a child to ask whether she/he is a mouzouris/mouzourou (slightly darker hair and skin) or an asproulis/asproulou (with blond or lighter coloured hair and whiter skin).

I should mention that the survey questionnaire did not include nationalities from the African continent because of the limited tabulated statistical data available on nationalities married to Greek Cypriots. As mentioned earlier, there is no data registered for these nationalities except for the year 2004 when data is registered for Egyptians only, and restricted to ‘nationality of groom’. At the time the survey questionnaire was distributed, the Demographical Report for the year 2004 had not been published. The
absence of such data means that the number of marriages between Greek Cypriots and African nationals would appear to be very small.

16. There is no statistical data tabulated for African nationals living in Cyprus (except for Egyptian men married to Cypriot women in 2004). The questionnaire employed does not list any African nationalities because of the lack of statistical data.


18. See also the statistical data presented earlier as well as in Appendix 1.

19. See also Appendix 1.

20. According to statistical and survey findings.

Bibliography


Appendix 1
Summary Tables with Greek-Cypriot Marital Choices for Different Nationalities, Resulting from Statistical Data Analysis (1989-2004)

Table 1: Most Frequent Marital Choices of Cypriots for Non-national Spouses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of nationalities</th>
<th>Most frequent marriage partner for Cypriot men</th>
<th>Most frequent marriage partner for Cypriot women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-American group</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>British and Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-European group</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian group</td>
<td>Filipina</td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Least Frequent Marital Choices of Cypriots for Non-national Spouses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of nationalities</th>
<th>Least frequent marriage partner for Cypriot men</th>
<th>Least frequent marriage partner for Cypriot women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-American group</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-European group</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian group</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The symbol ‘...’ means that no tabulated data is available for all nationalities under study for mixed religious marriages between Cypriots and non-Cypriots.

Appendix 2
Marriages: Cypriots-Non-Cypriots by Year and Gender

Migrant worker at construction site near the Green Line

© Photographer: Narges Abdi
Source: Limbo: The Migrant in Cyprus – A Portrait
Edited by David Officer and Nicos Philippou
Mediterranean Voices Project (Euromed Heritage Project)
THE PROBLEM OF PIGEONS: ORIENTALISM, XENOPHOBIA AND A RHETORIC OF THE ‘LOCAL’ IN NORTH CYPRUS

Mete Hatay

Abstract
This article discusses the Orientalism at the heart of Turkish Cypriots’ visions of modernity, as well as the more recent effects of this Orientalism on the immigrants from Turkey who now both compose and symbolise old Nicosia within the walls. The article, first, discusses the Kemalism of Turkish-Cypriot modernisation, looking at Kemalism’s roots in a type of Orientalism aimed at the supposedly “backward” self. The initial arrival of Turkish immigrants on the island after 1974 and Turkish-Cypriots’ initial reactions to them are also described. Later the article sketches the recent neoliberal privatisation in the north, its wealth effect, and the growing distinction between Turkish Cypriots and working-class “others” that has become a defining facet of a new Turkish-Cypriot identity. In this process, the article shows how representations of those “others,” especially in relation to the walled city of Nicosia, are inherently Orientalising, and it documents the ways in which this representation affects the lives of those now living within the walls.

Keywords: Settlers, immigrants, Kemalism, Orientalism, xenophobia, Turkish-Cypriots and Nicosia.

In one of the central squares of north Nicosia stands a statue of Dr. Fazil Küçük, the first recognised leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community and first vice-president of the Republic of Cyprus after 1960. Dr. Küçük looks down benevolently on a child who accompanies him, and two pigeons sit on his head. The casual observer is likely to think the pigeons are part of the assemblage of the statue, since they are usually the same grey as the iron from which it was cast. One might think that they are there to show Dr. Küçük’s love of animals as well as children, except that on more careful observation, unlike the child, the pigeons can be seen to move, flap about, or trade places on their resting spot. The pigeons are intruders on this homely scene, their intrusion visible in the white splotches that they leave on Dr. Küçük’s shoulders and head.
In recent years, the birds that have proliferated around the statue and in the other squares of Nicosia’s walled city do more than provide entertainment for children and retirees. Many Turkish Cypriots have cast the avian invasion as something much more sinister: the symbol of a cultural and political colonisation that threatens to sully local culture in the same way that the pigeons have dirtied the main squares. Hasan Hastürer, a columnist for *Kibris* newspaper, explained the local perception of these feathered intruders:

“In most of the mudbrick houses of Nicosia’s walled city, pigeons were raised in holes in walls or in empty cans that had been nailed into the walls as nests. And the baby pigeons would be boiled and fried and afterwards served on a bed of macaroni. After 1974 those living in Nicosia changed. While the Cypriots who ate this dish known as palaz abandoned the old, historic city, their places were taken by persons of Turkish descent. Palaz does not exist in the cuisine of the city’s new inhabitants. The pigeons that had for so many years lived in the holes in walls or cracks in roofs of the city’s houses slowly began to gather in Sarayönü Square. The pigeons of Sarayönü have now begun to symbolise the city’s changing human composition. And now in Sarayönü there are women wearing şalvars and children in plastic sandals who try to make a living selling seeds for the pigeons”.1

The pigeons’ multiplication, then, came to stand for the proliferation of cultural others, persons with different cuisines and different habits who, like the pigeons, were visible to them not only as a growing mass but also as one that dirtied the local landscape.

The growing nostalgia amongst Turkish Cypriots has been discussed elsewhere2 for the walled city of Nicosia, a place that historically has been the heart of Turkish-Cypriot cultural and political life but which Cypriots began to abandon in the 1980s in search of modernity in the spreading suburbs. In this article the Orientalism at the heart of Turkish-Cypriots’ visions of modernity will instead be discussed along with the more recent effects of this Orientalism on the women in şalvars [traditional baggy trousers] and children in plastic sandals who now both compose and symbolise Nicosia within the walls. This article will aim to sketch the recent neoliberal privatisation in the north, its wealth effect, and the growing distinction between Turkish Cypriots and working-class “others” that has become a defining facet of a new Turkish-Cypriot identity. In the process, this article also aims to show not only how representations of those “others”, especially in relation to the walled city of Nicosia, are inherently Orientalising, but also the ways in which this representation affects the lives of those now living within the walls.

The intention is to show the ways in which representations of the walled city elide political and cultural “colonisation”, conveniently confusing labour migration from Anatolia with accusations of a political colonisation by the Turkish state. It is
argued here that the effect of this confusion is that many Turkish Cypriots cast discriminatory attitudes and practices toward immigrants as a form of “resistance”, thereby appearing to give that discrimination a political and social justification. This has meant that even parties and organisations that claim to work for equality and human rights do not include the immigrant labour force in the scope of their struggle, and indeed often cast those immigrants as a group that they must struggle against.

The article, then, will first discuss the Kemalism of Turkish-Cypriot modernisation, looking at Kemalism’s roots in a type of Orientalism aimed at the supposedly “backward” self. The initial arrival of Turkish immigrants on the island will then be described as well as Turkish-Cypriots’ initial reactions to them, before discussing the economic transformations of the 1980s and 1990s and their effects on Turkish-Cypriot society. It was in this period of neoliberal change that a new immigrant population arrived on the island, making their home primarily in Nicosia’s walled city, which had been abandoned by Turkish Cypriots. The ways in which media representations of that population vacillate between describing them as a form of “Turkish colonisation” and a type of “Anadoluşaşma [Anatolianisation]” will be demonstrated. While the former implies colonisation tied to the policies of the Turkish state, the latter representation points to a local form of Orientalism that casts Anatolia as “the East”, a backward place where people are darker, more conservative, and in general culturally different from Turkish-Cypriots’ self-perceptions. The article concludes with a few remarks about the ways in which this Orientalism has been reflected in Turkish-Cypriots’ everyday perceptions of the divided city, in which many have also appropriated common ways of describing that division as one between a “Western” south and an “Anatolianised”, or “Eastern”, north.

Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus and the Orientalism of the Orientalised

In his groundbreaking work, Orientalism, Edward Said observes that the emergence of a discipline describing a place called “the Orient” depends on a relationship between knowledge and power, in which defining the place and its people and ruling over them are intrinsically related. Moreover, the West, in this description, is “modern” and “progressive”, while the East is “backward”, proved both for colonisers and colonised alike in the fact of Western hegemony. Following on from Edward Said, numerous postcolonial scholars have noted that Orientalism also became part of the self-perception of the colonised. As James Carrier notes, “Said’s concept of ‘Orientalism’ does not account for the potential for Orientals themselves to use Orientalism in their self definition”. Carrier claims that Orientalism serves “not just to draw a line between societies, but also to draw a line within” and that “this process is likely to be particularly pronounced in societies that self-consciously stand on the border between the occident and the orient”.

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This observation may also be made with regard to the Turkish-Cypriot community. Prior to the emergence of Turkish nationalism in Turkey, this community identified itself as either Ottoman or Muslim. But in the context of British colonial rule on the island, both these identities were also characterised by British rulers, as well as by some members of the community, as “backward” and incapable of modernisation. Although the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements of the late Ottoman Empire attempted to trace a path to modernisation, that path was also defined by the belief that their own identities were, indeed, Oriental and in need of Westernisation. At the same time, as Muslims, many in the community found it difficult to accept what they viewed as ethical changes brought by a Western, colonial modernity. For example, when the colonial administration attempted to bring an English schoolmistress to the Muslim girls’ school in 1902, the newspaper Mir’at-i Zaman protested, “We are not going to make our girls [serve as] English schoolmistresses, or Interpreters in the Government Departments, or let them dance a waltz at a public ball. If the intention of the Government is to drag us into English Civilisation, such things can never be admitted by Moslem Civilisation”. They were, in other words, caught between the rock of “Oriental backwardness” and the hard place of “English civilisation”.

The contradictions experienced by the Muslims of Cyprus reached a critical point during and after World War I, when Britain annexed the island, the Ottoman Empire suffered a humiliating defeat, and Philhellene Europeans encouraged Greek endeavours to occupy Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal’s stunning defeat of the invading forces and subsequent establishment of a new state was met with excitement by Muslim Cypriots, even though they found themselves excluded from their “motherland’s” nation-building project. Some heeded Kemal’s call to Turks in nearby territories to join in the establishment of the new nation-state and took advantage of the opportunity to opt for Turkish citizenship. Those Muslim Cypriots who chose to remain gradually embraced the ideology of Turkish nationalism.

At the core of this nationalism were the Kemalist values of secularism, modernisation and westernisation. Muslim Cypriots voluntarily accepted Kemalist principles and reforms introduced by sanction of the state in Turkey, such as the introduction of the Latin alphabet, adoption of western dress and secularisation. However, at the core of this Westernisation process was a belief that something fundamental in the nationalist self needed to change. The old, “Oriental” traditions and beliefs had to be discarded in the name of modernity and progress. Bobby S. Sayyid eloquently describes the relationship between Orientalism and Kemalism:

“To modernise, the Kemalists had to westernise, but the very nature of westernisation implied the necessity of Orientalisation since you can only westernise what is not western, that is what is Oriental. Thus, to westernise
you had first to Orientalise: one had to represent the Oriental, before one could postulate westernisation as an antidote. To reject the Orient in the name of the West meant the articulation of the Orient as ‘the Orient’.”

The “Orient” for Turkish Cypriots in this sense had become the old traditions and Islam. They perceived Kemalism as the only tool to civilise themselves. Anything to do with Arabic or Persian had to be deleted in their daily lives. In the meantime they demanded, too, that the colonial authorities recognise their Turkish nationality and that education be of a “national” rather than religious character. That Turkish Cypriots perceived Kemalism as modernising was also observed by British colonial administrators. A.J. Dawe of the Colonial Office commented that some British officers think that: “by supporting the die-hard Turks of the old regime … will prevent the Cypriot Turks from becoming Kemalist. In fact, I believe that this attitude is driving all the younger generation into the arms of the Kemalists. The only way to win them over to the British side is to give them a chance of becoming ‘modern’ in Cyprus”.

By the time the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, most of the Turkish Cypriots had either become or allied themselves with fundamentally Kemalist Turkish nationalists, partly due to the “civilising” process they had undergone since the late 1920s and partly because of the increasing Greek nationalism and violence in the 1950s. For example, Bryant argues that once the new Turkish state initiated certain reforms such as secularism and westernisation:

“Muslims in Cyprus immediately and voluntarily adopted these new statements about their identity, even while their presumed ‘brothers’ in Anatolia were in the throes of cultural upheaval. But they adopted them with a twist, for they had at hand an enemy – their Greek Cypriot neighbours – who was constantly agitating for a future that would not include Muslims. In other words, Turkish Cypriots adopted the modernising framework, constructivist history, and future-oriented rhetoric of the new Turkish republic, but they combined this with a belief in a powerful enemy that has been the hallmark of ethnic nationalism”.

As part of this “civilising” process, there was also Turkification of the social landscape. During the period leading up to independence, most of the village names or street names in the cities where Turkish Cypriots lived were changed to Turkish ones (even replacing some of the Islamic or old Turkish names). People were encouraged to use öz Türkçe, or “pure Turkish”, to name their children and were discouraged from using Muslim names. Turkish Cypriots found these names in history books or in Turkish mythology or legends. Names like Mete, Ulus, Özer, Oğuz, Vural, Hakan, and Kaan began to appear on birth certificates.
This Turkification reached its height in the period after independence, when intercommunal fighting erupted and Turkish Cypriots withdrew into armed enclaves. Archbishop Makarios proposed changes to the constitution in 1963, resulting in violent clashes. The enclaves to which Turkish Cypriots retreated were primarily controlled by the formerly underground organisation, Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, or Turkish Defence Organisation, usually known as TMT. The TMT surfaced above ground during this phase, joining with elected Turkish-Cypriot representatives in reorganising their community in these armed ghettos. In this period, due to the perceived and real threats coming from Greek Cypriots, most of the Turkish Cypriots submitted themselves to the nationalist projects initiated by TMT and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Anthropologist Moira Killoran claims that “during the turbulent and vulnerable period when a Turkish-Cypriot minority population was in direct conflict with the Greek-Cypriot majority, and after the end of British rule in 1960 through the war in 1974, Turkish Cypriots sought protection from Turkey as if from, in the words of Turkish Cypriot scholar Kizilyurek, a “tribal God”. Turkey and things Turkish became a kind of religion for Turkish Cypriots”.

This “religion”, discussed elsewhere, also had its own apocalyptic history that appeared inevitably to lead to Turkey’s military intervention. When a Greek military junta overthrew Archbishop Makarios in 1974, Turkey’s invasion and division of the island were welcomed by most Turkish Cypriots, who perceived the so-called “Peace Operation” as a relief from the oppression of nationalist Greek-Cypriot forces. The people greeted the Turkish soldiers as “liberators”.

According to Özkırımlı and Sofos, “Nationalism is almost invariably haunted by a fixation on territory, the quest for a ‘home’, actual or imagined”. They also note that this kind of fixation involves a “reconstruction of social space as national territory, often with a force and intensity that erase alternatives and graft the nation onto the physical environment and everyday social practices”. Following the 1974 war and after the flight and expulsion of the Greek Cypriots all the Turkish Cypriots gathered in the northern part of the island to construct their imagined state. All geographical names immediately changed into Turkish ones. The landscape was transformed into Turkish territory. Slogans like “how happy to say I’m a Turk” and Turkish flags decorated the mountains and hills of north Cyprus.

Moreover, in the period that immediately followed, Turkish Cypriots desired to consolidate their gains and give a jump-start to the new state’s economy. This required people who could work the lands and factories left behind by fleeing Greek Cypriots. And so there were initially no protests when Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot administration entered into an agreement to facilitate the migration of several thousand people from rural Turkey. Immigrants who were part of this policy received empty Greek-Cypriot properties and citizenship in the Turkish-Cypriot “state” almost upon arrival. This facilitated migration ended by the late
a further amendment of the citizenship law in 1993 restricted citizenship rights to persons who had been resident on the island for at least five years. By that time, however, approximately 25,000-30,000 persons had arrived on the island; of those, approximately 15,000-20,000 of the original “settlers” and 15,000 of their Cypriot-born descendants – many from marriages with Turkish Cypriots – have remained.

The ‘Other Turks’ and the Discourse of ‘Demographic Danger’

Following what can be described as an initial honeymoon period, some negative reactions surfaced among the Turkish Cypriots toward the influx of this large number of mainlanders. The rural background and lack of education of these immigrants provided Turkish Cypriots with grounds for prejudice and discrimination. The immigrants’ dress and appearance appeared to contradict the Kemalist ideals to which Turkish Cypriots had been accustomed for the previous four decades. Turkish Cypriots used the mainlanders’ religiosity, appearance, language – including spoken Turkish or other languages – and other cultural differences as “strong boundary-maintaining mechanisms”. Anthropologist, Sarah Ladbury, who carried out fieldwork in north Cyprus in 1976 and 1977, claims that:

“The mainlander is respected for his fighting ability, but not for his cultural ingenuity (‘they saw the legs off tables’), commonsense (‘after two years they still ride their bicycles on the right’), or Western ways (‘they wear shalvar’) ... Even the religiosity of the mainlander is used in the process of ethnic delineation (‘they build mosques before schools’).”

Turkish Cypriots also resented the government’s distribution of the “rewards” of the war, as many of the settlers received empty Greek-Cypriot land and property in what appeared an indiscriminate way. Ladbury notes this relationship between the exaggeration of cultural “otherness” and other motivations:

“Here the cultural differences between Cypriot Turk and mainland Turk, non-existent to the uninitiated observer, are emphasised and exaggerated by Turkish Cypriots in order to justify their exclusive claim to certain resources which seem to be both scarce and, at present, unjustly distributed.”

Moreover, certain isolated criminal incidents involving Turkish immigrants, such as fights between neighbours, or in one case someone trying to marry a Turkish-Cypriot girl before divorcing his first wife, also caused anger among the secular Turkish Cypriots. The late Turkish-Cypriot leader Dr. Fazil Küçük wrote a series of articles in 1978 criticising the “immoral behaviour” of the settlers. He said that they should all be sent back (the ones from the East) because they were not “civilised” enough to stay in Cyprus:
“Thus an ‘Eastern sultanate’ has been established in many villages. ... The earlier [mainland Turks,] those who have such bad manners and little civilisation that they would even spit in the face of the policeman on duty are sent back to their villages, the earlier they could reach the freedom they desire, and Cypriot Turks and the people who settled on the island could live in peace. Those coming from the western provinces [of Turkey] are as unhappy as we are”.26

Despite such criticisms, however, the issue of immigration from Turkey was not at the top of the Turkish Cypriots’ political agenda. One reason for this was, no doubt, the fact that many of the first immigrants were settled in remote villages and had little contact with Turkish Cypriots. As a result, any criticism of the policy at the time of the initial migration primarily concerned the distribution of Greek-Cypriot property. Real criticism would surface only much later, with the emergence of an emphasis on the “Cypriot” part of Turkish Cypriots’ identities.

In the Turkish nationalist discourse, Turkish Cypriots are perceived as an extension of the people of Turkey. There is no difference between the Turks of Cyprus and the Turks of Turkey. The former Turkish-Cypriot president and Turkish nationalist Rauf Denktaş has always emphasised his Turkishness rather than his Cypriotness. In one of his speeches he declared that he is a “Turk coincidentally born on Cyprus”.27 As a result, right-wing parties have not attempted to impede Turkish migration to the island.

Since the 1980s, however, there has been an emerging identification with Cypriotness that has been especially strong on the political left in the north. Apart from the mismanagement by the nationalist government of daily affairs and land distribution, another reason for the left’s attitude could be explained by their reactions against the Turkish nationalist hegemonic historiography which dominated the public sphere until recently. In this apocalyptic history anything Greek was erased. According to this historiography, “Turkish Cypriots suffered the attempted genocide of the Greeks” and “if Turkey was not there to help them they were all going to be killed”. This kind of understanding prohibited any form of criticism of Turkey, i.e. Turkey was the “saviour” who should not be challenged, regardless of who was in power in Turkey. Turkey was the one and only: the one who should, without doubt, be worshipped at all times.

In addition, during the three decades that were perceived by many as “the Denktaş period”, Turkish Cypriots underwent an attempted and only partially successful state-building process. During this era, there was only one direction in which people and goods could flow in and out of the island, and that was through Turkey. Moreover, Turkey had varying degrees of political, economic and military control in the north. As time passed and the parties in power failed to gain
recognition for the state in the north, the nationalist rhetoric of the right began to appear emptier. For all of these reasons, new generations increasingly felt ever more alienated from this monolithic discourse that they viewed as self-isolationist, chauvinistic, and banal. At this time leftist poets of “the generation of 1974”, as they called themselves, began to ask questions that evoked the anger of the nationalists. For example, Neşe Yaşın questioned in her poem:

“People must love their country.
So my father always says
My country has been divided through the middle into two
Which half must people love?”

From the nationalist side, this kind of questioning and challenge to the official discourse was immediately presented as a betrayal to the nation. Most of the opposition leaders, poets and writers were attacked publicly and branded as “traitors”. Nevertheless, every time nationalists attacked the “traitors”, those “traitors” became more and more Cypriot, because leftists saw these attacks of the right in Cyprus as either initiated or supported by Turkey and especially by the army. With time, this became a monolithic attitude as well, so that eventually anything that appeared to praise Turkey or almost anything Turkish became an object of hostility. According to Killoran, “The ‘Turks’; and that usually meant the poor, uneducated settlers, or the uncivilised-soldiers, and more importantly, the Cypriot Turk ruling party of ‘chauvinists’ and ‘Nationalists’; … were clearly the ‘oppressors’, the enemy, ‘all bad’ for the Opposition”. She also noted that in this discourse, Greek Cypriots were “European” and “all good”. In the 1990s leftist opposition, she claimed, “was united in difference – a sense of difference from the Turkish settlers”.

In this discourse of Cypriotness, the “settlers” and immigrants were also categorised as the hostile “other”. As a result, the “other” Turks of Cyprus (settlers) were then presented in this discourse as the “agents” of Turkey, which presumably tried to control them. Leftists believed that the majority of settlers and naturalised immigrants voted for the National Unity Party (UBP) and Rauf Denktas, who collaborated to consolidate the absolute control of Turkey. Conversely, as demonstrated in a previous study, the voting pattern of the settlers (to the extent that the settler villages represent a general tendency among the settlers in general) is not uniform. The settlers, although predominantly conservative, tend to distribute their votes among many parties, just like the rest of the electorate.

In addition to their embracement of Cypriotness, another possible reason for the left-wing parties’ reluctance to accept the settlers is a presumed lack of information concerning their numbers, especially those who are citizens. In particular, a former leader of CTP, the late Özker Özgür, was very outspoken in his views on this issue. He made numerous statements heavily criticising the on-going
immigration at the time. For example, in an interview recorded in 1986, he claimed:\(^3^2\)

“In the place of our people who flee abroad to earn their living, people come from Turkey under the name of ‘labour force’. This labour force is turned into a vote force for conservative, chauvinistically oriented politicians … We are faced with the danger of becoming a minority in northern Cyprus … foreigners in our own homeland”.

It may be noted that this discourse of demographic “danger”, insistently repeated in the leftist press, has also been politically effective as it has drawn votes to the parties that seem to protect Cypriots from this “danger”. The left claims not to know the numbers of citizens and immigrants, but at the same time it must be noted that in a small polity like north Cyprus, with a total of 550 ballot boxes and 140,000 voters, the failure of the leftist parties to determine the exact number of settlers in the total electorate appears suspect.

The leftist parties and newspapers have been outspoken in their negative attitudes towards the “other Turks”, who soon became simply the “Turks”, or Türkiyeliler, in opposition to the Cypriots, or Kıbrıslılar. However, it should be noted that such attitudes have not been limited solely to the left; they also exist on the right. In daily life, as well as in the mainstream press, critical reactions toward the settler or immigrant population are often voiced by people coming from the right or from the Kemalist tradition. Orientalising commentary such as that of Dr. Küçük that saw the arrival of “other Turks” on the island as the establishment of an “Eastern sultanate”, became even more common in public discourse at the start of the 1990s, largely because of the liberalising consequences of the economy in that decade. Killoran claims that in the early 1990s:

“Very rarely Nationalist and very often the oppositional Turkish Cypriots would suggest that they were much more ‘European’ and educated than these … ‘workers’. For example, a government official once told me that ‘they sent the wrong kind of Turks’ …”\(^3^3\)

**Economic Transformation of North Cyprus and ‘Neoliberal Cypriots’**

Following the 1980 military coup d’etat in Turkey that was intended to quell the then daily conflicts between the leftist and rightist youth, Turgut Özal came to power with the aspiration of liberalising the economy and depoliticising the public sphere.\(^3^4\) The public sector was gradually privatised, and a neoliberal economy took root in the country, including an influx of imported products that had until that time been limited. A mass consumer culture emerged, complete with large shopping malls and various forms of credit. The media became a vital dominant tool in the public sphere, and
under media privatisation a new pop culture also emerged, some branches of which catered to various ethnic groups and subcultures in the country. At the same time, the university structure was also altered, ensuring that youth would become increasingly more depoliticised, and oriented toward taking their roles in the new neoliberal economy and its consumer culture.

As in every other sphere, north Cyprus was influenced by these changes to the economic structure of Turkey, and a transformation of its own economy also began. This decade was a period of neoliberal privatisation in north Cyprus, making it attractive for owners of small business enterprises, as well as highly skilled professionals, such as financial experts hired in local or offshore banks, lecturers who teach in the universities, and businessmen who have made investments on the island. Several new hotels were built or older Greek-Cypriot ones, previously run by the government, were privatised. Together with growth in the hospitality industry, hotels began to open casinos which catered mainly to Turkish tourists. In addition, by the middle of the 1990s, changes in property laws resulted in a boom in the real estate sales and construction sector. The same period also saw the establishment of private universities in Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta which attracted an increasingly large population of students from Turkey and other third countries. Because the campus dormitories possessed insufficient bed capacity, many Cypriots started to rent their houses out to students, usually for a price above their market value. Apart from the income of rent, a large number of people profited by opening various shops, cafes and small businesses to accommodate the needs of the huge student population.

The effect of this new wealth also had a significant impact on the cultural landscape. Everyday life began to change rapidly. Consumption and the need for change became the defining concepts of this period. Purchasing power and consumption in turn became virtues and symbols of status, while in the meantime many concepts, attitudes, trends, fashions and thoughts began to be consumed rapidly. This was marketed mainly under the guidance of the new private TV channels in Turkey, which Turkish Cypriots eagerly followed. The lives and lifestyles of Turkey’s beautiful fashion models, famous actresses and pop singers entered Cypriot homes nightly and became their regular guests. The fake Euro-American way of life which was promoted by such Turkish TV channels began to dominate every kind of cultural and social interaction. Turkish Cypriots very quickly tried to imitate what they viewed on programmes, and Cypriot replicas soon began to appear on the local national TV (later on private TVs too). Fashion shows became a popular draw for local restaurants and hotels, where models would strut while grandparents ate kebab. Especially popular were underwear fashion shows, for evenings organised by football clubs, when frilly bras and bikinis were used to raise money for a “cause”.

THE PROBLEM OF PIGEONS
Even though the non-recognised ‘TRNC’ was isolated from the rest of the world and it was difficult for globalisation to implant its symbolic products such as McDonald’s on the soil of northern Cyprus, pirate copies of such products mushroomed in the north. Turkish Cypriots were soon frequenting Big Donald’s instead of McDonald’s, Pizza Hat instead of Pizza Hut, Burger City instead of Burger King, and Kermia Fried Chicken instead of Kentucky Fried Chicken. Huge supermarkets became the crowns of the new suburbs. During this period, however, places that brought different people together, and spaces where different people from different classes could meet, almost totally disappeared. The inner cities were left to the poor immigrants, while the neo-rich and middle class withdrew to particular neighbourhoods surrounding the cities. The new capital that was now accumulating from sectors such as tourism, catering, real estate sales, construction, banking and education became ever more visible on the motorways of the north: Luxury cars were everywhere.

At the same time, the political landscape changed. Socialist parties who were the main guardians of the state-run sectors also liberalised their attitudes toward the economy too. Many former leftists became businessmen themselves, and gradually featured in magazines that catered for the new Cypriot consumers and in the gossip columns of newspapers. Almost all of the newspapers in the north brightened their pages with colour, opening a society and “culture” section in the centre. The pages of the latter are usually filled with photographs of Turkish-Cypriot society, whether associations, social clubs or businesspeople enjoying themselves in the hotels, restaurants and night clubs that are now spread along the main roads of north Cyprus, where most of the new cars of the Cypriots are also on display. During the 1990s many bars, discos, cafes, youth bars, and rock bars also sprang up in the main cities. Furthermore, Chinese, Mexican and Italian restaurants opened, representing new global tastes.

This boom experienced a short negative downturn during the banking crisis of 2000 and 2001, when many lost money that had been deposited there at high rates of interest. But within a little more than a year a construction boom began, financed in part by Turkey, which rapidly propelled Turkish-Cypriot wealth accumulation on an upward spiral. Whilst these developments were underway, the population in the north began to crystallise into two main groups: ‘TRNC’ citizens and investors from Cyprus and Turkey, and those who worked for ‘TRNC’ citizens and the latter companies. Those Turkish Cypriots who were unable to succeed in the free market economy managed to escape the negative side-effects of liberalisation by seeking refuge in government offices – a sector mainly financed by Turkish aid – and these public-sector workers soon constituted the bulk of the middle-class population. Former carpenters, farmers, small shop owners, or their children who lost out in the new economy, were also rescued by politicians who turned them into civil servants in order to retain their support in elections.
At the same time, however, new sectors under the control of Turkish-Cypriot businessmen such as construction, pulled thousands of workers from Turkey. Many local entrepreneurs found the wages demanded by Cypriots to be more than they were willing to pay, and as a result, construction companies brought their workers from Turkey, especially from the poorer areas in Turkey’s south and southeast.\(^{37}\) In addition, large numbers of these workers were of Kurdish or Arab origin, and many hailed from the area of south eastern Turkey where they had experienced economic devastation and social turmoil as a result of long-term, low-level conflict.\(^{38}\) Many construction workers were originally offered accommodation on construction sites, but they gradually began to find housing in the empty properties of Nicosia’s walled city:

“When the need for construction workers created by the growing construction sector came together with the Turkish Cypriots lack of willingness to work ‘for nothing’, an unskilled labour force began to flow from Turkey’s undeveloped areas in the east and southeast to Cyprus. The accommodation needs of these ‘guests’ were first met in the half-finished construction sites, but as their numbers multiplied, the old houses that Cypriots had begun to abandon in Nicosia’s side streets began to be turned into workers’ boarding houses. These new residents of Nicosia’s side streets began to produce anxiety in its old residents and to accelerate their move into the suburbs”.\(^{39}\)

Although the houses remained in disrepair, and many lacked proper plumbing or cooking facilities, Turkish-Cypriot owners soon discovered that they could turn their unused properties into rooming houses.\(^{40}\) Crowding many workers into dormitory-style rooms allows owners to collect significant amounts of rent without upgrading the structures. They currently charge 100-200 Turkish lira per person, per month, often crowding as many as twenty or thirty workers into some of the larger houses.\(^{41}\) For immigrant manual labourers, however, the rents are relatively cheap, and living temporarily in these conditions provides them with an opportunity to fulfil their goal of sending as much money as possible to their families in Turkey.

However, the increasing use of Ottoman mansions and houses as pensions for manual labourers, or homes for large immigrant families, has effectively transformed Nicosia’s walled city into an immigrant ghetto. And as a ghetto, stores, cafes, and restaurants have also grown up that specifically serve workers and immigrants, often intended to cater to people from one’s home area.\(^{42}\) Cafes and restaurants are often named after the owner’s home region, which encourages people from that region to frequent them. The walled city now is not only crowded with persons who look different, speak different languages (mainly Kurdish and Arabic) and may dress differently, but the city centre is also sprinkled with the names of Anatolian towns and cities. In addition, young soldiers from the 35,000-strong Turkish military force come to Nicosia in civilian clothes on their days of
leave, and so additional shops selling jeans and cheap phone cards, or cafes where the soldiers drink tea and play backgammon, are scattered throughout certain accessible areas of the walled city. And because immigrant workers are primarily male, evenings and days of leave within the city’s walls have begun to take on not only an Anatolian image but a predominantly male character.43

The opening in 2003, of the checkpoints that divide the island, provided new access to the island’s south and gave Turkish Cypriots a new vision of the island’s “essential” “European” character. The south’s economy had grown rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, and especially in the period leading up to its EU accession. Boutiques carrying international brands, and stores selling the latest electronics and other consumer items confronted Turkish Cypriots on their initial checkpoint crossings. Suddenly, they were also confronted with the “not-quite”, even “fake” nature of their own products, indeed their own existence. Everything seemed much shabbier, not as new, clean, or progressive as the island’s “other half”. Moreover, it was very easy to blame this difference on the immigrants who appeared most viscerally to represent it. While Greek Cypriots were “European” – perceived by the cars they drove, the clothes they wore, the type of vacations they took – immigrants had made the north into “the East”, a piece of Anatolia. In this same period, this visceral, visual difference became one of the primary motivations for large segments of the population in the north to support a UN reunification plan that would have insured EU citizenship for the Turkish Cypriots and would have made north Cyprus, also, a part of Europe.

Such differences are particularly visible in Nicosia, which has been divided not once but in several ways: between north and south, but also, on both sides of the checkpoints, between the ancient walled city and the new, “modern” suburbs. In the north, as pointed out above, this abandonment also resulted in the ghettoisation of the walled city, which was left to immigrants from Turkey. In most Turkish-Cypriot representations, the walled city has become a place occupied by women in headscarves and children who run unsupervised in the streets, a place where the numbers of men in public spaces call up images of remote Anatolia rather than the city that Turkish Cypriots remember.

‘Invasion of Nicosia’: Media Representations of Migrants from Turkey

Media representations (both in mainstream and leftist media) of migration to north Cyprus dwell in great detail on the visual preponderance of the immigrant population, especially in the walled city, which was the historic centre of Turkish-Cypriot social and political life. During the period 1963-1974 when four-fifths of the Turkish-Cypriot population lived in enclaves, the walled city of Nicosia was the largest protected area; the centre of both the Turkish-Cypriot administration and the new, entirely Turkish, cultural life that developed in this chapter. Not only were the
main administrative offices located in Nicosia, but the city was also the centre for festivals, concerts, theatrical and sports events as well as providing cinemas and popular gathering-places that constituted the social and cultural life of the community then. It was a place where everyone knew one another, where faces were always familiar; it was a place of few cars and few shops, the owners of which were always known to all. The “village” atmosphere of Nicosia’s walled city was lost when the Turkish Cypriots moved to the impersonal apartment blocks, council housing, and supermarkets of the suburbs.

The absence of Turkish Cypriots within the walled city, and the preponderance of Turkish immigrants, is often lamented in the Turkish-Cypriot press. One of the most popular columnists in the north recently toured the walled city and wrote of what he found there:

“I don’t remember the last time I strolled through old Nicosia’s streets. It must have been two, maybe five months since I had walked there. The number of Turkish Cypriots that I saw between Kyrenia Gate and Saray Önü Square had decreased incredibly. A woman in a shop that sells coffee and nuts asked, ‘Hasan Bey, did you notice how much the number of Cypriots has decreased?’ ‘I’m aware of it’, I said. But afterwards I interpreted this awareness. The basic problem of the walled city that is Nicosia’s heart is the existence of people who don’t take responsibility for that [social and historical] fabric, or who don’t seem to care about taking responsibility. Or if those who live in the walled city were in a position to take conscious responsibility for that fabric, maybe the discomfort would be eased. But there are a lot of people in the walled city who are there temporarily”.

Many columnists describe similar strolls through the walled city’s streets, and their columns are filled with nostalgia for a time when those streets were “Cypriot”, when the sights and smells were familiar to them. “The scent of pots just beginning to boil emerges from the houses. There’s definitely no scent of molohiya or kolokas! ” one such columnist opines. “The new residents of old Nicosia have not yet become accustomed to these authentic foods”. Other writers contrast the familiar scents of the past with the odour of lahmacun, a spicy pizza from the southeast of Turkey whose aroma permeates certain Nicosia backstreets. The scent of lahmacun that invaded the nostrils of those who wandered Nicosia’s side streets came to represent an unwanted intrusion, one that was cast as backward and unfamiliar.

This change in the social fabric of the walled city is often referred to in the Turkish-Cypriot press as a form of “Anatolianisation”. In the widely read columns of Şener Levent in the newspaper Afrika, the “colonisation” or “Anatolianisation” of the walled city is a common theme. The day after the April 2008 opening of the checkpoint that divides Ledra Street, one of the city’s main arteries, Levent wrote: “The reporter for a television channel from Turkey who was filming at Lokmaci was
saying with great excitement, ‘The Greek side stopped the crossings to Turkey. It closed the gate’. Oh, man! I said. Finally someone’s come out and told the truth. I’m sick of hearing lies. Let’s speak the truth for once. It’s not a gate opening onto peace. It’s not about Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots uniting ... This gate certainly isn’t one that opens from one part of Nicosia to another. It opens from Nicosia to Turkey! From Europe to Anatolia!’47 In such portrayals, there is an inevitable elision of immigrants with Anatolia, of immigration with colonisation. Levent continues, “This isn’t Cyprus, it’s Turkey. A little Turkey. It’s a remote Anatolian town, with its pensions, coffee houses, simit sellers, and lahmacun salons”. The implication of such remarks is that the ghettoisation of the walled city is part of a plan to “integrate” Cyprus into Turkey, to “assimilate” Turkish Cypriots to Anatolian culture.

There is, as mentioned above, a widespread confusion – consistently reproduced by the media – between early settlers who acquired citizenship and the right to vote, and the later economic migrants, of whom only a small portion have acquired such rights. This confusion leads to laments that the Turkish-Cypriot population is shrinking or being overwhelmed.48 It has also led to accusations that “Türkiyeliler”, which in this vision includes any person from Turkey regardless of their citizenship status on the island, are following the will of Turkey and impeding the political will of Cypriots. This, therefore, is the “demographic danger,” mentioned above as well as the sense that Turkish Cypriots have no control over their own fate.

The fact, however, that this “demographic danger” is not really or only about numbers is clear in other representations of immigrants. Immigrants are not only perceived as a threat because of their numbers, or because they may impede the political will of Cypriots; Immigrants are also consistently portrayed in the media as a physical threat – as either potential criminals or as carriers of disease. In early 2008, newspapers reported that, according to the Ministry of Health, the regular health checks of foreign workers showed 35 cases of AIDS, 792 of Hepatitis B, 121 of Hepatitis C, 607 of gonorrhoea, 78 of syphilis, and 56 cases of human papilloma virus. According to a report in Kıbrıs newspaper, all of the cases of HIV and other untreatable diseases were immediately deported.49 In this sample there was neither any breakdown of the countries of origin of those who had been infected by these diseases, nor any report on when the diseases might have been transmitted. This is important because during the liberalisation of its economy, northern Cyprus has also developed a thriving sex industry that relies on women who are trafficked primarily from eastern European countries. Although prostitution is illegal in the north of the island, these women are nevertheless subjected to health checks, especially for sexual diseases, upon entry and later to regular health checks overseen by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. In most instances then, they become infected by disease after their arrival on Cyprus; moreover, it is known that most of
these women’s clients are local. Still, newspapers group “immigrant workers” in such a way that it appears that those who have brought disease to the island are all manual labourers from Turkey.

Moreover, the metaphor of disease is often used to describe the “plague” of immigrants. One article written by Mustafa Doğrusöz in 2002 described the change that the author had begun to see in the once pure face of Nicosia:

“First shadows began to appear on her face, then black spots. With time the black spots multiplied. According to some they were just a few unimportant pimples, while according to others they were an illness that had no cure. Those who said it was an unimportant illness soon realised that they had been wrong. The black spots multiplied even more … The pure white face had lost its magic. Both the face and the tongue were gradually obscured”.

Doğrusöz later explains the black spots as “an occupation by persons with different languages and different skin”. Just as the immigrants themselves carry disease, then, they are also cast as a “disease” on the face of the city.

This metaphor of “disease” is often used to refer to crime, for which Turkish immigrants are believed to be responsible. In early 2008, a wave of sexual crimes, including one violent rape and two cases of incest, led to an immediate and virulent reaction against Turkish immigrants, despite the fact that several of those arrested for these crimes were of Cypriot origin. The latter fact was not disclosed in the newspapers, which tended to tally the crimes and group them on one page. Kibris newspaper, owned by Doğan Harman, former Denktaş adviser and later supporter of the Annan Plan, suggested that this kind of “immoral” behaviour is psychologically contagious. He claimed that,

“But of course because of psychological contagion we see that Turkish Cypriots are also behaving in the same way. ... Because of this, the government needs a very serious population policy. ... If you force people to live together who don’t accept each other’s morals and conscientious values, it’s inevitable that even worse things will happen. ... Beware of the quality of the population!”

The suggestion in the grouping of these crimes – as well as the fact that the places of origin of Turkish nationals were invariably disclosed, while Cypriots’ places of origin were not – is that all crime in the north is committed by Turkish immigrants. Reactions to the wave of sexual crimes were especially virulent, and online commentary in the newspapers’ websites labelled the immigrants as “animals” and “barbarians”.
Such instances of hate language were not, however, limited to online readers and indigenous Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, some of the most virulent critics of the recent immigrants are earlier immigrants, often married to Turkish Cypriots, and especially those who come from the Western provinces of Turkey. Again, the newspaper Afrika took the lead when it published an article by a Turkish settler, Gülsade Soyköy, in which the author described the filth of the immigrants, who live in unsanitary conditions and cannot afford even to use the public toilets:

“It doesn’t matter if, ignoring their own unqualified state, they go out begging saying, ‘I’ll do any work, abi [older brother]’, or if despite their illegal status they manage to find work. (As soon as they grow a bit fat, they don’t see any objections to moving half of their seven tribes here!) And if they don’t find work, what is this pack of hungry, unvaccinated wolves going to do? First, they’ll greedily fill their stomachs; in order to achieve this, they rob small businesses. As if it isn’t enough that the government is banqueting off the people, now the thieves and criminals are also going to share the cake. After that, with their hungry eyes blinded by lust and rabid, they’ll rape anybody, and it doesn’t matter if it’s a baby, a young girl, a middle-aged woman, or the elderly. And in all of this, the biggest fault lies with the government’s laxity! [In what] other country would people enter so freely and shamelessly, swinging their arms and their diseased things [penises]?”

The same author warns that if the government does not take action to stop these crimes, “someone who has already lost trust in the scales of justice will appear to take justice in his own way”. She continues, “If you don’t do it, they’ll do it. They’ll bury these sick perverts (who anyway can’t be integrated) in deep salt-water wells and cover them with lime to keep them from smelling. Hey, with these hopeless, unnatural cases, at least nature could be kept clean and not sullied by this filth (mundarlar)”.

Unlike in western Europe, where hate crimes are legislated and monitored by special government bodies, both sides of Cyprus lack the legislative or political will to monitor such crimes. The ‘TRNC’ is a special case, in that, as an unrecognised state, it also falls outside the scope of international monitoring bodies. For example, the Human Rights First Country-By-Country Hate Crime Report Card of December 2007 takes the Republic of Cyprus to task but makes no report on hate crimes in the north. The anxiety produced a growing discourse of “demographic danger” among the Turkish-Cypriot public which has led to a proliferation of publications that in many western European countries would be classified as hate speech, but the lack of international intervention in the north has meant that there is no pressure to monitor such offences. As a result, articles such as the one quoted above may be cast as a form of resistance rather than as racism.
Conclusion

Although migrants to north Cyprus face much the same problems as economic migrants elsewhere, they also face special problems as immigrants in an unrecognised state on a divided island. An unrecognised state cannot sign conventions or treaties, including those that protect human rights, and so cannot be held accountable. Most international agencies cannot officially operate in, or provide oversight for enterprises in north Cyprus. And for the citizens of Turkey who constitute the large majority of migrants to northern Cyprus, the importance of demography in the Cyprus Problem impacts their ability to integrate into their new home, their ability to claim basic rights, and their sense of certainty about the future. The pervasive presence of Turkey on the island – militarily, economically, and politically – has made Turkish citizens who wish to work and live on the island into scapegoats for Turkish Cypriots seeking a different future.

At the same time, the contradictions of Turkish Cypriots’ “resistance” to Turkey are acted out in everyday interactions, media portrayals, and the legal regulation of immigrant status within the island. Turkish Cypriots have a preference for jobs in the civil service, and the public sector has expanded in past decades to meet demand. Much of the funding for civil service jobs comes from pecuniary aid provided by Turkey – which also demands a say in certain areas, because of its financial support and leads to accusations of colonisation. Moreover, many immigrant workers are aware of this drain on the Turkish state and accuse Turkish Cypriots of ingratitude, exacerbating existing tensions. As one interviewed Kurdish worker reported, “If Turkey would invest this much in my region, I’d be there now rather than here”.

As a consequence, the preference of Turkish Cypriots for civil service posts has meant that as sectors requiring cheap, manual labour grew, they had to be filled by an immigrant population. One research team that has conducted research with migrants inside Nicosia’s walled city remarked:

“In north Cyprus, the foreign (Turkish national) work force in both the formal and informal sectors is around 50,000, with the greatest number employed in construction. In contrast to this, according to the 2006 north Cyprus census, the number of residents is 178,000, the number of households is 72,000, and the number of persons drawing a government paycheque is 55,000. These figures clearly show that ‘TRNC’ citizens, as a work force, have clustered in the public sector, and that there is a structural labour deficit in north Cyprus’ developing sectors. It is this deficit that non-citizen workers, in both the formal and informal sectors, fill”.57

In other words, a new economic boom fuelled by the construction of villas, primarily on Greek-Cypriot land, has led to a need for cheap labour that Turkish
Cypriots themselves were not willing to fill and that has instead been filled by people from the impoverished south and southeast of Turkey.

Indeed, ironically, trade unions and businesspeople have unified over the issue of the problems that cheap labour created. As a result, recent proposals to resolve the problem have included one made by the Businessmen’s Association to institute two separate minimum wages. One minimum wage would apply to Turkish Cypriots and would be higher, hence encouraging them to seek jobs that they have hitherto avoided, and the second would be for foreign workers, who would, according to this scheme, earn the minimum wage of their home country.\(^58\) In addition, the new 2005 laws that almost entirely registered the whole foreign workforce and ensured that employers paid their social security, also led to a more secure environment for many of those labourers, encouraging them to bring their families. Labourers, bringing their families are, however, described in the press and perceived by much of the Cypriot public as a further stress on social services. The Businessmen’s Association has used these latter complaints to argue against creating conditions of security for workers, claiming that they will remain on the island, become citizens, and constitute a further “demographic danger” and an impediment to Cypriots’ political will.

Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots are not only dependent on Turkey’s cheap labour force and financial aid to support a burgeoning economy, but they are also unable to wean themselves from dependence on the Turkish military. Even during the latest round of negotiations, a poll conducted for Simerini by Turkish-Cypriot researcher Muharrem Faiz showed that 76.4% of Turkish Cypriots want a Turkish military contingent to remain on the island in the event of a solution.\(^59\) And in a similar poll that Faiz conducted for the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi), results showed that almost 100% of respondents wanted “the continuation of Turkey’s right of guarantee”, while 80.6% of respondents said that Turkey was the country they trusted the most.\(^60\) Such results – consistent with other polls conducted in north Cyprus over the past decade – show that the sense of colonisation, or of having one’s political will impeded, is one that remains impotent in the face of the “need” for Turkey’s economic and military intervention.\(^61\)

It is argued here that neither the makeup of the Turkish immigrant population and the reasons for the arrival of those immigrants on the island, nor the dependence on Turkey’s economic and military contributions to the north point to colonisation as the real reason for Turkish-Cypriot reactions to the labour migrants. Rather, xenophobic reactions to the migrants resemble those in other parts of the world where migration has proceeded quickly and where the immigrant population is perceived as “different” from the “local” population.
In north Cyprus, the perception of overwhelming numbers of immigrants is fuelled by their preponderance in the walled city of Nicosia. The media portrays the walled city as a place of crime and disease, a place dominated by single men who are both poor and uneducated, leading many Turkish Cypriots to avoid the area, especially after dark. Similarly, the media and public discourse have begun to portray all migrants as potential criminals who have come to disturb the peace of the island. This is reflected in education in the growing refusal of Turkish Cypriots to send their own children to schools where immigrants are present, and in the requests by some teachers to have immigrant children removed from their classrooms. It is also reflected in the lack of integration of migrant workers, most of whom spend their spare time in spaces owned by people from their own regions of origin.

The perception of difference, and especially of “backwardness”, is also reflected in language. In Turkish-Cypriot argot, persons from Turkey were referred to in the past as karasakal, or “black beard”, a name that supposedly emerged to refer to Turkish military commanders based on the island in the 1960s. Its connotations are not necessarily derogatory, though the word may be used in a derogatory way. There are other derogatory terms that have become more widely used in recent years. One of these is fellah, a word with Arabic origins meaning “peasant” and which in the Cypriot dialect means “Arab gypsy”. A more recent term which came into use to refer specifically to the large numbers of Turkish nationals arriving to work on the island, is gaco, or “gypsy”. Both fellah and gaco emphasise the immigrants’ perceived rural or peasant origins and these are words that are used to refer to immigrants from southern and eastern, but not from western, Turkey. These terms depend upon an East/West dichotomy, in which Cypriots see themselves (as well as educated, westernised Turks) as part of the West, and immigrants as part of an Orientalised East. This is expressed quite well in an interview with a 28-year-old female resident of Nicosia:

“I don’t want to put people down, but it’s mostly workers coming here from Turkey. Everything about them is bad – their clothes, the way they look at you. … Anyway they don’t come from normal places, they mostly come from Hatay and the East. I don’t particularly like them. … There’s always the same question: Why don’t you like Turks? Hey, I’m also a Turk! It’s not that we don’t like Türkiyeliler, it’s the people from Hatay and Mardin we don’t like”.

Another slang term that has come into popular use in recent years is fica, a Turkish-Cypriot word for seaweed. This word refers to the immigrants from Turkey who “washed up” on the shores of Cyprus like dead seaweed brought in by the tide. The word expresses the sense that manual labourers, many of Kurdish or Arab origin, constitute an unwanted invasion that spoils the landscape as seaweed litters a beach.
As the quote above shows, in popular discourse class difference is often confused with cultural difference, just as immigrants are often confused with the Turkish state. Moreover, the fear of “colonisation” is primarily one of “Anatolianisation”, or of Cyprus being culturally “dragged down” by immigrants perceived as uneducated and “backward”. This perception of cultural difference has, in turn, fuelled a new identity politics that is used by many political parties to avoid dealing with real issues of inequality and social injustice. A “Cypriot” identity has taken shape in reaction to immigration, but it is by nature a class-based identity that disguises its own roots in class inequality.

Habermas warned in the mid-1990s about a “chauvinism of affluence” that he saw on the rise due to European Union integration policies and the resulting influx of economic and political immigrants and refugees. As an example, he illustrated how East Germans had at the time begun selfishly to guard their newly acquired status, and the accompanying rights or benefits, against encroachment by “foreigners”.

In parallel, it is argued here that under the cover of “colonisation” Turkish Cypriots are partly “resisting” against sharing the affluence achieved since the 1974 war; the recent economic development built on immigrant workers’ labour; and privileges such as EU passports that Turkish Cypriots acquired since the checkpoints opened. Under the cover of “colonisation,” it has also been possible for Turkish Cypriots to claim that they are “resisting” the north’s “Anatolianisation”, at the same time allowing the perpetration of hate speech, a lack of attention to social inequality, and blindness to other social needs, such as the ecological destruction that resulted and continues to result from the recent construction boom in the north.

Notes

5. Hugh Poulton (1997) Top Hat Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic. London, Hurst and Company, pp. 76-77. According to Müseyevvild-zade Osman Cemal, a former müezzin (leader of the call to prayer), local politician, lawyer and Young Turk of the 1900s, the backward condition of Muslims in Cyprus had been
caused by religious dignitaries, who failed to adapt themselves to the requirements of modernity. “Our religious dignitaries, or more precisely a large number of turbaned men”, Cemal protested, “preach against science and technology and enlightened learning in our mosques and meschts” (Harid Fedai and Fuad Memduh Adsız Kitap [The Book with No Name], KKTC. MEKGSB Yayımlar-36, [Ankara, Yıldız Matbaası 1997], pp. 38-41).


7. Although colonial perceptions of their Greek neighbours were similarly Orientalising, Greek Cypriots resolved this dilemma by following the ideological route of the “motherland” Greece, which claimed an unbroken historical and cultural continuity with their ancient Greek ancestors. Hellenic civilisation, in turn, was the foundation for Western civilisation, and in such histories Greeks (and, following them, Greek Cypriots) were able to make claims through their ancestors to be already members of the West. The fact that a succession of “Oriental” rulers had also given them a Romaic culture that existed alongside the revived Hellenic culture did not dilute this identity but only meant that, as Carrier notes, the Oriental within must be expunged. This they attempted to do through language reform, history teaching, and folklore study.


9. Estimates diverge as to how many actually left. The Cyprus Annual Report of 1927, however, reckoned that about 5,000 had emigrated over the course of the previous three years. Cyprus Annual Report 1927, p. 40. According to one demographer, L.W. St. John-Jones, “if the Turkish-Cypriot community had, like the Greek-Cypriots, increased by 101 per cent between 1881 and 1931, it would have totalled 91,300 in 1931 – some 27,000 more than the number enumerated”. St. John-Jones speculates that this difference most likely should be accounted for by assuming that as many as 27,000 Turkish Cypriots emigrated during this 50-year period. See L.W. St. John-Jones, The Population of Cyprus: Demographic Trends and Socio-economic Influences (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1983), p. 56.


16 Mete Hatay and Yannis Papadakis, ‘A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Official Historiographies of Cyprus’, Paper presented to the Conference One Island,
Many Histories: Rethinking the Politics of the Past in Cyprus. PRIO Cyprus Centre 28-29 November 2008.


19. According to TSFC Citizenship Law Act No. 3/1975, anyone who resides on the island for one year may apply for citizenship. In addition, families of the 498 Turkish soldiers killed in the 1974 war would be eligible for citizenship, as would all Turkish soldiers who had served in Cyprus until 18 August 1974. Some of the veterans took the opportunity and settled on the island. There presently exists a Turkish Army Veterans Association with around 1,200 active members, the majority of whom (75%) are married to Turkish Cypriots. A clause in the law also allows the Council of Ministers to grant citizenship to anyone who is deemed to be of benefit to the state which was sometimes abused by the parties in the government.

20. This migration ended as a result of international pressure and internal opposition, which led to the 1982 amendment of the ‘Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value’ (İşkan, Topraklandırma, ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası [ITEM law] No. 41/1977) that eliminated property privileges for new immigrants who arrived after 1982. Turkish nationals migrating to Cyprus after implementation of this law received no properties from the state and had to buy or rent properties on the local market.

21. Although the 1993 citizenship law granted the right to apply for citizenship after five years of residency, not all persons who applied have been granted citizenship. For instance, some of the Kurdish-origin immigrants that were interviewed claimed that because of tensions between Kurdish militant organisations and the Turkish state, many Kurdish immigrants in the north have been unable to acquire ‘TRNC’ citizenship.

22. For further analysis of the demography in north Cyprus, see Hatay (2007).

23. A pair of long baggy pants in a traditional sort of style.


25. Ibid., p. 318.


29. Ibid., p. 170.
30. Ibid.
32. Turkish daily Günaydın Newspaper, 1986.
33. Killoran, 1994, p. 244.
35. Ibid.
37. There are no current figures on regional origins of immigrants, but a 2000 survey showed that 37.2% of the manual workforce came from the Hatay region of Turkey, while another 15.8% came from the country’s southeast. The remaining 47% comes from other regions of Turkey, especially in the south, or from third countries. See Özay Mehmet and M. Tahirolğlu, ‘An Empirical Study of Turkish Economic Migrants in North Cyprus,’ Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 2:2 (2000), pp. 127–138, and Ali Bizden (1997), ‘ Kıbrıs’ta güç/iktidar meselesinin değişen yüzü: Kıbrıs(ı Türk) milliyetçiliği [The changing face of the force/power problem in Cyprus: (Turkish) Cypriot Nationalism]’, Birikim 97, pp. 79-91.
38. See Hatice Kurtuluş and Semra Purkis (2008), ‘Türkiye’de Kuzey Kıbrıs’a göç dalgaları: Lefkoşa’nın dışlanmış güçmen-enformel emekçileri [Waves of migration from Turkey to North Cyprus: Nicosia’s excluded migrant and informal-sector workers],’ Toplum ve Bilim Vol. 112, pp. 60-101. The push factors for persons coming from the southeast of Turkey are clear, as the region has been devastated by almost fifteen years of conflict. Over the past decade, between 950,000 and 1.2 million people have abandoned the region, emigrating to other areas of Turkey and abroad. The conflict has not only destroyed infrastructure and security but has also produced an unemployment problem (Cenk Saraçoğlu (2007) ‘Yeni disimilasyonist milliyetçilik [The new dissassimilationist nationalism’], Toplum ve Bilim, Vol. 110, pp. 247-261).
41. Information determined from interviews conducted in this study and see also Kurtuluş and Purkus, 2008.
42. One article published by the Firat News Agency notes changes in attitudes towards Kurdish identity in Nicosia in the past few years. One Kurdish worker quoted in the article sees their ability to watch Roj TV as progress: “Until two years ago, when [the police] would search the pensions, if they saw Gündem Gazetesi [a Kurdish socialist newspaper] they would ask, ‘Why are you reading this? How do you get it?’ But now we can watch Roj TV in the café”. Ömer Leventoğlu, ‘ Kıbrıs’ta da en alttakiler Kürt işçileri [In Cyprus, too, the Kurdish workers are at the bottom]’, [http://www.rojaciwan.com/haber-23275.html].
43. There are today 11,416 males and 6,946 females of Turkish origin living in north Nicosia.


46. See for example: Hasan Hastürer, ‘Yasemin Kokuları Lahmacun Kokuları Altında Kalırken [While the scent of jasmine is overwhelmed by the scent of lahmacun]’, Toplum Postası, 9 April 2008; Hasan Hastürer, ‘Yasemini mağusa da buldum [I found jasmine in Famagusta]’, Kıbrıs, 14 July 2008.

47. Şener Levent, ‘Anadolu’dan Yol Bağladiğim Uzunyol’a [We paved a road from Ledra Street to Anatolia]’, Afrika Gazetesi, 5 April 2008.

48. One commentary in a local newspaper expressed this dilemma quite well: “The problem that we face is not really one of quantification but of qualification. For every second that the Turk of Cyprus believes that he won’t be able to determine his present and his future, he’s going to feel that he’s in the minority, even if numerically he’s the majority” (Mutlu Azgün, ‘Niteliksel Azınlık Sendromu [Qualitative Minority Syndrome],’ Yenidüzen Gazetesi, 6 August 2008).

49. ‘35 AIDS vakası, tümü sınır dışı [35 AIDS cases, all of them deported]’, Kıbrıs, 2 February 2008.


51. Ibid., p. 103.


59. ‘ Kıbrıslı Türkler yüzde 63‘ü görüşmelerden umutsuz’ [63% of Turkish Cypriots are not hopeful about the talks], Kıbrıs, 11 August 2008.


63. Ironically gaco in the Romany language means non-gypsy. In the past, Cypriot Roma used this word for persons not of Roma origin, such as Turkish Cypriots.


The weekly market opposite Holiday Inn
© Photographer: Durja Man Tamang
Source: Limbo: The Migrant in Cyprus – A Portrait
Edited by David Officer and Nicos Philippou
Mediterranean Voices Project (Euromed Heritage Project)
Traditional soutzouko by migrant labour
© Photographer: Scarlet Tugbo
Source: Limbo: The Migrant in Cyprus – A Portrait
Edited by David Officer and Nicos Philippou
Mediterranean Voices Project (Euromed Heritage Project)
The Population Issue in North Cyprus

Muharrem Faiz

According to calculations, it is estimated that one in thirty-five people on earth bore the status of migrant during the early part of 2002. Without doubt explanations about this situation should be investigated in conjunction with the more general phenomena of homelessness, poverty and statelessness. The “sacred” borders, which were established to meet the needs of capitalism at that time, are now becoming porous to meet the needs of the same system under “new” conditions in which multinational corporations have become more effective, and where the production process continues on a more multinational level. Neoliberal globalisation is not simply an economic project; it contains a political component too. The movement of people, whose lives are shaped by this generic change, has gained a momentum never seen before. Workers, who were eventually freed from being the property of their masters and subsequently sold their work “freely” on the market, now have the chance to market their labour power beyond national borders. However, with the logic of a national-state centred world, this undoubtedly requires the setting of restrictions and is subjected to certain limitations. The labour market, nevertheless, increasingly acquires different characteristics under the new global order which are affected not only by internal but also external dynamics. It is thus not just the jobless people within state borders but also those beyond the border who can be brought in as migrants and who are regularly exploited as the lowest wage earners. The latter segment of workers secure few benefits since they have no power to organise or collectively bargain effectively as well as exercise and receive the necessary solidarity to further their struggles. Moreover, their status remains continuously repressed and precarious. In sum, the reorientation of the needs of capitalism has changed both the places of production and the labour market.

Diverse practices are being developed in different countries in order to accommodate changing conditions. Significant variations can be observed even in the most advanced capitalist countries (United States of America, the European Union, and Japan) where the conditions for migrant entry to a country, or their rights within the country of destination, vary considerably. This variation can be observed in areas such as conditions of entry to a country; conditions for temporary residence; conditions for permanent residence; restrictions on family re-unification; citizens’ rights and cultural/identity rights and problems of representation.

Policies on immigration, multiculturalism, and diversity concerning immigrant people form continuously heated debates. National policies surrounding these issues are being established because human movement has gained such vital
importance for countries of destination (which are primarily ‘rich’ countries), that political parties now include it in their electioneering manifestos and then need to be seen to deliver. Much public debate focuses on the affects of immigration on various social processes (such as welfare, health services and jobs) and the matter is perpetually on the discussion agenda.

Global, European Union and North Cyprus: Similarities and Differences

A Post-war Periodisation

The developments regarding human movement in European Union countries and globally can be divided into four main periods:

- **1940-1950**: Mass immigration of 15 million people during and after the Second World War.
- **1950-1970s**: Migration to Germany, France and Britain to meet the needs of the work force in these countries. In the cases of Britain and France workers came mainly from former colonies, but in the case of Germany they mainly came from southern and south-eastern Europe.
- **1974-1980**: The worker intake came to an effective standstill during this period with the exception of family re-unification. Public and political debates focused on the legal framework and family re-unification.
- **1980-2002**: The local conflicts in Latin America, the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East triggered waves of politically but also economically motivated migration. Under the frame of asylum-seeking, increasing numbers of people left their homelands to find better working conditions and a better standard of living.

The latter period can be classified in terms of the notion of “illegal migration”. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, problems were observed that arose from the massive differences in the standards of living created by the “new world order” among Southern and Northern countries. This spawned a wave of migration of people attempting to break free from their misfortunes. As a result of intense human trafficking, people who escaped in their endeavour to migrate to a country they believed offered better living conditions, were subjected to hiding in stuffy trucks for days, or crowding onto ships that lacked any security measures. A current estimate suggests that 450,000-500,000 illegal immigrants have succeeded in entering another country. This signifies why the topic of illegal migration prevention is most widely discussed.

The most important issue to consider at this point is that no standards exist for studies and law practices. Countries are trying to stabilise certain regulations based on various agreements – for example, on human rights and minority rights.
However, even in countries that claim to exercise “social responsibility” – even for dimensions whose competence lies with powerful transnational formations, such as the European Union – the conditions are laid down by the needs of multinational corporations and local capital. The de facto state that appears to effect two-way dynamics (protective rights and laws on one hand and absolute needs of the capital on the other) is problematic. The situation can be summarised as follows: While some nation-states maintain relatively easy access into the country and extend citizenship rights on the basis of residence, another group of nation-states make entry into the country difficult, and in the short term restrict benefits which attend citizenship rights.

In most of today’s EU and European Economic Area (EEA) countries, the number and share of the foreign-born population has increased. Since the early 1990s, the biggest increases occurred in Spain. Relative to population size, increases have also been considerable in Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Luxembourg.

- Of the 474 million citizens and legal foreign residents of the EU/EEA and Switzerland, some 42 million were born outside of their European country of residence. In absolute terms, Germany had by far the largest foreign-born population (10.1 million), followed by France (6.4 million), the UK (5.8 million), Spain (4.8 million), Italy (2.5 million), Switzerland (1.7 million), and the Netherlands (1.6 million).
- Relative to population size, two of Europe’s smallest countries – Luxembourg (37.4%) and Liechtenstein (33.9%) – had the largest percentage of immigrants, followed by Switzerland (22.9%), Latvia (19.5%), Estonia (15.4%), Austria (15.1%), Ireland (14.1%), Cyprus (13.9%), Sweden (12.4%), and Germany (12.3%).
- In the majority of Western European countries, the foreign-born population accounted for between 7% and 15% of the total population. In most of the new EU Member States in Central Europe (with the exception of the Baltic States and Slovenia) the foreign born population was still below 5% (see Box 1).
Box 1: Foreign born population in Europe
(Source:http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=402)

North Cyprus
When considering the situation in northern Cyprus, we need to bear in mind the policies that attended mass immigration from 1975 onwards. This includes the expectations of many of these immigrants (e.g. pledges regarding Greek Cypriot properties etc), the methods of settling them (collectively in certain villages), the relations between these people and the wider mission their settlement served.

This context shows the inadequacy of taking this population movement as a solely economic or demographic phenomenon. In effect, all human movement throughout the world has both economic and political dimensions in relation to non-economic forces. To identify the specificities in human movement in northern Cyprus, it is important to consider the situation globally as well as in southern Cyprus in order to appreciate the significance of non-economic factors in relation to the economic factors. How “economic forces” and “non-economic forces” are connected should be examined alongside the analysis of their formation.
When viewed from the vantage point of economic criteria, the people who are currently in northern Cyprus are there because of labour market demand – unlike the period of 1975-1976 – or they are there because their expectations have been formed through information supplied by relatives and friends who either come on a seasonal basis or decide to stay in north Cyprus. This type of migration parallels the situation globally inside the EU. Non-economic factors that accompany this process however, make northern Cyprus different from other countries. Let us look at what these elements are.

Box 2: New regulations aim to change status of settlers

The migration process begins spontaneously but once started it is subjected to surveillance/observation by Turkey’s power network (the term ‘network’ is preferred to ‘centre’). Settlement is actively promoted in order to encourage the number of people to be as high as possible when the flow is directed towards northern Cyprus.

Regulations regarding permanent residence in the country, together with issues of citizenship, are changing to ensure the legalised permanent settlement of people of Turkish origin arriving in north Cyprus (Box 2). However, there are some examples that do not fit either of the state organs, i.e. the Security Forces (being the authority responsible for deportations) or the police (with their unwillingness to find and initiate legal processes against people whose legal stay as determined by the Department of Labour expired).

The relationship between northern Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey is by no means an innocent one because of the latter’s expansionist effect; in fact it is crucial
in understanding the population issue. The source of this deep-rooted and inseparable relation stems from the functioning of a fundamental dynamic of development. In other words, the population “brought/forced to come” (this distinction has lost its importance) to northern Cyprus to preserve, stiffen and reproduce the de facto state, has concurrently become the most vital component of the accumulative structures of capital in the north (capital accumulation crisis, expansion of the capital, minimising of the market problem, pillage of properties, and land usage) – the front benchers of northern Cyprus’ capital are not solely a collaborator comprador class. By the same token as a class whose own development opportunities have been dispelled by asymmetrical relations with Turkey, they have been reduced to organic actors within the process. Consequently, the population transfusion to northern Cyprus, which is one of the most significant elements of Turkey’s domination, is also a capitalist necessity for both economic (cheap labour, rearrangement of the labour market, magnifying the opportunities of organisation and solidarity, cutting the airflow of demands on education/health/social policies) as well as for many non-economic procedures in this part of the island. The pillage and seizure of Greek-Cypriot properties, the land in the northern area, and the usage of Karpaz land with intentions other than for parks, are prime examples.

The Republic of Turkey oversees everything that occurs throughout this entire process and provides ex post confirmation. Claiming that the flow of the population to northern Cyprus is induced purely by economic reasons without considering either the structural characteristics or the operation of non-economic forces is tantamount to being content with the ear of an elephant. If interpretations on the issue are not the result of a naive failure to see the whole, then they are the product of a finicky choosy understanding that does not consider the structural context. Moreover, regardless of what happens eventually, it equates to a stand that reproduces a given.

The Class Struggles of Ideology and Hegemony

Many social factors relating to the population issue impact on the understanding and evaluation of the migration process. For a number of years the topic has been dominantly projected as taboo. Rauf Denktaş’ phrase that “a Turk goes, a Turk comes” has become emblematic of this standpoint, representing a rhetoric that sees critique as the work of national enemies. A variation of this viewpoint, which was asserted between 1975 and the beginning of the 1980s, was submitted in the famous Cuço report: “People who come to the North of Cyprus from Turkey are in fact Cypriots who have immigrated to Turkey before.” It was observed that this fabrication, which held no substance at all concerning its legitimacy, was circulated under a different guise. The new understanding focuses on the rights of those who
originally came to settle in north Cyprus and who have resided in that area for a specific period. Indeed, the duration of residence of people who are categorised as migrants is also considered an important criterion in regard to their rights in other regions of the world too. The emphasis on this issue has been merged with the rights of people of Turkish origin who were born in northern Cyprus after the beginning of the 1990s. At this point, it is pertinent to focus on the ideological quality of the expression, “new” rights. It is a fact that attributing any right with a self-claimed value produces results to the contrary of those targeted at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Likewise, Cuco’s findings were justified in the updated study by the rapporteur, Jaakko Laakso, in his report regarding the transfusion of people to the northern part of the island, in which he added that: “naturalisation of the settlers encourages new arrivals and stiffens secret colonisation in the North.”4

Any kind of right/entitlement is an acquisition based on accumulation and is gained as a result of a social struggle, embodying positions that should not be allowed to degrade. This general thesis, however, should not lead to amnesia of the historical context and attributions of each concept employed for ideological purposes. Throughout history, capitalism had the power to absorb all kinds of concepts, social movements and rights. Absorption, does not necessarily render capitalism ineffective, it can also be used to enhance capitalist aims. We are going through a period where the revolutionary anthems of Rhodesia are played at the opening ceremonies of beauty contests, posters of Che are used as the main feature of sports shoes, and Deniz Gezmiş has become the hero of a soap opera. Civil initiatives, which were not allowed the space to breathe at one time, have currently been transformed into organic institutions that pave the way for neo-liberal ideology and its market, which in turn spreads its ideology. Republics, broken away from the collapsed Soviet Union and civil society organisations in many African countries now function as social actors, paving the way for multi-national corporations, for both ideological and physical practices in this neoliberal drive. Moreover, they are financed by the same multinational corporations and by their institutions beyond nations. Countries with problematic human-rights records have normally headed towards dissolution of the nation-state perspective (again meeting the needs of capitalism within this focus and periphery) and the authoritarian / anti-democratic administrations – including military / fascist administrations and their constant violation of human rights – acting with great sanctimony to protect the benefits of multi-national corporations.

It cannot be said that capitalism’s absorption potential is based on irresistible or absolute power. The basic dynamic that energises power is the quality of practice within our daily lives and expressions as well as discourses. If we accept the expression of right as a self-proclaimed fact, it ultimately generates an effect that reproduces specific structural elements. In other words, the most important element
that feeds the power of capitalism’s absorption is to refrain from questioning, and
gaining depth to the meanings of concepts that the system intends to use/absorb
within this framework. When evaluated within this context, the most fallacious
arguments in the discussions on the current population transfusion are not only “the
comers were actually the goers” or “both the comers and goers are Turks”, but it is
the neo-liberal expression of “rights” that also seems to voice human/immigrant
problems, and prioritisation of this argument is dangerous because it has the same
aims as older arguments regarding the ideologically reproduced integration of given
relations. Both expressions are, however, different versions of the same
understanding of hegemony (nationalistic and neo-liberal). In this case, what
actually happens is that a different dominant discourse is advanced globally in place
of another discourse5 which is facing a crisis of legitimacy.

What are the points highlighted by this new discourse against “segregating the
people originating from Turkey” or “discrimination against people originating from
Turkey”? Actually this is a fake sensitivity because it is the capitalist class that
insults people who come to northern Cyprus, discriminating against them and
exploiting them to the extreme. The famous process of “evil acts, evil actors”
succeeds, and workers who are set to work under the most severe conditions, and
are accommodated in places where animals do not even feel comfortable – and
most are actually villagers, not workers – are later insulted: “these live like animals,
smell like animals, they do not deserve more than this”. These people are
subsequently blamed for living under such appalling conditions. They are
categorised as responsible for their unfortunate situation and their “personal
characteristics” are similarly equated, resulting in overt “racism”. The discrimination
and racism of upper class society spreads to other sectors of the community, and it
is true that from time to time the Left in northern Cyprus has often reproduced such
discourses. Instead of disclosing the population policy that is being implemented
and thus challenging hegemonic structures, large layers of the community focus on
the people and criticise their dress code or their attitude on the beaches, leaving
neo-liberal ruling structures intact. Hence, a fake sensitivity which never reviews a
structural policy, or comes near to a rigorous analysis, is proclaimed from a secure
(and without risk) position. No attempt is made to unionise these people; the trade
unions and the Left neither raise the issue of how debased these persons are, nor
is there any concern raised about their problems, at least publicly. The targets are
the opposition who voice their discomfort regarding the population policies in force.
Turning almost into a “thunderstruck egg”, as the poet Mehmet Yaşın says, Turkish
Cypriots who feel ever more breathless each day are allegedly to be saved from
racism. The position is plain to see and in the fullness of time it reproduces the
dominant expression, dressed up with different accessories.
The Current Situation
It is evident that a census that complements the international criteria and considers
the needs of the country has not been undertaken in north Cyprus because the
figures contradict one another. Over a period of years “projections” have substituted
censuses, mocking both the people and the international community. Except for the
unsuccessful agriculture census of 1978, no census was conducted between 1974
and 1996. For 22 years the State Planning Organisation published population
figures based on projections without any “trend” (e.g. Population increase rate
based on censuses). All these figures were wrong. The de facto population was
estimated to be 178,023 just before the 1996 census. The census result was
201,008. The de facto population was estimated to be 115,436 the day before the
2006 census. The result was 265,100. In 2006, while the official publication of the
State Planning Department showed the projection-based population as 216,000, in
April of the same year the population was announced as 265,000 when the census
was carried out. There was also a serious deficiency during the census in the scope
of the statistics, and considerable errors were made in relation to the definitions and
differences between the de jure and the de facto population which was depicted as
little as 9,000. According to a study based on the revealed figures, the number of
original Cypriots (ancestral home) is about 133,000 and the number of people
originating from Turkey who became citizens, is 46,000. However, juxtaposed to

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Table 1: Statistics of RT (Republic of Turkey) and 'TRNC'
Arrivals and Departures to and from North Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RT entry</th>
<th>RT departure</th>
<th>'TRNC' entry</th>
<th>'TRNC' departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-2001</td>
<td>4924228</td>
<td>4833111</td>
<td>91117</td>
<td>2092729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>316193</td>
<td>310514</td>
<td>5679</td>
<td>133317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>340083</td>
<td>321447</td>
<td>18636</td>
<td>119682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>434744</td>
<td>402578</td>
<td>32166</td>
<td>134886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>488023</td>
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<td>583</td>
<td>152004</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>598529</td>
<td>555193</td>
<td>43336</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7674433</td>
<td>7480816</td>
<td>193617</td>
<td>2992680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: All these figures are tabulated from monthly records of Ministry of Interior)
this, there is a population of about 74,000 who also originate from Turkey. In addition, different figures appear on some alternative sources to the census; for example, the statistics of citizens of the Republic of Turkey (RT) on arrival and departure, is one alternative source (see Table 1).

Although the statistics on entry—departure contain some fluctuations in the calculations on population, it is an indispensable source which illustrates the overall picture. As observed in Table 1, after proving the entry—departure of people of Turkish origin, the number of those remaining in the northern area is 193,617. Without doubt, the children who were born in northern Cyprus should be included in this figure and the number of deceased should be excluded. Furthermore, approximately 26,000 RT-origin students and officials should also be excluded from this figure. Moreover, the population in northern Cyprus that originated from Turkey, is not 120,000 as speculated in the census in 2006, but is between 220,000 and 230,000.

When the figures are examined it is noticeable that the post-referendum period for the United Nations’ Annan Plan holds a special place.

As can be seen from Graph 2 opposite, a total of 59,849 people have come to northern Cyprus since 2003 and have decided to reside permanently. When the figures are examined (RT-origin officials and students should be excluded) it appears that post-2003 is an era that witnessed the most intensive population transfusion after the 1975-1976 period.
Graph 2: Number of those permanently resident in North Cyprus in accordance with their year of entry to the country.

Graph 3: Proportions of de jure population (based on ancestral home) (estimated figures based on arrivals – departures).
When the entries and departures of ‘TRNC’ citizens since 1974 are studied, a tendency is observed as regards migration. When approximately 3,500-4,000 RT-origin people are excluded from the figure because they are either estimated to have gone to Britain or to other European countries to seek asylum, or are Cyprus-origin people who are temporarily abroad due to various reasons, it can be seen that approximately 35,000 Turkish Cypriots have left the country permanently.

When the overall picture is evaluated – without getting lost in details – the outcome detected is that there is an intensive flow of RT-origin population to northern Cyprus during the recent 30-year period, and Turkish Cypriots are also constantly migrating to other countries, intensifying in certain periods. When the figures are analysed it is evident that there is a “radical demographic change” in northern Cyprus.

Notes
1. This figure is presumably referring to the Russian speaking population rather than a general category of ‘foreign born’: a large number of these persons do not have Latvian citizenship.
2. As with Latvia, the same issue applies in Estonia, except that in Estonia the relations between the Russian-speaking minority and the Estonian ruling groups are much more tense and polarised.

3. At the end of the meetings, Alfonse Cuco – the Spanish parliamentarian, member of the Committee of Immigrants and Demography of the European Council in Cyprus in 1991 (including the authorities of the period) – put in writing that the population in north Cyprus "was being changed radically".

4. This report was accepted at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 24 June 2003.

5. It is obvious that those who circulate this expression do not do so out of simple political choice. It is not a coincidence that those who make comments in this direction have positions as well as financial resources.
Using public transport: Nepalese workers waiting for the bus
© Photographer: Durja Man Tamang
Source: Limbo: The Migrant in Cyprus – A Portrait
Edited by David Officer and Nicos Philippou
Mediterranean Voices Project (Euromed Heritage Project)
Migrants, Social Space and Visibility

Nicos Philippou

It appears that some of the new communities of economic migrants in Cyprus are now in a transitional phase. In spite of the general precariousness that characterises the experience of the vast majority of migrants to Cyprus, it seems that certain sections of these communities now perceive their situation to be more permanent than they originally anticipated. This, among other things, is manifested on their adoption of space, and that their presence is becoming visible on the built landscape in certain areas of Nicosia.

It is common among Cypriot liberal intellectual circles to refer to and celebrate the island’s multicultural character. Nevertheless these references tend to distinguish the Republic’s established ethnic communities or religious groups; notably Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Latins and Maronites. The Republic’s constitution guarantees that these groups enjoy some degree, or other, of representation. Their long presence on the island means that they have well-established religious and secular institutions of their own. Such narrow definitions of the multi-cultural character of Cyprus, though, tend to exclude groups like the Gypsies or the many communities of economic migrants and migrant refugees. In the best of cases groups of economic migrants and political refugees are dismissed as non-Cypriot communities or even as non-communities at all, because of their non-permanent status.

Cyprus has a very long history of hosting refugees escaping war and disaster. During the twentieth century, for instance, it provided temporary or permanent shelter to thousands of Armenians fleeing a brutal attack launched against them by the Young-Turks; to Asia Minor Greeks escaping en-mass from blazing Smyrna, and from other towns under siege on the western coast of Turkey, and to thousands of Jews in transit from Europe to Palestine after the end of World War II. Cyprus has also provided shelter to many of Egypt’s Greeks who were forced to leave after Nasser’s decision to nationalise private enterprises and evacuate Europeans from Egypt as well as to thousands of Lebanese fleeing the savage civil war in Lebanon in the seventies and eighties.

During the past twenty years, the island has, nevertheless, hosted a new kind of migrant – hundreds of thousands of economic migrants and political refugees. Many belong to ethnic groups that have a sizeable presence on the island. Even so, their temporary residence status means that they make up communities whose main characteristic is transition and the continuous renewal of their
members. This fluidity means that these groups, unlike established Cypriot communities, do not have political power and representation, or any significant secular institutions of their own.

What has come into view recently, and most distinctly in and round Trikoupi Street in the old sector of Nicosia, are retail establishments aiming to cater for the particular needs of these new communities; primarily dietary and cultural needs. Filipino food stores, Halal butcher shops and Indian music CD stores are some examples. The purely visual dimension of this phenomenon is very interesting. The stores’ facades render visible the communities they cater for in a novel way. The members of these communities are no more visible as mere ‘bodies’ in the street but are now in the process of imprinting their trace on the built landscape. What is becoming visible, then, is their aesthetic, linguistic and cultural idiosyncrasies; all contributing to the formation of the members of these groups as part of meaningful cultures rather than as individuals, cut-off, and forced to be viewed as performing supportive roles in the background or the margins of dominant Cypriot culture(s).

Another interesting aspect of this new phenomenon, which I want to explore further, is the use or even adoption of space in the process of the ‘making’ of a community. These unusual establishments are naturally becoming reference points for the members of such fluid communities and do reflect the transitional phase they are currently experiencing as more and more of their members manage to secure permanent status on the island. In particular, places that serve food, beverages and other products that need be consumed on the premises provide a space and the opportunity for contact with others, permitting webs of relationships to form whose impact on how the groups define themselves remains to be seen. Although I have not traced any significant signs pointing in this direction, as yet, I can propose with some confidence that these spaces will, in the future, provide a platform for political debate and organisation to migrant workers who are becoming Cyprus’s new under classes, gradually replacing the local working class.

In this article I present three cases as examples of the specific functions of such spaces and the meaning and importance attached to each for the people that use them. The first case is an establishment, which I located during my ethnographic research on coffee-houses in 2006 and 2007.¹ This might be the first attempt of one migrant community to set-up a space that resembles, in its essence and functions, the Cypriot coffee-house; especially in its role of contributing to the construction of a community. The establishment I refer to is called Carla’s, and it operates as a kind of somateio (social and cultural club) for Filipino workers in Cyprus. The consumption of Cypriot coffee is not at the centre of the commercial operation of this establishment – even though the beverage is
served on request – but it was exciting to discover that its clients provided reasons for using the space that so much resembled those of Cypriot refugees in their use of the *kafeneion* (coffee-house) in refugee estates; notably the creation of a sense of belonging to a community.

One primary function of Carla’s place is that it transforms the Filipino community from a demographic one to a physical one.² The establishment operates during the weekends when its clients, who are mostly female domestic workers, take their free time. On Sunday mornings they gather for coffee after church and stay at least until lunchtime when they have the opportunity to eat Filipino food, which is offered at very low prices. The place is decorated with large posters illustrating Filipino landscapes while a karaoke machine provides the main entertainment.

When I first enquired about the place and its functions I was invited for coffee and lunch on New Year’s Eve in 2007 and was told that I would have the opportunity to talk with clients. The responses I received from many of the women I talked with revolved around the sense of being part of a community and being at Carla’s providing a sense of home. They talked about how the food, decorations and the karaoke machine evoked the Philippines and how meeting friends creates a feeling of belonging.

My second case may initially strike the reader as an odd one. This case involves the adoption of existing working class social space by members of the Filipino community rather than one of setting up their own. The space in question is the *somateio* of Anorthosis Famagusta in Engomi, Nicosia. Anorthosis is a refugee first division football club established in 1911 in Famagusta. The club’s home-ground is now in Larnaca but because of the displacement and dispersal of its supporters throughout Cyprus it maintains *somateia* in all major towns in Cyprus. The club has nationalist roots and in the fifties was associated with EOKA. This is a place frequented by hard-core football fans – mostly men – that use the space to socialise, eat and drink and to watch Cypriot, Greek, English and European football on a number of large LCD screens installed in various rooms in the *somateio*.

Alkis, the manager of the Nicosia club, is married to Tereza, a Filipino woman. This marriage was catalytic in redefining the space. About thirteen years ago the couple decided to serve Filipino food along with the standard – mostly grilled – taverna style food. Filipino spring rolls, noodles and marinated kebabs were added to the menu. This naturally attracted the attention of Nicosia Filipinos who frequent the place and organise functions like wedding and christening parties. A karaoke machine is available and offers a form of entertainment very popular among Filipinos. Many mixed couples are also regular customers. Alkis serves all
his grills accompanied by a free bowl of salad, a small plate of pickle and onion and, of course, pitta bread; all complementing the grills very well. Interestingly the same set of free side dishes is served when a customer orders noodles or spring rolls; an odd combination, which nonetheless points towards a desire for a dietary and cultural egalitarianism!

The extra-ordinary adoption of such an establishment by migrant workers is not the only strikingly post-modern characteristic of this particular somateio. Despite the club’s nationalist roots it is frequented by a number of Omonoia fans, the most popular leftist club in Cyprus, an English man that often watches English Premier League games wearing a CCCP inscribed t-shirt and a Turkish-Cypriot man who has a taste for grilled lamb chops and KEO and enjoys watching Anorthosis Champion League games with his Greek-Cypriot friend.

This harmonious co-existence among such – on first examination – sharply heterogeneous groups and individuals is fascinating because it points to the fact that working class social space is inclusive and that every man within it is equal. It could also be seen as a sign that the working classes are more tolerant to difference and more prepared to absorb and incorporate diverse groups, and that class status is probably considered a more important criterion for inclusion than ethnicity or, even, ideology.

My third case is Al-Zahra on Trikoupi Street. Al-Zahra is the commercial name of a Halal butcher shop and a neighbouring restaurant serving Lebanese food; both owned by the same family. The restaurant serves kebabs, falafel and some very tasty casseroles. As the meat dishes are made using Halal meat and the food in general is served at low prices, the place is very popular among Muslim migrants and others. Its location near Omeriyeh mosque contributes even further to its popularity. Al-Zahra serves the particular needs of a religious rather than an ethnic community. Its clientele consists of individuals from a variety of Arab countries and the Subcontinent. This means that we cannot discuss Al-Zahra in relation to the processes of community ‘building’ in the same straightforward way – and with ethnicity in mind – that Carla’s place was discussed above. For instance, Al-Zahra serves nargilegh and Lebanese tea, while some of its curry style casseroles and rice dishes would obviously satisfy the taste of migrants from the Subcontinent. Similarly, while the aesthetic of the decorations that adorn the restaurant is referential to Arabic culture, a sizeable TV set occupying a prominent position within Al-Zahra’s space is frequently tuned into channels from the Subcontinent.

Joseph, the owner, talked about how grateful he is to the Republic for demonstrating a sensitivity and respect towards Muslim traditions because he has been granted permission to slaughter animals according to his religion’s
The Cypriot working classes are shrinking as increasing numbers of the older generation of blue collar workers have managed – through their hard work and trade union organisation and activity – to provide their children with opportunities for upward mobility. This vacuum has, during the last two decades, been filled by migrant workers who – as I hope I have managed to demonstrate – have begun to claim space within which they can express their cultural idiosyncrasies and at the same time have started to imprint their presence on the built landscape of Nicosia and other urban centres in Cyprus. I have hinted at the possible political implications of this. What I feel needs to be confidently vocalised is that there are tangible signs that these groups are now communities in the making and that we should begin to renegotiate and redefine the content of the term Cypriot Multiculturalism.

Notes


2. I should not neglect to mention, of course, that the role of organised religion is also paramount in doing just that. Nevertheless, Carla’s place is probably the first secular establishment to function as such in Cyprus.
Migration is a massive issue today in our increasingly globalising world. The ways we think about migration have been transformed, however, over the last decades as it has become a complex and diversified phenomenon. ‘People on the move’ has characterised all societies to a greater or lesser extent but the forms this has taken point attention to the transnational character of most societies today.

Migration used to be distinguished in terms of the binary between internal and external migration. The former referred to movement of people within a particular country or particular nation-state borders. The latter referred to movement across these borders. There was also a clear distinction in the past between forced migration and economic migration. The picture today is much more complicated with the phenomenon of transmigration (and transmigrants), where an individual migrates multiple times. People may move, for example, from their first country of destination (say Greece) and then onto a number of different countries looking for the best opportunities for themselves and/or their families. No longer is migration a question of a person moving from her/his homeland to a destination country where they are likely either to settle or to return from eventually (as happened for example with much of the older migrations from Cyprus or other parts of the New Commonwealth countries).

Apart from the transmigrant there is the commuter migrant who comes and goes to and from the homeland (for example this is the case for many professionals from Eastern Europe who commute to and from Northern European countries). In addition there are the so-called family reunification migrants (increasingly being curtailed) i.e. those who come formally or informally to join their families; many of them are women but there are also men in this category.

This brings me to the important point about the increasing feminisation of migration. This is a response to the dissolution of the welfare states of many Northern European countries, leading to the growth of the care industry at the private level. Changes in family structure and the greater insertion of indigenous women in the labour market have led in many countries to the growth of the privatised and state run care system e.g. for the old. It has also led to the expanding role that migrant women play in domestic care as nannies, cleaners and domestic
helpers. This is a phenomenon particularly important in Southern European countries including Greece and Cyprus (see Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000).¹

I have already hinted about the diversification of skills that migrants have today with many having high educational qualifications, many of which are professional diplomas and competencies. Some of these migrants, despite their high qualifications are able and willing (a constrained choice) to do jobs for which they are over qualified: for example some doctors who are working as taxi drivers or domestic maids.

On top of this there is the wide range of countries from which contemporary migration flows both come from and arrive in. Many of them have been transformed from countries of outward migration to immigration countries, i.e. receiving countries: Greece and Cyprus are examples of such societies. Where the countries from which migrants originated from tended to be countries with some Colonial connection or developing countries, the Eastern European countries have furnished many of today’s migrants, both male and female.

As the phenomenon of migration has transformed, the landscape and demographics of Europe (alongside the changes in the boundaries of Europe), social directives and policy initiatives as well as funding opportunities in this area have grown. Academic research and writing has proliferated in the area with new approaches to the phenomenon being introduced alongside debates on new migration, feminisation, deskilling and integration/social cohesion as well as multiculturalist frameworks. These debates involve protagonists and their opponents and a new public, policy and academic discourse on migration which includes issues of class exploitation, emotional labour, cultural hybridity, new identities and new exclusions and violence.

The book ‘European Integration: A Sourcebook’, however has a more modest agenda for it aims to provide ‘a sourcebook’ (a challenge in itself). This book, edited by Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas, is one of the first publications from the EU Research Project ‘POLITIS’, funded under the Sixth Framework programme. This has an impressive array of European partners, including Greece and Cyprus and has involved researching foreign residents in 25 countries.

The book aims to be a comprehensive reference for students, practitioners and scholars in Europe. It starts with a first chapter by the editors which provides an overview of migration, particularly focusing on post 1989 Europe. This is followed by 25 country chapters, all of which have a similar format. In each chapter there is an initial clarification of the categories which are considered migrant, an explanation of the national statistical data provided, an overview of migration history over the
last 10-15 years, an account of the migration policies of the country and finally a
discussion about how these policies influence the categories of migrants within the
country.

There is also a concluding chapter which sets out some common
characteristics and comparative aspects as well as attempting to provide a
‘schematic grouping’ in terms of five subsets within the 25 European states. These
are the following: old host countries; recent host countries; countries in transition;
small island countries and non-immigration countries. These act as types or models
with the first category referring to northern and western European countries, the
second to Southern European (Mediterranean) countries, and the third to central
and Eastern Europe. Cyprus and Malta are in the fourth category of small island
countries and the final category – that of non-immigration countries – comprises the
Baltic states, Slovenia and Slovakia.

As well as providing a typology of countries, the concluding chapter sets out a
typology of migration pathways. Eight pathways are cited and they are: pathway of
co-ethnics and returnees; the colonial and post-colonial pathway; the pre 1989
internal migration pathway; the labour migration pathway; the asylum seeking
pathway, the pathway of seasonal and temporary migration; the ‘gold-collar
pathway’ and the pathway of irregular migration. This chapter also considers
integration practices within each country such as naturalisation, voting rights and
civic and political participation of migrants.

In other words, the book aims to provide a useful sourcebook, ambitious in
itself, but not an in-depth analysis of each country or the particular and complex
issues in each country or a theoretical framework. The types or models of migration
set out in terms of subsets of countries are ways of organising particular similarities
and differences and cannot in themselves provide the nuances necessary to
capture the complexities in each country. Indeed, it is possible to furnish other
subsets which cast a different lens on the phenomena and which would place, for
example, Greece and Cyprus together or make a distinction between France,
Germany, the UK and Sweden rather than treating them as part of the same model.
It would have been useful to have a discussion of the uses of the typologies. The
book, in light of the constraints of space, does a useful job. One quibble, however,
might be the extent to which the last chapter assumes the typologies it uses rather
than reflecting more analytically on them. The extent to which they provide a
particular but not necessarily well argued framing for the similarities and differences
that are being highlighted, is another issue that can be raised. But in such a volume
of only 376 pages for 27 chapters it may have been a tall order to reflect and
examine the theoretical principles at work and the heuristic potential in such
typologies.
Similar points could be raised in terms of the structure in each chapter that does not consider crosscutting differences of gender as a specific theme (given the particular importance of feminisation) or the issues of informality, legality and integration strategies which relate to debates on integration, citizenship and multiculturalism. But maybe this would have required a companion volume, which hopefully will be forthcoming.

As the book stands, it provides a useful sourcebook for those who want a quick account of what is going on in each country and an assessment along the themes chosen by the editors. One issue however that is central is that migration phenomena are subject to twists and changes at a very rapid rate and therefore a discussion of tendencies and transformations, contextualising migration within the broader parameters of the European and international landscape would have been helpful here so that the material does not date as quickly.

Given space constraints I will now refer briefly to the chapter on Cyprus. This chapter, written by Nicos Trimikliniotis and Corina Demetriou, provides a useful summary and discussion of the major characteristics of migration to Cyprus today. It discusses developments in Cyprus’ immigration policy in the context of the political and economic history of Cyprus which are crucially linked. The rapid modernisation of the island post-1974 with its economic imperatives as well as political stalemates have led to policies for the importation of migrant labour to fill shortages in supply, particularly in the service, construction and care sectors. The migration phenomenon and changes in immigration policies in Cyprus in the 1990s are linked to both the internal economic ‘needs’ of the island and the supply of workers from Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet block as well as increasing barriers to migration within ‘Fortress Europe. The western and northern European countries themselves were increasingly viewing immigration as a threat to their national culture and society.

The assumption in Cyprus has been that migration is a temporary phenomenon and that migrants should have their permits restricted to a definite time frame, attaching these permits to a specific employer. Cyprus state policy has on the whole treated migrants as a necessary but undesirable intrusion into Cyprus territory and fears of uncontrollable entry, particularly of undocumented and unregulated migrant labour has been a particular concern in public debates, as shown by Trimikliniotis and Demetriou. As they argue, the more recent entry into Europe has led to a rise in the use of Europeanised arguments about migration and the growing awareness of the porosity of the borders of Cyprus vis-à-vis entry to Europe (a porosity also found in Greece) as well as its role as a ‘waiting room’ for entry into western European countries. However, it is clear in the chapter that on the one hand there have been developments which transform Cyprus both to a country with
sensitivities to migration that now parallel those within the other European nations (for example in terms of directives around integration and potential regularisation and naturalisation law), and on the other, the development of migrant groups who self-organise alongside NGOs who offer advice and support.

However, media and public discourse around migration has tended to refer to the negative consequences of migration and mirrors some of the ideas found in Thatcher’s fears of being ‘swamped’ in the UK. Whilst the more progressive media, unions and politicians are less xenophobic on the whole, government representatives have not been so quick to grasp the more positive aspects of immigration nor has there been an extensive public debate about the new more multiethnic society that Cyprus is becoming. It is hoped that the recent change of President and power base in Cyprus will push Cyprus forward into exploring the type of Cyprus and Cypriot identity that can be produced, particularly in symbiosis with a potential new framework which also links Turkish, Maronite, Armenian and all the other ethnicities on the island. In such a context a new debate on Citizenship and belonging in Cyprus is badly needed.

Floya Anthias

Note
Many Middle Passages
– Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World

Edited by
Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus and Marcus Rediker

One and a half decades ago Paul Gilroy reminded many scholars in his seminal The Black Atlantic – Modernity and Double-Consciousness (1993) that for people of the African Diaspora the dawn of modernity was not an experience of progress and liberation but of bondage and dehumanisation. Furthermore this study was instrumental in focusing many scholars’ attention to oceans as spaces of linkage and encounter rather than separation and thus inspired a number of studies focusing on oceans. Being part of this sweep of oceanic history the authors of Many Middle Passages aim at a new perspective on the history and presence of forced migration and labour, and its role in the development of our contemporary globalised society.

With its provocative title this book provides a global perspective on forced migrations and includes Edward Alpers’ chapter on the African slave trade in the Indian Ocean, Iain McCalman’s contribution on Livingstone’s struggle against the slave trade in lake Nyassa, James Warren writing on the Sulu sultanate in South East Asia, Nigel Penn on German soldiers transported to the Cape, Cassandra Pybus’ description of the first, and Emma Christopher’s of the second fleet transporting convicts from Britain to Australia, Clare Anderson recounting the sufferings of Indian convicts sentenced for ‘transportation’ by British authorities, Scott Reynolds Nelson focusing on forced drafts of Chinese and Irish labourers during the American Civil War, Evelyn Hu-DeHart on the trade of Chinese coolies to Peru, Cuba and Australia, Laurence Brown delineating the Melanesian Labour Trade, Julia Martínez depicting the horrors of the forced transportation of women and children across the China Sea.

Framed by an introduction by the editors and an afterword by Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd the title’s reference to the Middle Passage is explained as not only referring to this aspect of the trans-Atlantic slave trade but as serving as a concept that allows comparison of these widely dispersed examples and their linking to contemporary forms of exploitation.
Being mostly historians, but also sociologists and activists fighting today’s slavery, the authors use the sources that seem obvious for this subject, i.e. maritime registers, colonial documents, court files, crew members’ notes or correspondence and most of all former slaves’ personal accounts. Actually it is interesting to note how many of the contributions are framed by or based on individual stories or experiences, illustrating the growing appreciation of this approach among historians. This would make this book a very approachable read were it not for the subject. The ‘Making of the Modern World’, we are confronted with, is an account of treacherous and violent kidnappings, overcrowded, stinking ships strewn with vomit, tormented human cargoes dying of dysentery, scurvy or the brutalities of their guards, people being thrown overboard, an ever present cat o’ nine tails, work under the most inhuman conditions, and finally forced assimilations, resistance, suicide or escape. In London we are led into overcrowded cells with convicts dying of illness or hunger, entering the harbour of Cape Town we are presented with the sight of pierced, severed heads and tortured bodies on the city walls, Sydney is depicted as a cave harbouring some downtrodden Britons under the terror regime of a sadist governor, and the Chinese sea is indeed an ocean of continuous exchange – of opium and teenage prostitutes.

These all-too-well-known images of seemingly archaic brutality are probably not the ones that would come to most readers’ minds when thinking about the ‘Making of the Modern World’ – and this is one of the title’s provocations, inviting readers to remember the omnipresent violence that shaped the organisation of global labour division. But what exactly the authors mean by ‘Modern World’ remains vague. Obviously they situate its making in the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries and connect it to our time, but we are not told what its characteristics are.

More important than this question is the even more provocative main title and the understanding of ‘Middle Passage’ as a concept encompassing a wide variety of forced migration and labour. As a symbol of the historical catastrophe that created the African Diaspora, the Middle Passage denotes a main motif of the collective memory unifying people of the Black Atlantic.

It may be thus quite disturbing for many readers to find under the heading of Middle Passage the story of Livingstone ‘discovering’ Lake Nyassa and thereby laying the ground of the abolition of the slave trade across this lake, a tale that although critically written, strikingly reminds one of British colonial self-representation. Probably even more strange a choice would be the voyage of an educated man from a village near Bayreuth in Southern Germany to Cape Town as a Middle Passage. Sure, he sailed on a ship with German soldiers, forced into dubious contracts by the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, suffering violence, suicide, madness, and other terrible things comparable to aspects of a slavers voyage, but still the comparison seems awkward.
This is lamentable especially as the Middle Passage as a concept and its reference to the trans-Atlantic slave trade is thoughtfully discussed in the introduction and the afterword. The concept is linked to the rise of capitalism since the sixteenth century that brought people from Europe and Africa forcefully to other continents. It takes the Atlantic slave trade as an example to study other social and cultural transformations that resulted from the transport of people. It focuses on the comparable experiences of slaves, indentured servants, transported convicts, and other coerced migrants. It includes ships, prison cells and other places of bondage as part of these middle passages – even for those labourers who were nominally free. The Middle Passage is therefore understood not only as a maritime metaphor but as “the structuring link between expropriation in one geographical setting and exploitation in another” (p. 2). The authors stress that they are aware of the uniqueness of chattel slavery referring to its incomparably high numbers of persons that suffered from its terrors.

Keeping this in mind many arguments are actually in favour of such an extended usage of ‘Middle Passage’: Shortly after the end of the slave trade there existed a contemporary awareness of the comparability of the slaves traded and the felons transported from Britain to the penal colony in Australia. Some of the latter suffered under conditions worse than slaves because the captains were paid beforehand and had thus no special interest in delivering their human cargo. A crew member making this comparison experienced both Middle Passages (the trans-Atlantic and the one from Europe to Australia) and his comparison was done at a time when the slave trade was not yet a trope for something inherently bad. Critics of the transport of convicts used even abolitionist rhetoric, but the abolitionists who fought slavery were less interested, probably fearing for the success of their cause (chapter 6). For the era after slavery the authors show how the continuously existing plantation economies still in need of (forced) labour found ways to guarantee this in a brutal way comparable to slavery, catering for Europe’s growing taste in exotic goods, and how the expansion of Europe’s empires continued to displace people in the centuries to come.

Indeed, the different contributions’ focus on the Middle Passage as a common concept allowing for comparison gives this a book a coherence only seldom achieved by edited volumes. A more profound reference to the concept’s indebtedness to the Afro diasporic experience of the trans-Atlantic slave trade not only in the introduction and afterword but throughout the book would have made the use of this concept even more convincing. Authors would then not have missed on reflecting on the incredible irony that a ship transporting forced labourers in Melanesia was named ‘Uncle Tom’ (p. 188), or – and this is a real lapse – failed to refer to Gilroy’s Black Atlantic that informed so many studies over a wide range of disciplines.
Still, some authors acknowledge the importance of the experience of people of the African Diaspora and in quoting Toni Morrison they are not denying the wound that has been inflicted on those people, but they add a reminder that this wound continues to be inflicted everyday on people everywhere on this globe. Theirs is an activists’ perspective; consequently the authors stress the continuities from the eighteenth century to our time. Hu-Dehart for example compares the way recruiters of forced labourers used strategies like subcontracting and outsourcing to present-day practices in the globalised world economy (p. 169). Martínez shows the continuities of Chinese trade in women and children from colonial times until today – and dares to discuss the fuzzy boundaries between voluntary and forced labour in the recruiting of sex workers: people may freely enter a contractual relationship but find themselves in the situation of violent suppression soon after. And most importantly the authors remind us that today more than 27 million people live as slaves, more than ever before on this planet.

And exactly this is the important issue, that makes this book a valuable read not only for people interested in world history or in the history of slavery and other forms of forced labour but also for scholars in Cypriot studies working on migration and especially trafficking and sex work in Cyprus. They may find it helpful to embed their work in the wider synchronic as well as diachronic perspective that this book has to offer.

Hauke Dorsch
Borders, Migration, Security and Trafficking Dilemmas: Current Debates and Cypriot Challenges

Introduction to the Cypriot Border Dilemmas and Immigration Challenges

This extended review essay aims to address some major debates around the transformation of borders, migration, securitization and trafficking via a review of some texts that are informative of the current global debates on the subject. The “age of migration”\(^1\) requires that we locate Cyprus in its wider context and this means rethinking the concepts, theories and the policy framework of appreciating and handling the “turbulence of migration” which reshapes our understanding of globalisation, localisation, deterioralization and hybrity:\(^2\) yet we have to bear in mind that whenever boundaries are drawn the mechanisms are set in motion for their racialisation.\(^3\) Although the texts reviewed in all but the last subsection do not contain, or if they do, they contain very little direct references to Cyprus, they are highly relevant to the current debates about Cypriot policy-making and academic research on the regulation of borders and immigration, the public discourses and police practices regarding ‘security’ and the combating of trafficking. Each subsection can be considered a key ‘subheading’ on particular dimensions of the issues facing Cyprus today. The only books reviewed that refer directly to the Cypriot context are those dealing with the exceptional subject of trafficking, prostitution and exploitation, and these titles are dealt with in the last subsection of this essay.

Transformations and Dilemmas on Borders and Migration control: Can Cypriot Debates Draw on the Broader Debates?

Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe
Edited by Joan DeBardeleben

Thinking the Unthinkable: The Immigration Myth Exposed
Nigel Harris

Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls
Teresa Hayter
Rethinking Borders in the EU context

Teresa Hayter’s Open Borders makes a powerful case against immigration control. She illustrates this primarily by drawing on the UK experience of 1990 as well as from other countries. The books reviewed in this subsection deal with the notion of border control in different ways: DeBardeleben et al., consists of essays concerned with the changing nature and the current dilemmas of the European borders and their management, whilst the books by Harris (2002) and Hayter (2000) examine the policy dimension of immigration control and advocate open borders. This is a radical solution but they claim that it is the only effective solution to the current crisis of immigration policy across the globe and in Europe in particular.

The collection of essays edited by DeBardeleben, illustrate how the question of the nature of the ‘borders of Europe’ is becoming ever more important in understanding state processes: notions such as ‘soft borders’ and ‘hard borders’ are dilemmas for the enlarged EU. It is a well-written and well-structured volume which provides empirical support from the EU context, primarily drawing on the eastern European context – as well as on a theoretical level – the operation of the idea that “the boundary encapsulates the identity of the community”. The book comprises of three parts following the introduction by the editor, and an illuminating chapter by Nanette Neuwahl under the title ‘What Borders for Which Europe?’ Part I is concerned with enlargement and the ‘wider Europe’ and has three chapters dealing with eastern Europe and the neighbours in countries formerly belonging to the so-called ‘actually existing socialist camp’. Charles Pentland looks at what he calls “eastern approaches” where “the EU encounters the former Soviet Union” (pp. 45-68), whilst Helmut Hubel concentrates on the notion of “direct neighbours” to unpack the relationship between the EU and post-Soviet Russia (pp. 69-84). Dragoș Popa and Bodan Buduru explore the ‘new borders’ and staged enlargement by looking into the Romania-EU relations (pp. 85-104) prior to accession to the EU.

Part II covers enlargement and EU border policies, which is really the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the EU’s mechanisms for policy-making on questions of borders: migration and border control, focusing on economic and security factors (Helene Pellerin); the politics of exclusion and inclusion in ‘wider Europe’ (Sandra Lavenex) and the EU ‘integrated management of external borders’ (Jorg Monar). Part III explores the question of managing new borders along the Russian perimeter, with two chapters: the first discusses the idea of a “Friendly Schengen Border” in the context of combating illegal migration (Olga Potempkina), and the second is on Latvia’s EU accession and the Russian border (Juris Grommons).

The paper by Neuwahl is particularly insightful: the notion of ‘border’ is nicely unpacked from the outset showing that the assumptions related to borders are flawed and ill-conceived. The notion of borders is often assumed to be a ‘physical’ or ‘linear border’, which was traditionally associated with “central repressive and
extractive agencies such as immigration, customs and exchange control” (p. 24).
This, however, is changing: boundaries and borders are historically constructed and
their nature and meaning is never static; neither is it constructed necessarily on
legal or legalistic grounds. DeBardeleben (p. 11) reminds us that the European
dilemma is between ‘hard borders’ versus ‘soft borders’. The former essentially
means strict visa regimes, extensive policing and customs control on cross-border
transport of goods creating a ‘closed system’ and functions as a ‘barrier’ which
manifests a regime with exclusive and rough edges. On the other hand there are
measures to ‘soften’ the borders by loosening visa requirements and allowing “free
flow of traffic and goods, and an easy exchange of human contact”. Yet, there is no
uniformity in approaches on the borders of the EU; there are contradictions, mixed
signals and highly volatile situations reflecting the contestations within the EU over
the issue as well as “the uncertainty about the likely shape of EU’s future limits (pp.
11-12). Neuwahl questions whether EU membership is necessarily the most
desirable option for all neighbours given that non-EU members can participate in
the shaping of various EU policies. She refers to a multi-tiered structure currently in
place which involves EU members, the Schengen protocol, the EU monetary union
and the various custom unions etc. Potemkina deals with some of the contradictions
between the so-called “Friendly Schengen border” and the tough policies to combat
illegal immigration. In any case when analysing borders the power-relations
between the forces involved cannot be ignored. As Pellerin reminds us there is a
problem of asymmetrical relations in the regulation of borders with their neighbours.

If the philosopher Giorgio Agamben is right, in the current, generalised state of
exception, “the question of borders becomes all the more urgent”5 In speaking
about the ‘edges’ of law and politics, Agamben refers to the “ambiguous, uncertain,
borderline fringe, at the intersection between the legal and the political”.6 These
analytical insights allow us to explore the ambiguity and uncertainty of the “the no-
man’s land between the public law and political fact”, between judicial order and life.
The idea of the state of exception is a general schema but can and should be
applied to specific situations; in this we can see the interplay between literal,
metaphorical and symbolic borders. On the more conceptual level of state theory,
the notion of ‘soft borders’ forces us to rethink the very concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and
‘democracy’.7 Interestingly, we are dealing with a paradox here: the argument is that
we are essentially arguing for the centrality of the border – an idea which at first,
appears to be an oxymoron: how could the ‘edge’, the ‘border’, be the ‘centre’? Etienne
Balibar8 expands on the centrality of the border as a new socio-political
entity in the following passage:

“The term border is extremely rich in significations. One of my hypotheses is
that it is undergoing a profound change in meaning. The borders of new
sociopolitical entities, in which an attempt is being made to preserve all the
functions of the sovereignty of the state, are no longer entirely situated at the

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outer limit of territories; they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled – for example, in cosmopolitan cities. But it is also one of my hypotheses that the zones called peripheral, where secular and religious cultures confront one another, where differences in economic prosperity become more pronounced and strained, constitute the melting pot for the formation of a people (demos), without which there is no citizenship (politeia) in the sense that this term has acquired since antiquity in the democratic tradition.

In this sense, border areas – zones, countries, and cities – are not marginal to the constitution of a public sphere but rather are at the center”.

In the context of the politicisation of immigration the question of the border increasingly becomes the ‘centre’ in terms of political discourses at the EU, and within national politics as, for instance, in the case of Cyprus. Often there are ‘soft borders’ cutting across countries divided by wars that create new types of immigration problems such as Cyprus, Ireland and others. Moreover, beyond the celebratory dimension that heralds the border changes as ‘good for migrants’ because they find employment, crucial questions about the transformation patterns, informalisation and the exploitation of migrants at the workplace, are part and parcel of the ‘loosening of borders’. What we are dealing with is a wider phenomenon whereby migration must be located within the post-Fordist restructuring that is occurring across the European Union and the globe.

Neuwahl refers to the case of Cyprus as a particularly complex case: “the division of Cyprus [...] has created definite ambiguity for future EU borders”. This is because “until a settlement on the island is reached, the UN Green Line zone will act as a kind of frontier running across the island, thus ensuring the non-application of the economic provisions of EU law to the North” (p. 25). In practice, the notion of ‘soft border’ is proving an extremely difficult issue at a very practical level. The Treaty of Accession and the Green Line Regulation 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 regulates the peculiar “soft border” of Cyprus under the current situation as long as the de facto partition persists. In fact, immediately after a divided Cyprus acceded to the EU following the failure to agree on a settlement to the “Cyprus problem”, there was a special regulation, referred to as “the Green Line regulation”, which governs problems deriving from “the de facto partition of Cyprus”. There are inherent complications resulting from the operation of the Green line Regulation, which aims to combat illegal immigration of third country nationals and to detect and prevent any threat to public security and public policy. Nevertheless, there are various obstacles to the exercising of this right. It can be said that the ‘soft border/ceasefire line’ of Cyprus is turning out to be both softer and harder in practice than predicted: there is an ‘unofficial’ EU office operating in the north which is trying to develop a process that would bring the situation more in line with the EU (and the south) but the functioning of the Green Line Regulation is proving difficult to manage. There has certainly been a rise in inter-communal trade over recent
years but at the same time there are bureaucratic, operational and social stumbling blocks to trading in a state of exception.17

To Open or Not to Open the Borders?

Teresa Hayter’s Open Borders makes a powerful case against immigration control. She illustrates this primarily by drawing on the UK experience of 1990 as well as other contexts, and maintains that the concept of “controlling” migration is based not only on false premises, but immigration control effectively undermines the very notion of human rights. This is the kind of critique which rightly pushes ‘liberalism’ to be truly liberal and is not based on some unrealistic idealistic premise which is detached from actual practice. This is a well-written and researched book, quite compact with ideas and arguments for open borders. Firstly, immigration control undermines human rights such as the basic right of not being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment; the right not to be tortured; the right not to be arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned; the right to a fair trial by a properly constituted court; the right to family life, the right to work, etc: “Britain violates virtually all the UN High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] handbook guidelines it detains for longer periods and with less judicial control than in other countries” (p. 117). Secondly, immigration control simply does not work. Hayter makes a powerful case that the abolition of immigration controls will have some effect on increasing numbers but “it” would not have an overwhelming effect on numbers (p. 152). Despite the increase in repressive measures the numbers of asylum-seekers remained roughly constant. The ‘water metaphor’ often used to describe migration by anti-immigration advocates are used by Hayter to argue the opposite case: “controls are like a dam; when one hole is blocked another appears somewhere else” (p. 152). Moreover, she illustrates the fallaciousness of the argument that 400 million Indians are ready to immigrate en mass to the rich countries should borders open. Drawing on works of orthodox or neo-classical economists, she disputes the views that suggest that free movement of labour would create such large scale movements of workers and result in equalised wages, thus reducing the wages of workers in the western rich countries. Hayter argues, quite convincingly that this is a false assumption, (a) when Britain (reluctantly) offered 20,000 visas to Hong Kong citizens, only 10,000 applied for them. (b) In situations where there were no immigration controls, e.g. from the Commonwealth countries to Britain, Puerto Rico and Cuba, the USA, and from French Overseas Departments to France, only a very small proportion migrated when the borders were open between 1950 and 1980. During this period only 0.6% of the Caribbean population migrated. This type of argument answers those who call for stricter controls in Cyprus, maintaining that there are 2 million migrants waiting in Syria to swamp Cyprus.18

The volume by Harris (2002) very much complements that of Hayter. Harris aims to “expose the immigration myth” and succeeds in illustrating the arbitrariness
of immigration control and how recent this is. In six chapters he manages to put a very powerful case for open borders by demonstrating that: first, the current regime of immigration control does not work. Second, the current tough immigration regime will undermine welfare and socio-economic prospects for the developed economies themselves. Third, the current regime only emerged in the 1960s and 1970s; before that time people had much more freedom to move than they do now! Fourth, in the current globalised economy the closed border system effectively creates a system of ‘global apartheid’ whereby the majority are disempowered to move and are confined to a state of permanent risk. Fifth, Harris destroys - what he claims - are totally unfounded arguments for immigration control, as the chances of being ‘swamped’ are so slim, and cultural objections are merely disguised racism. Sixth, the logic of dismantling borders is based on the premise that these mechanisms are ineffective anyway, but there is such an insatiable economic need in developed countries for unskilled labour that no matter how sophisticated immigration controls are, clandestine labour will keep on growing, forcing host states to embark on periodic amnesties. Seventh, the current system of immigration control, which was established in the ‘60s and ‘70s, is beginning to crumble because competition exists amongst developed countries for migrants with IT skills, for example, and there is also a great demand for labour-intensive workers in jobs caring for the elderly and other ‘intimate’ posts. Eighth, once the distortion from the so-called ‘illegal’ or ‘clandestine’ workers is removed then Governments can begin to properly regulate the labour market on a more rational basis.

What is striking about the books by Harris and Hayter is that what is assumed to be the situation now as opposed to the memory of what ‘it has been’, is proven to be no longer the case. What the books offer are no ‘guilt trips’, nor do they make an appeal to our benevolent or charitable ‘generosity’ mood; They really illustrate how migration has always been present throughout history in such a way that it is difficult to mount a serious moral argument that disputes whether the same practice ought to continue in the future. The four periods of migration since the sixteenth century demonstrate a reality that cannot be denied: (a) There were an estimated 100 million slaves forced out of Africa; (b) bonded or indentured labour make up another significant number of migrants; (c) economic migration from Europe to America during the eighteenth – nineteenth century is estimated to be around 60 million; (d) The last period starts from the twentieth century onwards.

A criticism of the Harris and Hayter books is that the thrust of their argument is directed towards the police. In spite of the policy of the wealthy West (or North) to maintain tight immigration control, both authors argue for a generalised implementation of open borders across the globe rather than the adoption of such a policy by individual countries. Harris’ ‘globalist’ perspective in particular is a sharp and powerful critique of immigration control as a generic tool of regulating population movements, but it is less powerful and useful if one is to adopt a more
open immigration policy at national level. Hayter’s focus, in the specific example of the UK, makes it more ‘relative’ and focused in that sense, but less ‘global’ in another. Having said that, the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum policies, which is an undeniable trend in EU policy-making, makes the arguments of both authors much more relevant and sound: a European-wide policy that tends towards open borders is very much in line with the cogent case put forward by these two authors.

Both books make a strong case for open borders against the perverse logic of immigration controls. Such controls actually ‘trap’ migrants in the countries of destination. Even when they are willing to return to their country of origin to try their luck it is too risky to attempt return if the migrants are irregular. Hence, they are forced to stay. Also powerful is the case the authors make regarding the idea that the industry of ‘smuggling’, ‘trafficking’ and assisting illegal migration is, by and large, a consequence of strict immigration control. There are large profits being made by those willing to risk bypassing the legal and repressive apparatuses of immigration control. The stricter these control are, the higher the risks and the higher the profits.

On reflection a more relevant and focused theorisation of policy dilemmas on migration and border control in Cyprus, is to examine in the same spirit of the above three books, the implementation of the various amnesty and regularisation regimes that exist across the southern EU border. The most impressive of these is the Spanish case of permanent regularisation as the only method of dealing with the crisis. The dilemma would be either to have thousands or even hundreds of thousands of migrants as irregular migrants as experienced in Greece for instance, or to recognise them and bring them out of irregularity, thus ensuring that their rights are protected and labour standards are maintained for all, including the locals. It is time to contemplate the fact that immigration control as ‘border control’ is simply not working and there are other ways to regulate the flows whilst ensuring labour standards and equal treatment for all.

Europeanisation, Securitisation and Migration Dilemmas: Connections with the (Greek) Cypriot debates

Terror, Insecurity and Liberty, Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11
Edited by Didier Bigo and Anastasia Tsoukala

Security, Risk and Human Rights: A Vanishing Relationship?
Anastasia Tsoukala

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The changing function and meaning of borders discussed above relates to questions of security and migration control, which is the subject matter of this subsection. The ‘securitisation of migration’ has been an issue of concern in European and international literature over recent years. It must be noted that it is not uncommon for the dangers posed by migrants, especially certain categories deemed as ‘dangerous migrants’, to be invoked, thus cultivating fears and insecurity amongst the host population. These discourses have, however, certainly taken a particularly pernicious form since the attacks of Sept 11, 2001, in what was aptly described by the criminologist Anastasia Tsoukala as “the terrorism-immigration nexus in the EU in the post-11 September era”. The alleged connection between terrorism and migration, including the use of ‘racial profiling’ as a police method to ‘predict behaviour’ of ‘potential terrorists’ is a controversial issue for civil libertarians in the EU and beyond. Such debates have been taking place in the EU and USA over the last years: under George W. Bush in the US, as well as from Margaret Thatcher through to Tony Blair in the UK, civil liberties have suffered enormous blows using anti-terrorism as an excuse to pass such measures. Nevertheless, it is superficial to assume that the changes occurred merely or primarily due to the programme of the particular heads of state. The changes are deeper and of long-term nature.

The edited volume by professors Bigo and Tsoukala is highly relevant in understanding the current climate, where there seems to be an increasingly frequent use of the alleged connection between ‘migration’ and ‘security’. More importantly, however, the book illustrates how routine “illiberal practices” are used by so-called liberal regimes, particularly but not exclusively after 9/11. The editors aptly inform us that “the central notion of this volume is the field of professionals of the management of unease” (p. 2). What we are dealing with in the so-called ‘war on terror’ is what Agamben called “a permanent state of exception” which is cited as justification for suspending civil liberties and human rights by liberal states. Migrants and asylum seekers bear most of the brunt of these tough new measures. This book contains six chapters, written by different authors, illustrating how different dimensions interact in the formation of the ‘state of exception’. After a general introduction by Bigo and Tsoukala, which frames the analysis for the rest of the book, Didier Bigo (‘Globalised (in)security: The Field and the Panopticon’), examines the processes of globalised (in)security. It is an interesting chapter that uses Foucaultian insights to explore the field. Anastasia Tsoukala then scrutinises the processes of defining the terrorist threat in the post September 11 era (pp. 49-99) and Laurent Bonelli inquires into the “hidden in plain sight” by scrutinising intelligence, exception and suspicion after 11 September 2001 (pp. 100-120). Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet studies the French case of military activities within national boundaries (pp. 121-145) and finally Christian Olson makes an attempt at “bringing the political back in the interactions between external forces and local
The book unpacks the notion of (in)security in what Ulrich Beck termed as ‘risk society’. It can be viewed as a well-argued and documented response by criminologists, sociologists, philosophers and historians to the dominance of the discipline of International Relations in the field. The volume puts forward an awesome critique of modern liberal governmentability on (in)security which is not based on an abstract or philosophical analysis but on a theoretical argumentation that is fully empirically backed. To précis, the argument is that this modern liberal governmentability contains within it a zone, which is fundamentally a denial of democracy based on the logic of exceptionalism. This is not external or somehow detached but a structural element internal to its logic which rests on the premise that is necessary to exclude the right of persons deemed to belong to a category of ‘abnormality’. The behaviour of this group is fully and predictably criminal and must thus be halted. They call this “the pan-opticon dispositif” – clearly alluding to Michel Foucault’s groundbreaking concept. The authors take issue with Agamben’s grand schema, which they only partly accept: first, they dispute the line taken by those who, in part, accept the necessity of anti-terrorism but consider the response disproportionate; second, they dispute the position of those who consider that 11 September 2001 unmasked the logic of liberal democracy and modernity as the logic of the ‘Camp’ – this is based on merely blaming clandestine organisations or governments. Their argument is that we need to go beyond the schematic and programmatic approaches that focus on “the spectacular” to a more rigorous analysis based on research. They, therefore, “insist on the mimetic relation between transnational clandestine organisations using violence, the coalition of governments of the ‘global war on terror’ and a complex web of vested local interests” (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008, p. 3). They propose that we look at “the routine and the everyday practices of late modernity” by “contextualising them to immerse them in a ‘societal logic’ and into a political sociology that insists on a different way of conceptualising the (in)securitization, far from the fear and terror, but concerned with insecurity as risk and unease” (Bigo and Tsoukala. 2008, pp. 3-4). We are dealing with an analysis of “the politics of unease” as they term it, as well as the social and political dimensions of (in)security, whereby we have the professionals with specific views and interests on the management of unease. ‘Security’ is demystified from an ‘unqualified human good’ beyond criticism to what it actually is in society: a socio-political construct shaped by the structural competition between the various actors with different forms of capital and legitimacy over the contradictory definitions of security and different interests.

The chapters deal with the different dimensions of this: Bigo discusses the new governmentability of unease; Bonelli unpacks the restructuring and functioning of
specific security agencies – the British, the French and the Spanish intelligence by demonstrating the multi-facetted and complex contestations between the struggles of agents who defend their field by defining the ‘terrorist threat accordingly’. Guittet deals with the army’s keenness to get involved in internal counter-terrorism, whilst Olsson deals with counter-terrorism abroad.

The novelty of their contribution lies also in the way they handle and connect the various institutional formations and practices that shape the formation of the governmentability of insecurity. For the purposes of this essay, whose focus is primarily migration-related (including distorted and violent forms of migration and exploitation), the volume is extremely valuable: we are able to locate the processes of both criminalisation of migration/migrants and securitisation in the wider context. In fact, Tsoukala’s own contribution to the volume illustrates these processes via the use of analysis of political representation of (dis)order in the UK. Particularly, the representation of Muslims as a menace is a central theme in defining the terrorist threat. She demonstrates confidingly how the “terrorism-immigration-asylum nexus is established (Tsoukala, 2008a, pp. 66-69), the criminalisation (pp. 69-71) and the ‘threatened’ values of society” (pp. 73-74).

In other areas of text reviewed, Anastasia Tsoukala puts forward the basic logic of the school of thought in her very readable paper on security, risk and human Rights and illustrates in a convincing manner what she refers to as a “vanishing relationship” between the subject of human rights and the agencies in charge of ensuring that these rights are upheld in practice. In a fascinating but highly disturbing paper, Tsoukala advances the thesis that there has been a trend of a longer-term nature, which manifests “the gradual disappearance of the person as a subject of rights in contemporary legal systems” (p. 1). This is explained, not as something ‘sudden’, which occurs after 11 September; it is not a rupture that occurred as a result of the post September counter terrorism policies but as a natural outcome of the prevalence of the risk-focused mindset in both crime control and the human rights reality since late 1970. The notion of the negation of personhood as a correlation “with certain deep changes in the legal frame of the protection of human rights and democracy” is related to a number of changes that are unpacked: the introduction of new elements in crime-control management which target social control as the primary aim away from rehabilitation-orientated crime; the individual is denied of any capability of free choice, hence “the shifting attention from the delinquent person to the deviant, potentially risk-producing group” (p. 5). Examples of this trend include sex offenders who are deemed certain to re-offend; youths of North African origin residing in the poor Parisian suburbs; English football fans considered to be unrepentant ‘hooligans’ and the Roma in Italy. In this world the principle of presumption of innocence disappears in favour of risk-management. Risk management obliterates “the distinction between deviant and criminal behaviour”: mere suspicion is enough as “the Europol Computer System has
information on possible future offenders” (p. 7). We have a situation where “persons are reduced to predictable systems of behaviour, the efficient monitoring of which cannot but prevent them from taking certain expectable norms” (p. 8). Moreover, the time-space dimension central in criminal law is now denied. The trend does not simply reflect a meagre change in the practices of the mechanisms of control. Tsoukala convincingly argues that we have a deeper structural transformation where law enforcement agents are now “legally upgraded”: “The break from the past is so radical that it arguably calls into question the whole conception of the criminal justice system in a democracy” (p. 11). This 17-page long dense paper, although compact with ‘theoretical ammunition’ is well-written, lucid and empirically supported. It makes a cogent case for a very bleak picture of the world. Tsoukala demonstrates the trends towards an aspect of what Poulantzas had referred to some thirty years ago as “authoritarian statism” but in a more Foucaultian sense by focusing on the field of criminal law and criminology. We may criticise this approach on the ground that it leaves little room for resistance and contradictions of the system. Moreover, given that in this essay we are primarily interested in the migration dimension, we may question how effective this undeniable trend is in achieving the ‘desired ends’: the failure of border and immigration control is indicative of the loopholes of the systems of surveillance and social control. Then again, the case made in favour of open borders is based on the premise that border and immigration control simply cannot work within a democratic setting: if Tsoukala, and indeed the case put forward in the book edited by Bigo and Tsoukala, are correct, then authoritarianism will sweep aside the potential not only for democratising and opening borders but to the very essence of democratic rule; the nightmare described in the political comic ‘V for Vendetta’ is becoming the reality.

The books reviewed are highly relevant to understand the current climate in which ‘migration’ is increasingly related to ‘security’: this is a global trend that can be exemplified in the context of the EU but it is extremely appropriate to the Cypriot context of the migration debates. What is alarming for the current Cypriot public dialogue on migration, is that although the discourses on threats to ‘liberal norms’, and the dangers from an alleged “Afro-asiatic Muslim community implanted in the territory under the control of the Cyprus Republic” amounting essentially to ‘a fifth column’, have been repeated before, what is novel is the veracity and frequency of the argument. The fact that it is now routinely uttered in the public sphere, seems to be shared by significant numbers of the population and the fact that we have an organised group making this discourse central to their campaign adds credence to the debate.

In the case of Cyprus, we can safely say that so far the ‘anti-terrorism frenzy’ has thankfully been minimised by and large by a more measured approach, generally taken due to the specific nature of Greek-Cypriot politics. However, measures, including racial profiling were never abolished; in fact the Cyprus ENAR
report 2007\textsuperscript{25} claims that “racial profiling is not an uncommon practice of the police, although this is not officially admitted”. Citing the NGO KISA, which claims that police practice racial profiling against people of Turkish (Kurds), Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin who repeatedly submit complaints to the Ombudsman and the Independent Authority for Investigation of Claims and Complaints against Members of the Police Force. Moreover it claims that “it is a common practice of the Immigration Police to illegally arrest and detain asylum seekers of Turkish nationality and Kurdish origin when they submit asylum applications and to fail to inform the competent authorities of the change of address of asylum seekers of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin”.\textsuperscript{26} More recently, the public debates about the securitisation of migration are dangerously creeping into the Cypriot political landscape in a way that can pose a threat to the democratic decision-making process in Cypriot political life. In the 1980s the connection in such discourses between anti-immigrant politics and the Cyprus problem was primarily an indirect one. The dominant view, almost near orthodoxy, was that “we are forced to use migrant labour” but “let's keep a check on how many, for how long and from what country of origins do we accept migrant workers. The ‘Cyprus problem’ is of course ever-present as a background force shaping the debate to the extent that it was referred to as a voice of ‘caution’ and conservatism given that the Cyprus problem was the main political issue and the question of economic growth in conditions of ‘semi-occupation’ was of vital importance. Now we have some discourses where migration questions become directly racialised possibly by making direct connections with the states of exception: the connection to the discourse of security, threat, national emergency”. Elsewhere, I have argued in the past that there is currently no ‘political space’ for the emergence of a single racist/extreme right party which has as its primary goal an anti-immigrant policy but there are elements of these kinds of politics in mainstream political actors (Trimikliniotis, 2005, 2006, 2007). We ought to revisit this conclusion in the current climate: We have a Minister of Interior, who if anything is considered to be pro-migrant, rather than a populist Sarkozy, who served as a notorious anti-immigrant Minister of Interior before becoming President of the French Republic. However, we have new organisations emerging consisting of persons who come from various different parities across the political and ideological spectrum. In July 2008 the two organisations called ‘Movement for the Salvation of Cyprus’ and ‘Movement for a European Future of Cyprus’ announced their intention to hold a public meeting to summon support for their fight against the ‘dangers’ from ‘Afro-asiatic’, ‘Muslim-asiatic’ and ‘Turko-asiatic’ hordes that are ready to invade Cyprus as part of a plan orchestrated by Turkey to change the demographic character of Cyprus through illegal immigration, and they circulated a leaflet to this effect.\textsuperscript{27}
A Critical Review:
Literature on Trafficking and Prostitution in Cyprus

The Global Political Economy of Sex,
Desire, Violence Insecurity in Mediterranean Nation States
Anna Agathangelou

Εμπόριο Γυναικών στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία
Ramona Lenz

Εμπόριο Κοριτσιών: Η Διακίνηση Νεαρών Γυναικών Από και Προς την Κύπρο και η Εξώθηση τους στη Πορνεία
Chambis Kiatipis

Debates date back to the 1990s over the extent of sexual and labour trafficking in Cyprus. The controversy surrounding the ‘artistes’ visa, which was essentially a euphemism for (illegal) prostitution by migrant dancers, has been happening for years: it has been criticised as a form of trafficking with the acquiescence of the state. Despite international pressure and embarrassment when referred in international human rights reports, no Minister of Interior had the courage to abolish these visas until the current Minister, Neoclis Sylikiotis, took the decision to cut the ‘Gordian knot’ in October 2008. This, of course, hardly ends the problem of trafficking; nevertheless it is certainly an important step forward in what is a very difficult matter. It moves institutionally the regulation of this group of workers to a more ‘normal’ setting – the Ministry of Labour. The issue remains highly emotive and controversial: a recent conference only highlighted the long-standing failure of the prosecuting authorities, and in particular the attitude of the attorney general himself who failed to properly engage with the interested parties and NGOs working to support women who suffer in this regime.

This contentious issue has for some time attracted researchers, who have provided valuable insights into the operation of the sector. There are a number of international, European and national reports, three books and several on-line resources of media reports, which cover the broad subject of sex work in Cypriot cabarets. These include the annual USA country Report on trafficking, the Robles Report, the Cyprus Ombudsman report of 2001, the report of the Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies – a national NGO which carried out a mapping of the situation by interviewing policymakers and NGOs. It is worthy of note that a recent work, based on client interviews conducted during 2006-2007, investigates the
demand side of trafficking in Cyprus, but it is not appraised here as this reviewer is one of the principal authors; nonetheless this paper draws on that study.

**International and National Reports on Trafficking: Socio-economic Exploitation, State Collusion and International Relations**

A number of reports, some based on empirical investigations, contributed to knowledge and understanding of the sex industry and trafficking in Cyprus. Indicative of the situation is the following extract from the 2007 USA Report Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report:

“Cyprus is primarily a destination country for a large number of women trafficked from Eastern and Central Europe for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Other countries of origin include the Philippines and the Dominican Republic. Traffickers continued to fraudulently recruit victims for work as dancers in cabarets and nightclubs on short-term ‘artiste’ visas, for work in pubs and bars on employment visas, or for illegal work on tourist or student visas. Traffickers often rotated victims between different cabarets in cities throughout Cyprus”.

The Report was critical of the role of the Cypriot Government and for “not fully complying with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so”. Cyprus was placed “on Tier 2 Watch List because of its failure to show evidence of increasing efforts to address its serious trafficking for sexual exploitation problem”. Moreover, the government was criticised for failing to fulfil its commitment to abolish the ‘artiste’ visa category.

The Report also notes that “… [w]hile the government convicted seven suspects on charges related to prostitution, it was unable to confirm whether a trafficking element was involved”. Noteworthy is the assessment of the progress made in implementing the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Robles. In his report of 2003 the Commissioner noted that the number of young women migrating to Cyprus as nightclub artistes was well out of proportion to the population of the island, and that the authorities should consider introducing preventive control measures to deal with this phenomenon, in conjunction with legislative safeguards. In particular, the Commissioner recommended that the authorities adopt and implement a plan of action against trafficking in human beings. The Commissioner noted:

“Some efforts have been made by the Cypriot authorities to improve victim identification and referral, and in particular, 150 police officers have been trained on this issue. However, according to NGOs a culture still prevails in which women are seen by the police to have ‘consented’ to their predicament and victim identification remains inadequate”.

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At the end of 2003, the Cypriot Ombudsman issued a report following a self-initiated investigation about the situation of sex-trafficking in Cyprus, a report that has provoked intense debates. At the beginning of 2004, the Report of the European Commissioner for Human Rights on Cyprus, Alvaro Robles, was made available to the public. Both reports criticise the Cypriot government for not taking the appropriate measures in order to combat human trafficking and especially sex-trafficking. In 2004, the country report of the US State Department put Cyprus on the watch list (TIER 2 Watch List) because, according to the report, no proper measures were taken against sex-trafficking. In addition, the report makes recommendations for measures to assist victims and to improve control at borders, i.e. to contribute to closing roads of sex-trafficking. Also, in 2004, the police established a Human Trafficking Prevention Bureau responsible for coordinating actions against trafficking and to aid collaboration with international police departments. The USA Reports for 2006 and 2007 repeat that Cyprus is a destination for sexually exploited migrant women.

In 2007 the national Report Mapping the Realities of Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation in Cyprus alleged that “the government appears to tolerate trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation in Cyprus and contributes to demand for sexual services through the issuing of specific ‘artiste’ visas as well as ‘high risk’ establishments”. It points out that “within 20 years [1982-2002] there has been a dramatic increase of 111% in the number of cabarets”. It notes that sex workers are unable to move freely, are forced to work over and above their working hours, and live in desperate conditions, isolated and under strict surveillance. A significant number of trafficked women are misled into believing that they are expected to work as waitresses, or barmaids. Instead, most of these women are forced, through the use of threats and/or violence, into prostitution. Moreover, the Third ECRI Report refers to the problem of ‘artistes’ in cabarets, night clubs and pubs, who are often victims of trafficking (para. 111).

Works on Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation in Cyprus

The texts reviewed here demonstrate the importance of the issue, and in a number of ways they complement one another as they approach the issue from different angles: Anna Agathangelou, The Global Political Economy of Sex, Desire, Violence Insecurity in Mediterranean Nation States, focuses on the situation in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey; Ramona Lenz, Εμπόριο Γυναικών στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία examines prostitution and trafficking of migrant women in the Republic of Cyprus based on fieldwork and interviews with some women’s work; and the book by Chambis Kiatipis, Εμπόριο Κοριτσιών, is based on a critical analysis that draws on his own experience in the 1980s and 1990s; the article by Philaretou and Allen (2006) ‘The Cabaret Sex Industry in the Republic of Cyprus: An Exploratory
Investigation of Greek-Cypriot Male Cabaret Patronage’ is a psycho-social approach to the issue in Cyprus.

**Kiatipis: “A Testimony”**

The book by Kiatipis, Εμπόριο Κοριτσιών, contains four parts and three appendices. Part I is a 108-page “Report – Testimony”, written by the author himself. Part II consists of press cuttings; part III is written by Nearchos Ioannou, a humorous (or so its author thinks) chronicle called ‘The Strip-joints’ (Τα Στριπτιζάδικα); part IV is the report by the ombudsman (November 2003), which is an excellent critique and exposition of the system; Appendix 1 is a study on the shadow economy in Cyprus by the research bureau of the political party AKEL; Appendix 2 is a paper entitled ‘Trafficking of Women: A Global Issue’, by the British Council in London, from Gender Equality News, No. 26, March 2004; Appendix 3 is the US State Department Report of 2003 (published on 14 June 2004). The volume is, therefore, a good resource containing different documents on this subject in Cyprus.

Kiatipis’ work is motivated to raise awareness about prostitution and the underworld, and targets primarily policymakers and legislators. He introduces the phenomenon of prostitution from a socio-historical perspective by identifying different causes, forms and the historical evolution of prostitution in Cyprus. He identifies as “traditional prostitution” the sexual services sold by native women which he describes as the complete form of prostitution, but finds that the predominant form of prostitution in Cyprus during the period of his study (1979-1986) is what he names the ‘imported prostitution’ with its protagonists being young women “imported” for this purpose. The author also describes the different mechanisms through which these women are brought ‘legally’ to Cyprus by the networks of sex-traffickers in order to work as dancers (as they are initially told), but instead they are forced to do ‘consomantion’, an act which the author considers must be declared illegal but as he demonstrates, the state is complicit as it receives taxes out of this practice. In Kiatipis’ view, the ‘consomantion’ is essentially a form of prostitution, even if it is not always followed by sexual intercourse. Kiatipis’ conclusion is that the conditions of stay and work of cabaret dancers/’artistes’ in Cyprus are the result of an ‘unholy alliance’ between cabaret owners, the agents who organise the logistics for the locating and the “importing” of these women in Cyprus, and the Department for Aliens and Immigration of the Ministry of the Interior. The author emphasises the need for research in this domain, as he perceives it necessary for the process of healing personal and social diseases which result from the transformation of the feminine nature into merchandise by the organised networks of human traffickers who earn illegal incomes from human exploitation.
The most problematic element of the book is the use of tantalising nude pictures in various porn-like poses, primarily in cabarets and other joints, which are found in various cheap places. Also distasteful and in stark contradiction to the spirit and letter of the book are the various little comments in the captions, which reflect the cheap commentary on picture pages or soft-porn magazines: this undermines the declared goal of the author. Nevertheless, this study is a valuable insight into the operation of the sex industry, seen through the eye of a concerned ex-client, and from that perception it is most useful in understanding demand from a historical perspective. Moreover, the comparison between the author’s account and other empirical research enables us to comprehend how the industry practices and the demand have evolved in recent decades. The book by Kiatipis was written and published before the important recent changes in the law and the abolition of the ‘artistes visa’: the decision to abolish these visas combined with political resolve will be judged in due course when we begin to see the results of the measures taken to combat trafficking. In spite of this, the basic argument of the book still holds: a great deal more needs to be done to break the ‘unholy alliance’ between cabaret owners, the agents ‘importing’ these women in Cyprus, and the various state-related forces.

**Philaretou and Allen: A Psycho-cultural Review of Prostitution**

A very different approach is taken by Philaretou and Allen (2006), who employ a psycho-cultural review of prostitution. This work emphasises the macro environmental contexts and micro intrapersonal and interpersonal factors, which “have contributed to the historical evolution of the cabaret industry in the Greek-Cypriot Republic of Cyprus”. They explain how machismo practices effectuated by masculine gender role socialisation, help construct a mechanistic and limiting male sexual ethos that exploits female sexuality into sexualised work environments. The definition of the cabaret in Cyprus is given as “an intermediary of a strip club and a brothel – whereby males and females utilise their financial assets and sexual appeal respectively, to benefit and exploit each other”. Their conclusions emphasise factors of psychological nature in shaping demand for prostitution in the case of Cyprus: “Essentialist masculine socialisation renders a considerable number of Greek-Cypriot adolescent males susceptible to developing male sexual anxiety and sexual preoccupation with Eastern-European sex workers. Patriarchal socio-cultural environments promoting machismo practices provide men with little, if any, guidance for seeking alternative ways to promote healthy sexual intimacy in their interpersonal lives. The study is a useful tool in understanding attitudes and perceptions of Cypriot males towards paid sex, and as such is a valuable contribution to appreciating the nature of demand for trafficked women.
Lenz: Are the ‘Artistes’ in Cyprus Free Social Agents or Victims of Trafficking?

The book by Ramona Lenz is an ethnographic study conducted in 2001 and can be located in the theoretical insights provided by feminism and critical social theory. It is no coincidence that she begs the question echoed in many recent debates: are the ‘artistes’ in Cyprus free social agents or victims of trafficking? Lenz poses this crucial question in order to address the complexity of the power-relations involved.

Her study, based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between August and October 2001, studies the regime governing foreign women working as ‘artistes’ in cabarets or night clubs in Cyprus. These women, mostly from ex-USSR countries, come to Cyprus on a renewable three-month visa through specialised state-recognised agents-impressarios, who at the time of the research totalled sixteen. Lenz’s study tries to shed some light on sex work in Cyprus by interviewing different agents involved: two ‘artistes’ (sex workers/performers in cabarets), two cabaret owners and two clients as well as government and state officials and NGO representatives dealing with migrants. The empirical research is based on a theoretical framework, which perceives that the process of neo-liberal globalisation has profound influence on migration and trafficking. Moreover, the author challenges the static idea of gender relations translated into the traditional model of ‘pride and shame’ specific for the conventional ethnography of the Mediterranean; she proposes that a focus on dynamic processes is necessary when considering gender relations.

She describes how the official discourse is aimed at improving the image of the government, whilst underneath the surface an exploitative employment relation operates, tolerated by the state, which restricts itself to emphasising a façade of ‘liberty’ and ‘choice’ given to the sex workers, namely whether or not to leave their work in Cyprus and return to their countries of origin. In reality, this alleged ‘free choice’ of action is in fact strictly limited by a series of official policies and surveillance measures by the employers. The official policy ties sex workers to their employers, increasing their dependency; and as a paradox, these measures are invoked by cabaret owners as ‘evidence’ of the inexistence of any exploitation structure. The author shows how the spaces of action available for ‘artistes’ are defined by their alleged choice to prostitute themselves under the specific circumstances created by official government agents, employers and the agents-impressarios. Within this framework of possible choices, the decision for prostitution is interpreted by both employers and agents as ‘free choice’ prostitution. This kind of discourse constructed by employers and clients in the sex industry coincides with the interpretation given by government representatives. For example, the director of the Aliens and Immigration Department emphasises the ‘artistes’ liberty’ to...
complain in case they are forced into prostitution. Official representatives presume that those women who do not make use of the complaints procedure have freely made the decision to enter prostitution. Essentially there are structural reasons that limit the artistes’ liberty, which include surveillance measures imposed by employers, the complicity of individual police officers and the inefficiency of the support and the complaints system. On the other hand, representatives of mainstream migrant support NGOs adopt a strategy of sensationalising the sex work-related issues employing dramatic methods of awareness-raising by exaggerating and presenting the extreme situations as the norm. According to Lenz, neither the limitations/constraints on migrant women’s free-choices, nor the emphasis given to their ‘exploitation’ are able to describe the situation of these women. She concludes by stating that being female migrants in sex work is not the same as being female victims of sex-trafficking. Therefore, the free-choice decision-making cannot be taken-for-granted and used as an excuse for any exploitative relation as regards employment and residence conditions of women migrants. Lenz emphasises the necessity of using different approaches in combating sex-trafficking and protecting sex workers from oppressive conditions of employment. More specifically, she suggests that those women who freely choose to work in the sex industry need to be officially recognised as migrant workers and be protected from exploitation by employers and employment agencies.

The scope of Lenz’s book is understandably limited given that it was written as a Masters’ dissertation. The fieldwork undertaken was restricted and the sample was small. Little can be deduced as far as the question of demand is concerned as the focus of this book is elsewhere. It does, however, provide us with a valuable insight into the operation of the industry, some public/official perceptions which provide a useful starting point for the analysis of the issue of ‘freedom’ and ‘choices’ of sex workers. This is important in understanding the position of sex workers, their social relations, relations with clients and employers and policymaking.

Agathangelou: A Global Political Economy of Desire Industries in Three Peripheral States

Anna Agathangelou’s book is much wider in scope and geographical span. It employs a method of analysis that is referred to as a ‘global political economy of sex’ and illustrates that we are dealing with a case of state complicity and exploitation in a peripheral economy. Agathangelou’s contribution to the debate on what she refers to as “desire industries” in the Mediterranean is that she sets a global and regional framework on the subject by focusing on Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The notion of a ‘global political economy of sex, desire, violence and insecurity’ in the context of ‘Mediterranean nation states’ offers an insight into aspects of the practices, ideologies and modes of resistance and coping not offered
before. Based on a comparative model it relies on interviews, focus groups and participant observation. Her work investigates the structures and processes that reproduce these industries. It is the first time such a comparative approach has been offered for these three countries. From the outset she refers to the “complicit state” (Agathangelou, 2004, pp. 15-16) which offers the economic order of things: the institutional and policy framework for legitimising and covering up the exploitation of two types of migrant females – the ‘objects of desire’ in the sex industry and the “unwanted” domestic workers. The fact that female migrant workers are performing labouring tasks that are designated as somehow ‘specialising’ in ‘dirty manual jobs’ is an interesting connection between the two categories of female migrant workers. It is ironic that literally ‘cleaning’ and ‘caring’ jobs performed by ‘domestic’ workers are considered ‘dirty’, but it is also ironic in another sense that ‘intimate’ moments with sex workers are considered to be ‘dirty’ due to their lack of ‘moral value’.

Agathangelou’s work illustrates that there has been an expansion of exploitation precisely due to the encouragement and the extension of free movement of labour as well as the global division of labour that is imposed by globalisation. The role of the state is emphasised as the regulator of freedom of movement of labour for “the sale and purchase of racialised bodies for self-centred sexual and racial consumption” (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 17). Interestingly she notes that there is a racialised division of labour within the female migrant jobs:

“white but not quite’ bodies are sex and sexual gratification and ‘black’ bodies are for cleaning after one’s self and family” (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 17).

Yet in ‘peripheral economies’ there seems to be a more ‘economic’ goal of the sex and desire industries. She argues that “desire has become a strategy that hides the exploitation of peoples’ labour by suggesting that if one desires labour one can exchange it for cash” (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 97). Agathangelou’s task is ambitious and the width of her study is rather broad in scope, and from the start she sets out to demolish a number of deeply-embedded ideas that go to the core of modern understanding. First, the nature of the ‘economy’, or to employ the classical term favoured by Agathangelou, ‘political economy’, in the barriers between the so-called ‘shadow economy’ and the ‘black economy’ or ‘informal economy’; second, the division between the public and private – a work that she reformats in her critical feminist analysis; third, the complex relationship between class, sex/gender and ethnicity/race is explored to produce an analytical and empirical framework that locates these within a broader socio-economic, political and cultural setting of the restructuring of capitalism in the era of globalisation; fourth, she shows the extraction of surplus value as the result of exploitation of labour, and the destruction of the ‘personal’ in the desire industry not merely as an element in the reproduction of capitalism but as an expression of super-exploitation; fifth, Agathangelou
illustrates that the nature of economic processes and the interrelation between the
nation-state and ‘the global’ requires a more nuanced analysis that goes beyond the
simplistic assumptions and terms of the debate between the ‘hyper-globalisers’ on
the ‘globalisation sceptics’, to use the expressions of Held et al. (1999), about the
‘problematique’ around global transformations. And finally, her analysis offers
critical knowledge on the issues of migration, nation-state and economy, and the
relations and practices in the regional and European setting via a comparative
analysis that draws from her findings in fieldwork in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

In general, it has to be noted that the empirical basis of most of the above works
remain rather slim – which is not surprising given the difficulty in researching this
field. Agathangelou’s book is a proper academic book published by a reputable
international publisher and is, of course, in a different league: her focus is on the
analysis of the positioning of the sex industry in the globalised economy of the
region but has empirical research from Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. In the case of
Lenz, which is a Master’s dissertation, only a small number of interviews are
presented with women who had previously worked in the sex industry but are not
identified in the book as victims of trafficking. In the case of Kiatipis, the author sets
out his own experiences as participant observer but offers no findings of any
empirical research. In spite of this observation, the findings in my view remain quite
sound and all point in a similar direction: serious action is required to combat
trafficking in Cyprus.

Final Remarks on the Cypriot Debates and Dilemmas

The books reviewed are read in light of the migration-related dilemmas of Cyprus:
this divided country is a ‘soft border’ of the eastern Mediterranean of the EU, as well
as the land-mined buffer zone constructed as a ceasefire line of a bloody war. This
is a ‘state of exception’ par excellence, yet, we cannot hide behind this
exceptionalism to avoid the processes of transformation that are taking place simply
because the very meaning of ‘borders’ is in a state of flux. The notion of ‘soft
borders’ forces upon us the urgency to re-conceptualise ‘national sovereignty’,
‘democracy’, ‘migration control’ and the nature of ‘policing’ these. This essay has
advanced the case that it is imperative for academics, researchers, experts and
policymakers in Cyprus (and further afield) to engage more seriously with the state
of the art debates around the issues discussed here in order to appreciate the
dialectic of transformation taking place on the island. In this sense we are required
to go beyond the terms of its ‘uniqueness’ in what is alleged to be yet another
‘Cypriot state of exception’,42 and embrace its actual comparability and universality
as a southern European state in the eastern Mediterranean region. In fact we can,
and indeed we should, begin to view the migration question in Cyprus over a much
larger time span, precisely because Cyprus is, by nature, a ‘border society’,43 or
even a ‘frontier society’. Moreover, the processes of Europeanisation of migration, integration, settlement and security as well as combating trafficking and the exploitation of vulnerable migrants requires that we begin to read texts in the light of rethinking the whole process of population transformation in Cyprus. Not only has the current immigration and integration model run its course, if it ever had any logic, but more importantly this ‘model’ has proved totally inadequate and requires urgent reform. In any case, the actual trends that are observable on closer analysis of the subject illustrate that we are already operating in a world and a region well beyond the old paradigm of migration being “the last bastion of state sovereignty”. As shown in the case of Cyprus, the notion of ‘soft border’ is a difficult issue of ‘management’ on an everyday level, given the Treaty of Accession and the Green Line Regulation which monitors this peculiar “soft border” of Cyprus.

The books reviewed open the possibility of rethinking the very nature of ‘borders’; they offer the potential to reconceptualise the policies regarding migration control via an outmoded and totally ineffective ‘border policing’ and unpack the securitisation of migration, whether in the form of xenophobic and alarmist public cries for stricter immigration control, or authoritarian state practices of populations deemed to ‘threaten national security’, or ‘public order’ or ‘cohesion’ society. Finally, the books on trafficking and exploitation of women in the ‘desire industries’ in Cyprus offer an insight that permit us to rethink the conceptualisation and policy responses that would properly combat these gross human rights and labour violations against women in Cyprus. Academics, researchers, NGOs and policymakers are faced with the challenge of locating Cyprus in its wider global and regional context: a rethinking of the directions conceptually, politically and practically is urgently required, if we are to make sense of a world and a country in a state of radical transformation.

Nicos Trimikliniotis

Notes
4. This is an illuminating remark by A.P. Cohen, quoted by Joan DeBardeleben in the introduction to the book (p. 4).
6. Agamben cites Fontana (1999, p. 16) as his source.
12. This is the division line of Cyprus, which is nothing more than a ceasefire line. When Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided island the EU decided to make this into a ‘soft border’ of the EU. See Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession (OJ L 161, 30 April 2004), at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=304R0866R(01].
18. This is routinely invoked in the public media in Cyprus. One MP, Angelos Votsis, referred to it on a television programme on Monday 24 October 2008 during CyBC’s programme «Το Συζήτημα». 


24. This was the question the journalist presenter Irini Charalambidou, who advertised the popular public television CyBC programme «Το Συζήτημα», put directly to the guests of the programme on Monday 24 October 2008.


26. The Report cites an Ombudsman report of 2007 regarding a case of an asylum seeker of Turkish origin, who was illegally arrested and detained when he applied to the police to submit his asylum application.

27. The announcement, which claimed that the key-note speaker would be the Chief of Police, prompted the public to attend the meeting en mass. There was a strong reaction by human rights and anti-racist NGOs and, following a live radio debate, the Chief of Police publicly disputed the allegation that he was going to address this meeting. Complaints were filed with the Cyprus Equality Body (Ombudsman) against the two organising NGOs for violation of the constitutional equality and anti-discrimination principle and for stirring up racial hatred contrary to the criminal code. A complaint was also filed with the Commission for Journalistic Ethics against the media outlets that publicised the announcement for circulating racist material. No action was taken by the prosecution authorities against the organisers for dissemination of racist material.

28. The English translations of the two Greek titles are: Εμπόριο Γυναικών στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία [Trafficking of Women in the Republic of Cyprus] and Εμπόριο Κοριτσιών: Η Διακίνηση Νεαρών Γυναικών Από και Προς την Κύπρο και η Εξώθηση τους στη Πορνεία [Trafficking of Girls: Trafficking of Young Women from and to Cyprus and forcing them into Prostitution].


35. This is a project carried out by the Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS – www.medinstgenderstudies.org). The main aim of the project was to gain and share awareness, knowledge and understanding on the phenomenon of trafficking in women in Cyprus for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The research was carried out using a gender sensitive, feminist perspective with the objective to: a) map and assess existing data on the extent of trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in Cyprus; b) outline state and non-governmental responses to the problem; and c) suggest ways to combat this increasingly widespread phenomenon. The full report is available online at [http://www.medinstgenderstudies.org/wp/?p=322].


37. The term denotes the act of a woman who drinks with and ‘entertains’ a client who is charged with a sum equal to several times the value of the drinks they actually consume together.


39. The text was originally written in German as a Masters dissertation in Cultural anthropology and Ethnology for the University of Johann Wolfgang Goethe of Frankfurt, and later translated into Greek.

40. More recently the number of these agents rose to several hundred, with many operating illegally without permits.

41. The exact number is not clear from the book.


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